STATEMENT BY DAVID
KAY ON THE INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE IRAQ SURVEY
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
October 2, 2003
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this opportunity to discuss with
the Committee the progress that the Iraq Survey Group has made in its
initial three months of its investigation into Iraq's Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) programs.
I cannot emphasize too strongly that the Interim Progress Report, which
has been made available to you, is a snapshot, in the context of an
on-going investigation, of where we are after our first three months
of work. The report does not represent a final reckoning of Iraq's WMD
programs, nor are we at the point where we are prepared to close the
file on any of these programs. While solid progress - I would say even
remarkable progress considering the conditions that the ISG has had
to work under - has been made in this initial period of operations,
much remains to be done. We are still very much in the collection and
analysis mode, still seeking the information and evidence that will
allow us to confidently draw comprehensive conclusions to the actual
objectives, scope, and dimensions of Iraq's WMD activities at the time
of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Iraq's WMD programs spanned more than two
decades, involved thousands of people, billions of dollars, and were
elaborately shielded by security and deception operations that continued
even beyond the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The very scale of this
program when coupled with the conditions in Iraq that have prevailed
since the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom dictate the speed at which
we can move to a comprehensive understanding of Iraq's WMD activities.
We need to recall that in the 1991-2003 period the intelligence community
and the UN/IAEA inspectors had to draw conclusions as to the status
of Iraq's WMD program in the face of incomplete, and often false, data
supplied by Iraq or data collected either by UN/IAEA inspectors operating
within the severe constraints that Iraqi security and deception actions
imposed or by national intelligence collection systems with their own
inherent limitations. The result was that our understanding of the status
of Iraq's WMD program was always bounded by large uncertainties and
had to be heavily caveated. With the regime of Saddam Husayn at an end,
ISG has the opportunity for the first time of drawing together all the
evidence that can still be found in Iraq - much evidence is irretrievably
lost - to reach definitive conclusions concerning the true state of
Iraq's WMD program. It is far too early to reach any definitive conclusions
and, in some areas, we may never reach that goal. The unique nature
of this opportunity, however, requires that we take great care to ensure
that the conclusions we draw reflect the truth to the maximum extent
possible given the conditions in post-conflict Iraq.
We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not
yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapon
stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our only
task is to find where they have gone. We are actively engaged in searching
for such weapons based on information being supplied to us by Iraqis.
Why are we having such difficulty in finding weapons or in reaching
a confident conclusion that they do not exist or that they once existed
but have been removed? Our search efforts are being hindered by six
- From birth all of Iraq's WMD activities were highly compartmentalized
within a regime that ruled and kept its secrets through fear and terror
and with deception and denial built into each program;
- Deliberate dispersal and destruction of material and documentation
related to weapons programs began pre-conflict and ran trans-to-post
- Post-OIF looting destroyed or dispersed important and easily collectable
material and forensic evidence concerning Iraq's WMD program. As the
report covers in detail, significant elements of this looting were
carried out in a systematic and deliberate manner, with the clear
aim of concealing pre-OIF activities of Saddam's regime;
- Some WMD personnel crossed borders in the pre/trans conflict period
and may have taken evidence and even weapons-related materials with
- Any actual WMD weapons or material is likely to be small in relation
to the total conventional armaments footprint and difficult to near
impossible to identify with normal search procedures. It is important
to keep in mind that even the bulkiest materials we are searching
for, in the quantities we would expect to find, can be concealed in
spaces not much larger than a two car garage;
- The environment in Iraq remains far from permissive for our activities,
with many Iraqis that we talk to reporting threats and overt acts
of intimidation and our own personnel being the subject of threats
and attacks. In September alone we have had three attacks on ISG facilities
or teams: The ISG base in Irbil was bombed and four staff injured,
two very seriously; a two person team had their vehicle blocked by
gunmen and only escaped by firing back through their own windshield;
and on Wednesday, 24 September, the ISG Headquarters in Baghdad again
was subject to mortar attack.
Vials: A total of 97 vials-including those with
labels consistent with the al Hakam cover stories of single-cell
protein and biopesticides, as well as strains that could be used
to produce BW agents-were recovered from a scientist's residence.
Lab Equipment From Mosque.
