Detailed Information on the
National Nuclear Security Administration: Global Threat Reduction Initiative Program Assessment

Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is updating and streamlining GTRI performance measures to be reported in the initial FY2010 OMB Budget to more appropriately reflect the Convert, Remove, and Protect subprogram structure.

The GTRI program is aggressively working to implement a direct contract vehicle to capture cost savings and improve program efficiencies.

The GTRI program will complete a scoping analysis so that clear, endpoint targets can be implemented and tracked.

Integrate several existing stand alone management systems into one project management information system to reduce data redundancy and increase data integrity and reporting efficiency.

Measure: Cumulative number of HEU reactors converted or shut down.

Explanation:By 2018, convert to LEU 129 Heu reactors.

Measure: Cumulative kilograms of nuclear material (HEU and plutonium) removed or disposed.

Explanation:By 2015, remove or dispose of 4.917 kilograms of nuclear material (HEU and plutonium) from civilian sites.

Measure: Cumulative number of excess radioactive sources and radioisotopic thermoelectric generators (RTGs) removed or disposed.

Explanation:By 20XX, remove {XXXX} excess rediological sources and RTGs.

Measure: Cumulative number of builidings with high priority nuclear and radiological materials secured.

Explanation:By 20XX, protect [XXXX] buildings with high priority nuclear and radiological materials.

Measure: Cumulative number of buildings with all nuclear material removed, thus avoiding the need for expensive security upgrades and long-term sustainability.

Explanation:By 20XX, remove all nuclear material from XXXX buildings.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has a clear purpose -- to reduce the risk of terrorists acquiring the nuclear and radiological materials for a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) by working at civil sites worldwide to convert reactors from operating on WMD-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuels to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels, to remove or dispose of excess WMD-usable nuclear and radioliogical materials, and to protect at-risk WMD-usable nuclear and radiological materials from theft until a more permanent threat reduction solution can be implemented.

Evidence: GTRI FY06 Budget; GTRI FY07 Budget Request; NNSA Strategic Plan.

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: GTRI reduces the threat that nuclear and radiological materials will be obtained and used by terrorists in an improvised nuclear device or radiological dirty bomb against the United States and the international community. President Bush stated that "the greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with ... radiological or nuclear weapons" and "America and the entire civilized world will face this threat for decades to come." Additionally, the "National Security Strategy of the United States of America" emphasizes threat reduction and controls of nuclear materials, and it identifies GTRI as a key element in preventing nuclear and radiological materials from being acquired and used by terrorists.

Evidence: GTRI FY06 Budget; GTRI FY07 Budget Request; NNSA Strategic Plan; Bush speech at National Defense University (2/04); National Security Strategy (3/06).

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: GTRI is unique from other efforts because (1) it minimizes and, to the extent possible, eliminates the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civil nuclear applications by converting reactors from HEU to LEU fuel; (2) it removes and disposes of WMD-usable HEU and plutonium from civil sites in foreign countries, and (3) it protects or recovers high-risk WMD-usable radiological materials. While NNSA's Material Protection Control & Accounting Program addresses securing Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-usable material sites, GTRI addresses civil nuclear applications around the world. GTRI is the only DOE/NNSA program that addresses converting reactors, removing/disposing of WMD-usable nuclear material at civil sites, and securing/recovering radiological materials in the United States and around the world.

Evidence: NNSA Strategic Plan; Secretary Abraham's May 26, 2004 Speech before the IAEA; NNSA PPBE process.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: GTRI design is free of flaws that would limit its effectiveness and efficiency because it has implemented strategic review recommendations to better integrate and unify program/project management, personnel training, performance measures and office structure to best meet evolving threat reduction requirements. A solid program concept has been developed and approved by DOE and NNSA. All activities and the schedule for their accomplishment are implemented through an integrated plan whose milestones and deliverables are monitored through monthly reviews and reporting mechanisms. Risk analyses have been accomplished and mitigation efforts identified and implemented to ensure success. In fact, GTRI was created in 2004 in order to fix a major design flaw that existed because the programs to convert reactors, and remove/protect materials at civil sites were spread throughout DOE and could not maximize and leverage resources. GTRI fixed this flaw by consolidating all of these related programs in one office to maximize synergies between the programs.

Evidence: GTRI FY06 Budget; GTRI FY07 Budget Request; NNSA PPBE process; Secretary Abraham's May 26, 2004 Speech before the IAEA.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: GTRI's resources are effectively targeted to reach the intended beneficiaries and achieve the program's purpose. GTRI's methods for targeting resources are important because they ensure that the most attractive, high risk nuclear and radiological materials are addressed first and secured to the appropriate levels of protection. GTRI resources are focused on permanent threat reduction (e.g. minimizing civil use of HEU by converting reactors from HEU to LEU fuels and removing excess HEU). Direct contracting with the private sector is important because it provides the most efficient method of rapidly implementing the program's nuclear and radiological threat reduction mission/goals. This is because private firms can use their existing commercial fuel cycle facilities to quickly and efficiently remove and downblend the HEU and radiological materials.