Burned Documents Found at SAAD Center: An exploitation
team on a recent mission to the SAAD Center, part of the Baghdad
New Nuclear Design Center, found massive looting and the remnants
of deliberately destroyed documents. Other documents were left
untouched, however, and recovered by the team
Storage room in basement of Revolutionary Command
Council Headquarters. Burned frames of PC workstations visible
on shelves. All rooms sharing walls with this storage room were
untouched from fire or battle damage.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The basement historical
files were systematically selected and destroyed.
What have we found and what have we not found in the first 3 months
of our work?
We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant
amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during
the inspections that began in late 2002. The discovery of these deliberate
concealment efforts have come about both through the admissions of Iraqi
scientists and officials concerning information they deliberately withheld
and through physical evidence of equipment and activities that ISG has
discovered that should have been declared to the UN. Let me just give
you a few examples of these concealment efforts, some of which I will
elaborate on later:
- A clandestine network of laboratories and safehouses within the
Iraqi Intelligence Service that contained equipment subject to UN
monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research.
- A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of
BW agents, that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections
were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN.
- Reference strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientist's
home, one of which can be used to produce biological weapons.
- New research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean
Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin
were not declared to the UN.
- Documents and equipment, hidden in scientists' homes, that would
have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment by centrifuge and
electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS).
- A line of UAVs not fully declared at an undeclared production facility
and an admission that they had tested one of their declared UAVs out
to a range of 500 km, 350 km beyond the permissible limit.
- Continuing covert capability to manufacture fuel propellant useful
only for prohibited SCUD variant missiles, a capability that was maintained
at least until the end of 2001 and that cooperating Iraqi scientists
have said they were told to conceal from the UN.
- Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with
ranges up to at least 1000 km - well beyond the 150 km range limit
imposed by the UN. Missiles of a 1000 km range would have allowed
Iraq to threaten targets through out the Middle East, including Ankara,
Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.
- Clandestine attempts between late-1999 and 2002 to obtain from
North Korea technology related to 1,300 km range ballistic missiles
--probably the No Dong -- 300 km range anti-ship cruise missiles,
and other prohibited military equipment.
In addition to the discovery of extensive concealment efforts, we have
been faced with a systematic sanitization of documentary and computer
evidence in a wide range of offices, laboratories, and companies suspected
of WMD work. The pattern of these efforts to erase evidence - hard drives
destroyed, specific files burned, equipment cleaned of all traces of
use - are ones of deliberate, rather than random, acts. For example,
- On 10 July 2003 an ISG team exploited the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC) Headquarters in Baghdad. The basement of the main building
contained an archive of documents situated on well-organized rows
of metal shelving. The basement suffered no fire damage despite the
total destruction of the upper floors from coalition air strikes.
Upon arrival the exploitation team encountered small piles of ash
where individual documents or binders of documents were intentionally
destroyed. Computer hard drives had been deliberately destroyed. Computers
would have had financial value to a random looter; their destruction,
rather than removal for resale or reuse, indicates a targeted effort
to prevent Coalition forces from gaining access to their contents.
- All IIS laboratories visited by IIS exploitation teams have been
clearly sanitized, including removal of much equipment, shredding
and burning of documents, and even the removal of nameplates from
- Although much of the deliberate destruction and sanitization of
documents and records probably occurred during the height of OIF combat
operations, indications of significant continuing destruction efforts
have been found after the end of major combat operations, including
entry in May 2003 of the locked gated vaults of the Ba'ath party intelligence
building in Baghdad and highly selective destruction of computer hard
drives and data storage equipment along with the burning of a small
number of specific binders that appear to have contained financial
and intelligence records, and in July 2003 a site exploitation team
at the Abu Ghurayb Prison found one pile of the smoldering ashes from
documents that was still warm to the touch.
I would now like to review our efforts in each of the major lines of
enquiry that ISG has pursued during this initial phase of its work.
With regard to biological warfare activities, which has been
one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are uncovering significant
information - including research and development of BW-applicable organisms,
the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities,
and deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests Iraq after
1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining
smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge
the production of BW agents.
Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to unravel
a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security
service apparatus. This network was never declared to the UN and was
previously unknown. We are still working on determining the extent to
which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror
weapons, but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving
BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D - all key
elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production. The
IIS also played a prominent role in sponsoring students for overseas
graduate studies in the biological sciences, according to Iraqi scientists
and IIS sources, providing an important avenue for furthering BW-applicable
research. This was the only area of graduate work that the IIS appeared
Discussions with Iraqi scientists uncovered agent R&D work that
paired overt work with nonpathogenic organisms serving as surrogates
for prohibited investigation with pathogenic agents. Examples include:
B. Thurengiensis (Bt) with B. anthracis (anthrax), and
medicinal plants with ricin. In a similar vein, two key former BW scientists,
confirmed that Iraq under the guise of legitimate activity developed
refinements of processes and products relevant to BW agents. The scientists
discussed the development of improved, simplified fermentation and spray
drying capabilities for the simulant Bt that would have been directly
applicable to anthrax, and one scientist confirmed that the production
line for Bt could be switched to produce anthrax in one week if the
seed stock were available.
A very large body of information has been developed through debriefings,
site visits, and exploitation of captured Iraqi documents that confirms
that Iraq concealed equipment and materials from UN inspectors when
they returned in 2002. One noteworthy example is a collection of reference
strains that ought to have been declared to the UN. Among them was a
vial of live C. botulinum Okra B. from which a biological agent can
be produced. This discovery - hidden in the home of a BW scientist -
illustrates the point I made earlier about the difficulty of locating
small stocks of material that can be used to covertly surge production
of deadly weapons. The scientist who concealed the vials containing
this agent has identified a large cache of agents that he was asked,
but refused, to conceal. ISG is actively searching for this second cache.
Additional information is beginning to corroborate reporting since
1996 about human testing activities using chemical and biological substances,
but progress in this area is slow given the concern of knowledgeable
Iraqi personnel about their being prosecuted for crimes against humanity.
We have not yet been able to corroborate the existence of a mobile
BW production effort. Investigation into the origin of and intended
use for the two trailers found in northern Iraq in April has yielded
a number of explanations, including hydrogen, missile propellant, and
BW production, but technical limitations would prevent any of these
processes from being ideally suited to these trailers. That said, nothing
we have discovered rules out their potential use in BW production.
We have made significant progress in identifying and locating individuals
who were reportedly involved in a mobile program, and we are confident
that we will be able to get an answer to the questions as to whether
there was a mobile program and whether the trailers that have been discovered
so far were part of such a program.
Let me turn now to chemical weapons (CW). In searching for retained
stocks of chemical munitions, ISG has had to contend with the almost
unbelievable scale of Iraq's conventional weapons armory, which dwarfs
by orders of magnitude the physical size of any conceivable stock of
chemical weapons. For example, there are approximately 130 known Iraqi
Ammunition Storage Points (ASP), many of which exceed 50 square miles
in size and hold an estimated 600,000 tons of artillery shells, rockets,
aviation bombs and other ordinance. Of these 130 ASPs, approximately
120 still remain unexamined. As Iraqi practice was not to mark much
of their chemical ordinance and to store it at the same ASPs that held
conventional rounds, the size of the required search effort is enormous.
While searching for retained weapons, ISG teams have developed multiple
sources that indicate that Iraq explored the possibility of CW production
in recent years, possibly as late as 2003. When Saddam had asked a senior
military official in either 2001 or 2002 how long it would take to produce
new chemical agent and weapons, he told ISG that after he consulted
with CW experts in OMI he responded it would take six months for mustard.
Another senior Iraqi chemical weapons expert in responding to a request
in mid-2002 from Uday Husayn for CW for the Fedayeen Saddam estimated
that it would take two months to produce mustard and two years for Sarin.
We are starting to survey parts of Iraq's chemical industry to determine
if suitable equipment and bulk chemicals were available for chemical
weapons production. We have been struck that two senior Iraqi officials
volunteered that if they had been ordered to resume CW production Iraq
would have been willing to use stainless steel systems that would be
disposed of after a few production runs, in place of corrosive-resistant
equipment which they did not have.
We continue to follow leads on Iraq's acquisition of equipment and
bulk precursors suitable for a CW program. Several possibilities have
emerged and are now being exploited. One example involves a foreign
company with offices in Baghdad, that imported in the past into Iraq
dual-use equipment and maintained active contracts through 2002. Its
Baghdad office was found looted in August 2003, but we are pursuing
other locations and associates of the company.