Evidence: NNSA Strategic Planning Guidance (2005-2009) (pp. 15-16); National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (pp. 2-6); Basic Ordering Agreements; Statements of Work; Annual Program Reviews; Program/Project Work Plans; NNSA PPBE process; RTR Draft Prioritization Plan; "Global Materials Removal and Research Reactor Security Study"; GTRI Town Hall Meeting booklet dated February 9, 2006.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: GTRI has a limited number of specific long-term measures to meaningfully assess progress in achieving its program purpose. They are: (1) by 2017, convert or verify shutdown of 118 of 189 civilian HEU reactors that the IAEA has identifed (goal is 118 because LEU fuel exists or is being developed for 118 reactors and fuel development costs may prohibit additional conversions); (2) by 2019, remove and dispose of 6,269 kgs of excess WMD-usable nuclear material at civil sites (enough for 210 nuclear weapons); (3) by 2021, remove 31,500 excess U.S. radiological sources totalling ~916,000 curies (enough for 916 radiological dirty bombs); 5) by 2020, protect high priority radiological material at 1,500 civil sites totalling ~50,000,000 curies (enough for 50,000 radiological dirty bombs); and (6) by 2007, place a direct contract with private industry for new threat reduction services that will save at least $4M in laboratory costs over the life of the 5-year contract when compared to the cost if the work was sub-contracted to private industry through the labs.

Evidence: GTRI FY06 Budget; GTRI FY07 Budget Request; NNSA PPBE process; PPBS.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: GTRI targets and timeframes listed in Q2.1 are ambitious. This is because of technical and political challenges, unexpected opportunities caused by global events, the voluntary nature of international participation in program activities, the unprecedented task of repatriating HEU to Russia, the technological challenge of developing new high-density LEU fuels, and the sensitivities of encouraging private operators to convert research reactors to LEU fuels. However, these targets and timeframes remain realistic and achievable as the program maintains a detailed project-by-project lifecycle plan that these schedules are based on and the program is developing strategies to streamline and accelerate activities to fully achieve all program threat reduction long-term goals on-time. Firm commitments are contained in the Bratislava Presidential Agreement.

Evidence: GTRI FY06 Budget; GTRI FY07 Budget Request; NNSA PPBE process; PPBS; Secretarial speeches denoting acceleration of GTRI including GTRI International Partners' Conference Opening Keynote Address (9/04).

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: GTRI has a limited number of specific annual measures that meaningfully demonstrate progress in achieving the program's long-term measures. For FY 2008, they are: (1) convert or verify shutdown a cumulative 61 civilian HEU reactors; (2) remove and dispose of a cumulative 2,288 kgs of excess WMD-usable nuclear material from civil sites (enough for 82.5 nuclear weapons); (3) remove a cumulative 341,000 curies of excess radiological sources (enough for 341 radiological dirty bombs); (4) protect a cumulative 19,429,000 curies of radiological material at civil sites (enough for 19,429 radiological dirty bombs); and (5) save a cumulative of $0.8M in laboratory overhead costs from new direct contract.

Evidence: GTRI FY06 Budget; GTRI FY07 Budget Request; NNSA PPBE process; PPBS.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: GTRI has detailed ambitious annual milestones and deliverables documented in project work plans, statements of work, and annual operating plans to monitor progress toward achieving annual measures. For example, GTRI has a list of specific targeted reactors for conversion to LEU under the reactor conversion program. The program uses this list to develop the work plans to reach the FY 2008 target of a cumulative total of 61 research reactors converted. In addition, GTRI knows how many kgs of Russian-origin HEU fresh fuel and U.S.- and Russian-origin spent nuclear fuel assemblies will be returned to the United States in FY 2008.

Evidence: Program/Project Work Plans; Statements of Work; GTRI FY06 Budget; GTRI FY07 Budget Request.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: GTRI federal personnel and the M&O/private sector contractors work together to establish aggressive project budgets and milestones to achieve baseline deliverables. Performance targets are incorporated into the individual performance plans of federal personnel and into contractor Performance Evaluation Plans that are the main tool for providing award fees. GTRI is a cooperative, voluntary program. GTRI communicates its long-term performance goals to partners that include the governments of over 80 countries. Meetings are held on a regular basis with domestic and foreign partners to continually reinforce performance goals and to track progress. Agreements on annual work plans and long-term goals are reached with foreign partners through bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements and statements of intent, such as the Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation by Presidents Bush and Putin at the Bratislava Summit. The program uses joint coordinating meetings and program reviews to address and resolve performance issues with partners/contractors.