Information obtained since OIF has identified several key areas in
which Iraq may have engaged in proscribed or undeclared activity since
1991, including research on a possible VX stabilizer, research and development
for CW-capable munitions, and procurement/concealment of dual-use materials
Multiple sources with varied access and reliability have told ISG that
Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled CW program
after 1991. Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale
capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced
- if not entirely destroyed - during Operations Desert Storm and Desert
Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and UN inspections. We are carefully examining
dual-use, commercial chemical facilities to determine whether these
were used or planned as alternative production sites.
We have also acquired information related to Iraq's CW doctrine and
Iraq's war plans for OIF, but we have not yet found evidence to confirm
pre-war reporting that Iraqi military units were prepared to use CW
against Coalition forces. Our efforts to collect and exploit intelligence
on Iraq's chemical weapons program have thus far yielded little reliable
information on post-1991 CW stocks and CW agent production, although
we continue to receive and follow leads related to such stocks. We have
multiple reports that Iraq retained CW munitions made prior to 1991,
possibly including mustard - a long-lasting chemical agent - but we
have to date been unable to locate any such munitions.
With regard to Iraq's nuclear program, the testimony we have
obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government officials should
clear up any doubts about whether Saddam still wanted to obtain nuclear
weapons. They have told ISG that Saddam Husayn remained firmly committed
to acquiring nuclear weapons. These officials assert that Saddam would
have resumed nuclear weapons development at some future point. Some
indicated a resumption after Iraq was free of sanctions. At least one
senior Iraqi official believed that by 2000 Saddam had run out of patience
with waiting for sanctions to end and wanted to restart the nuclear
program. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) beginning around
1999 expanded its laboratories and research activities and increased
its overall funding levels. This expansion may have been in initial
preparation for renewed nuclear weapons research, although documentary
evidence of this has not been found, and this is the subject of continuing
investigation by ISG.
Starting around 2000, the senior Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC)
and high-level Ba'ath Party official Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id began
several small and relatively unsophisticated research initiatives that
could be applied to nuclear weapons development. These initiatives did
not in-and-of themselves constitute a resumption of the nuclear weapons
program, but could have been useful in developing a weapons-relevant
science base for the long-term. We do not yet have information indicating
whether a higher government authority directed Sa'id to initiate this
research and, regretfully, Dr. Said was killed on April 8th during the
fall of Baghdad when the car he was riding in attempted to run a Coalition
Despite evidence of Saddam's continued ambition to acquire nuclear
weapons, to date we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook
significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce
fissile material. However, Iraq did take steps to preserve some technological
capability from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program.
- According to documents and testimony of Iraqi scientists, some
of the key technical groups from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program
remained largely intact, performing work on nuclear-relevant dual-use
technologies within the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). Some
scientists from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program have told ISG
that they believed that these working groups were preserved in order
to allow a reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program, but none
of the scientists could produce official orders or plans to support
- In some cases, these groups performed work which could help preserve
the science base and core skills that would be needed for any future
fissile material production or nuclear weapons development.
- Several scientists - at the direction of senior Iraqi government
officials - preserved documents and equipment from their pre-1991
nuclear weapon-related research and did not reveal this to the UN/IAEA.
One Iraqi scientist recently stated in an interview with ISG that
it was a "common understanding" among the scientists that
material was being preserved for reconstitution of nuclear weapons-related
The ISG nuclear team has found indications that there was interest,
beginning in 2002, in reconstituting a centrifuge enrichment program.
Most of this activity centered on activities of Dr. Sa'id that caused
some of his former colleagues in the pre-1991 nuclear program to suspect
that Dr. Sa'id, at least, was considering a restart of the centrifuge
program. We do not yet fully understand Iraqi intentions, and the evidence
does not tie any activity directly to centrifuge research or development.
Exploitation of additional documents may shed light on the projects
and program plans of Dr. Khalid Ibrahim Sa'id. There may be more projects
to be discovered in research placed at universities and private companies.
Iraqi interest in reconstitution of a uranium enrichment program needs
to be better understood through the analysis of procurement records
and additional interviews.
With regard to delivery systems, the ISG team has discovered
sufficient evidence to date to conclude that the Iraqi regime was committed
to delivery system improvements that would have, if OIF had not occurred,
dramatically breached UN restrictions placed on Iraq after the 1991
Detainees and co-operative sources indicate that beginning in 2000
Saddam ordered the development of ballistic missiles with ranges of
at least 400km and up to 1000km and that measures to conceal these projects
from UNMOVIC were initiated in late-2002, ahead of the arrival of inspectors.
Work was also underway for a clustered engine liquid propellant missile,
and it appears the work had progressed to a point to support initial
prototype production of some parts and assemblies. According to a cooperating
senior detainee, Saddam concluded that the proposals from both the liquid-propellant
and solid-propellant missile design centers would take too long. For
instance, the liquid-propellant missile project team forecast first
delivery in six years. Saddam countered in 2000 that he wanted the missile
designed and built inside of six months. On the other hand several sources
contend that Saddam's range requirements for the missiles grew from
400-500km in 2000 to 600-1000km in 2002.
ISG has gathered testimony from missile designers at Al Kindi State
Company that Iraq has reinitiated work on converting SA-2 Surface-to-Air
Missiles into ballistic missiles with a range goal of about 250km. Engineering
work was reportedly underway in early 2003, despite the presence of
UNMOVIC. This program was not declared to the UN. ISG is presently seeking
additional confirmation and details on this project. A second cooperative
source has stated that the program actually began in 2001, but that
it received added impetus in the run-up to OIF, and that missiles from
this project were transferred to a facility north of Baghdad. This source
also provided documentary evidence of instructions to convert SA-2s
into surface-to-surface missiles.
ISG has obtained testimony from both detainees and cooperative sources
that indicate that proscribed-range solid-propellant missile design
studies were initiated, or already underway, at the time when work on
the clustered liquid-propellant missile designs began. The motor diameter
was to be 800 to 1000mm, i.e. much greater than the 500-mm Ababil-100.
The range goals cited for this system vary from over 400km up to 1000km,
depending on the source and the payload mass.
A cooperative source, involved in the 2001-2002 deliberations on the
long-range solid propellant project, provided ISG with a set of concept
designs for a launcher designed to accommodate a 1m diameter by 9m length
missile. The limited detail in the drawings suggest there was some way
to go before launcher fabrication. The source believes that these drawings
would not have been requested until the missile progress was relatively
advanced, normally beyond the design state. The drawing are in CAD format,
with files dated 09/01/02.
While we have obtained enough information to make us confident that
this design effort was underway, we are not yet confident which accounts
of the timeline and project progress are accurate and are now seeking
to better understand this program and its actual progress at the time
One cooperative source has said that he suspected that the new large-diameter
solid-propellant missile was intended to have a CW-filled warhead, but
no detainee has admitted any actual knowledge of plans for unconventional
warheads for any current or planned ballistic missile. The suspicion
expressed by the one source about a CW warhead was based on his assessment
of the unavailability of nuclear warheads and potential survivability
problems of biological warfare agent in ballistic missile warheads.
This is an area of great interest and we are seeking additional information
on warhead designs.
While I have spoken so far of planned missile systems, one high-level
detainee has recently claimed that Iraq retained a small quantity of
Scud-variant missiles until at least 2001, although he subsequently
recanted these claims, work continues to determine the truth. Two other
sources contend that Iraq continued to produce until 2001 liquid fuel
and oxidizer specific to Scud-type systems. The cooperating source claims
that the al Tariq Factory was used to manufacture Scud oxidizer (IRFNA)
from 1996 to 2001, and that nitrogen tetroxide, a chief ingredient of
IRFNA was collected from a bleed port on the production equipment, was
reserved, and then mixed with highly concentrated nitric acid plus an
inhibitor to produce Scud oxidizer. Iraq never declared its pre-Gulf
War capability to manufacture Scud IRFNA out of fear, multiple sources
have stated, that the al Tariq Factory would be destroyed, leaving Baghdad
without the ability to produce highly concentrated nitric acid, explosives
and munitions. To date we have not discovered documentary or material
evidence to corroborate these claims, but continued efforts are underway
to clarify and confirm this information with additional Iraqi sources
and to locate corroborating physical evidence. If we can confirm that
the fuel was produced as late as 2001, and given that Scud fuel can
only be used in Scud-variant missiles, we will have strong evidence
that the missiles must have been retained until that date. This would,
of course, be yet another example of a failure to declare prohibited
activities to the UN.
Iraq was continuing to develop a variety of UAV platforms and maintained
two UAV programs that were working in parallel, one at Ibn Fernas and
one at al-Rashid Air Force Base. Ibn Fernas worked on the development
of smaller, more traditional types of UAVs in addition to the conversion
of manned aircraft into UAVs. This program was not declared to the UN
until the 2002 CAFCD in which Iraq declared the RPV-20, RPV-30 and Pigeon
RPV systems to the UN. All these systems had declared ranges of less
than 150km. Several Iraqi officials stated that the RPV-20 flew over
500km on autopilot in 2002, contradicting Iraq's declaration on the
system's range. The al-Rashid group was developing a competing line
of UAVs. This program was never fully declared to the UN and is the
subject of on-going work by ISG. Additional work is also focusing on
the payloads and intended use for these UAVs. Surveillance and use as
decoys are uses mentioned by some of those interviewed. Given Iraq's
interest before the Gulf War in attempting to convert a MIG-21 into
an unmanned aerial vehicle to carry spray tanks capable of dispensing
chemical or biological agents, attention is being paid to whether any
of the newer generation of UAVs were intended to have a similar purpose.
This remains an open question.
ISG has discovered evidence of two primary cruise missile programs.
The first appears to have been successfully implemented, whereas the
second had not yet reached maturity at the time of OIF.
The first involved upgrades to the HY-2 coastal-defense cruise missile.
ISG has developed multiple sources of testimony, which is corroborated
in part by a captured document, that Iraq undertook a program aimed
at increasing the HY-2's range and permitting its use as a land-attack
missile. These efforts extended the HY-2's range from its original 100km
to 150-180km. Ten modified missiles were delivered to the military prior
to OIF and two of these were fired from Umm Qasr during OIF - one was
shot down and one hit Kuwait.
The second program, called the Jenin, was a much more ambitious effort
to convert the HY-2 into a 1000km range land-attack cruise missile.
The Jenin concept was presented to Saddam on 23 November 2001 and received
what cooperative sources called an "unusually quick response"
in little more than a week. The essence of the concept was to take an
HY-2, strip it of its liquid rocket engine, and put in its place a turbine
engine from a Russian helicopter - the TV-2-117 or TV3-117 from a Mi-8
or Mi-17helicopter. To prevent discovery by the UN, Iraq halted engine
development and testing and disassembled the test stand in late 2002
before the design criteria had been met.
In addition to the activities detailed here on Iraq's attempts to develop
delivery systems beyond the permitted UN 150km, ISG has also developed
information on Iraqi attempts to purchase proscribed missiles and missile
technology. Documents found by ISG describe a high level dialogue between
Iraq and North Korea that began in December 1999 and included an October
2000 meeting in Baghdad. These documents indicate Iraqi interest in
the transfer of technology for surface-to-surface missiles with a range
of 1300km (probably No Dong) and land-to-sea missiles with a range of
300km. The document quotes the North Koreans as understanding the limitations
imposed by the UN, but being prepared "to cooperate with Iraq on
the items it specified". At the time of OIF, these discussions
had not led to any missiles being transferred to Iraq. A high level
cooperating source has reported that in late 2002 at Saddam's behest
a delegation of Iraqi officials was sent to meet with foreign export
companies, including one that dealt with missiles. Iraq was interested
in buying an advanced ballistic missile with 270km and 500km ranges.
The ISG has also identified a large volume of material and testimony
by cooperating Iraq officials on Iraq's effort to illicitly procure
parts and foreign assistance for its missile program. These include:
- Significant level of assistance from a foreign company and its
network of affiliates in supplying and supporting the development
of production capabilities for solid rocket propellant and dual-use
- Entities from another foreign country were involved in supplying
guidance and control systems for use in the Al-Fat'h (Ababil-100).
The contract was incomplete by the time of OIF due to technical problems
with the few systems delivered and a financial dispute.
- A group of foreign experts operating in a private capacity were
helping to develop Iraq's liquid propellant ballistic missile RDT&E
and production infrastructure. They worked in Baghdad for about three
months in late 1998 and subsequently continued work on the project
from abroad. An actual contract valued at $10 million for machinery
and equipment was signed in June 2001, initially for 18 months, but
later extended. This cooperation continued right up until the war.
- A different group of foreign experts traveled to Iraq in 1999 to
conduct a technical review that resulted in what became the Al Samoud
2 design, and a contract was signed in 2001 for the provision of rigs,
fixtures and control equipment for the redesigned missile.
- Detainees and cooperative sources have described the role of a
foreign expert in negotiations on the development of Iraq's liquid
and solid propellant production infrastructure. This could have had
applications in existing and planned longer range systems, although
it is reported that nothing had actually been implemented before OIF.
Uncertainty remains about the full extent of foreign assistance to
Iraq's planned expansion of its missile systems and work is continuing
to gain a full resolution of this issue. However, there is little doubt
from the evidence already gathered that there was substantial illegal
procurement for all aspects of the missile programs.
I have covered a lot of ground today, much of it highly technical.
Although we are resisting drawing conclusions in this first interim
report, a number of things have become clearer already as a result of
our investigation, among them:
- Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other insiders
who worked in his military-industrial programs, had not given up his
aspirations and intentions to continue to acquire weapons of mass
destruction. Even those senior officials we have interviewed who claim
no direct knowledge of any on-going prohibited activities readily
acknowledge that Saddam intended to resume these programs whenever
the external restrictions were removed. Several of these officials
acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from Saddam or his sons
about how long it would take to either restart CW production or make
available chemical weapons.
- In the delivery systems area there were already well advanced,
but undeclared, on-going activities that, if OIF had not intervened,
would have resulted in the production of missiles with ranges at least
up to 1000 km, well in excess of the UN permitted range of 150 km.
These missile activities were supported by a serious clandestine procurement
program about which we have much still to learn.
- In the chemical and biological weapons area we have confidence
that there were at a minimum clandestine on-going research and development
activities that were embedded in the Iraqi Intelligence Service. While
we have much yet to learn about the exact work programs and capabilities
of these activities, it is already apparent that these undeclared
activities would have at a minimum facilitated chemical and biological
weapons activities and provided a technically trained cadre.
Let me conclude by returning to something I began with today. We face
a unique but challenging opportunity in our efforts to unravel the exact
status of Iraq's WMD program. The good news is that we do not have to
rely for the first time in over a decade on
- the incomplete, and often false, data that Iraq supplied the UN/IAEA;
- data collected by UN inspectors operating with the severe constraints
that Iraqi security and deception actions imposed;
- information supplied by defectors, some of whom certainly fabricated
much that they supplied and perhaps were under the direct control
of the IIS;
- data collected by national technical collections systems with their
The bad news is that we have to do this under conditions that ensure
that our work will take time and impose serious physical dangers on
those who are asked to carry it out.
Why should we take the time and run the risk to ensure that our conclusions
reflect the truth to the maximum extent that is possible given the conditions
in post-conflict Iraq? For those of us that are carrying out this search,
there are two reasons that drive us to want to complete this effort.
First, whatever we find will probably differ from pre-war intelligence.
Empirical reality on the ground is, and has always been, different from
intelligence judgments that must be made under serious constraints of
time, distance and information. It is, however, only by understanding
precisely what those difference are that the quality of future intelligence
and investment decisions concerning future intelligence systems can
be improved. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is such a
continuing threat to global society that learning those lessons has
a high imperative.
Second, we have found people, technical information and illicit procurement
networks that if allowed to flow to other countries and regions could
accelerate global proliferation. Even in the area of actual weapons
there is no doubt that Iraq had at one time chemical and biological
weapons. Even if there were only a remote possibility that these pre-1991
weapons still exist, we have an obligation to American troops who are
now there and the Iraqi population to ensure that none of these remain
to be used against them in the ongoing insurgency activity.
Mr. Chairman and Members I appreciate this opportunity to share with
you the initial results of the first 3 months of the activities of the
Iraqi Survey Group. I am certain that I speak for Major General Keith
Dayton, who commands the Iraqi Survey Group, when I say how proud we
are of the men and women from across the Government and from our Coalition
partners, Australia and the United Kingdom, who have gone to Iraq and
are carrying out this important mission.