Evidence: Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation by Presidents Bush and Putin at the Bratislava Summit (2/05); GTRI International Partners' Conference at the IAEA (9/04); Agreement between the United States and Russia on the Russian research reactor fuel return program (5/04); International Fuel Development Working Group; Annual International Meeting on RERTR (the research reactor conversion program); Joint Coordinating Committee meetings with foreign partners; annual reviews; program/project work plans; monthly reports.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: GAO and the DOE IG have performed a total of seven evaluations on GTRI programs over the last three years covering HEU minimization and radiological threat reduction programs. Ongoing evaluation activities incude a GAO audit on the radiological material protection program, IG survey on use of funding by Oak Ridge facilities, and a budget process validation for all of GTRI. Additionally, a recent independent review validated the prioritization methodology used by the program.

Evidence: GAO-04-807 "DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors"; GAO-05-57 "DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the U.S. and Russia"; DOE/IG-0638 - Audit Report: Recovery of Highly Enriched Uranium Provided to Foreign Countries; GAO 03-483 "DOE Action Needed to Ensure Continued Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources"; GAO-03-638 " U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening."

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: GTRI is managed using long-term performance goals with annual targets that cascade from the NNSA strategic plan, and also link to supporting milestones, deliverables, and the budgets for program performers. Performance measures are the framework for resource allocation decisions made in the annual PPBE process. Annually, the NNSA performance-planning-budgeting decisions are documented in the Administrator's Final Recommendation and used to develop the budget requests. Program and financial performance for each measure is corporately monitored and assessed during budget execution/evaluation phase. The budget and reporting (B&R) categories are listed and linked to performance metrics. All direct and indirect costs to attain the performance are reported in the B&R categories. The cost for the NNSA Federal employees is carried in a separate NNSA program direction account, as required by Congress. In the FY05 President's Budget, NNSA initiated a budget request format that includes the current 3 years plus 4 additional years of performance and budget data for each program.

Evidence: NNSA PPBE process; NNSA PDMs.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: GTRI was established in May 2004 to consolidate and expand program elements related to nuclear and radiological material threat reduction. Program elements were moved specifically into GTRI from DOE's Office of Environmental Management and NNSA's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security. GTRI successfully has integrated these elements into a single comprehensive strategy and implementation plan to maximize effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. resources.

Evidence: National Security Strategy (pp 5-6, 14); National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction; NNSA Strategic Plan; DOE Strategic Plan.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: GTRI requires monthly reporting from each program against baseline program milestones and costing targets. This information is used to determine whether corrective action is necessary. Contractor performance is reviewed quarterly and annually to correct systematic program/project management deficiencies. Official DOE accounting data is reviewed monthly by federal managers as a check on contractor reports. All program/project work plans and performance reporting are tracked in GTRI's Program Management Information System (PMIS). Progress against annual performance target baselines is reported quarterly to the DOE Joule system for inclusion in the annual Performance and Accountability Report (PAR).

Evidence: Monthly Reports; Program Reviews; Financial Data; NA-21 Procedure Memos (2/23/05 and 3/8/05); GTRI's Program Management Information System (PMIS).

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Federal managers are held accountable for meeting performance targets, cost, and schedule through their annual performance appraisals. Federal managers take past performance of contractors and national laboratories into account when follow-on funding decisions are made. Contractors are held accountable as their performance on GTRI goals is factored into their annual award fee. GTRI has established specific performance standards for program partner governments to ensure their contributions help achieve program goals.

Evidence: Performance Appraisals; Lab performance appraisals.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: GTRI funding is allocated at the start of the fiscal year and as needed throughout the fiscal year via the DOE/NNSA Approved Funding Program and matched to work requirements in Implementation Plans via Work Authorizations. Expenditures and commitments are tracked monthly and uncommitted carryover is carefully managed through the DOE financial reporting system. Program uncommitted carryover is typically held to below 10%.

Evidence: Financial Plans; NNSA PPBE process; GTRI's Program Management Information System (PMIS).

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: GTRI has procedures and tools to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effective program execution. GTRI's Program Management Information System (PMIS) tracks costs and schedules and provides the process and tools for program managers to validate costs/schedules and identify and correct problems quickly before they impact efficiencies. GTRI has developed a new efficiency measure. The measure tracks overhead cost savings resulting from the program directly contracting with the private sector for new threat reduction efforts when compared to the cost if the work was sub-contracted to private industry through the labs.

Evidence: NNSA PPBE process; JOULE.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: GTRI is in nearly daily coordination with colleagues elsewhere in NNSA, DOE, and other agencies (especially State Department). State Department is cognizant and has representatives on many of GTRI's international trips. GTRI works closely with the IAEA and foreign government officials on all GTRI programs.

Evidence: Program/Project Work Plans; RRRFR Joint Coordinating Committee; RERTR Annual Meeting; BN-350 Seminannual Joint Program Reviews.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: GTRI is covered by DOE's financial management policies, procedures, and practices that meet all statutory requirements. DOE provides the accounting services for NNSA and the financial management processes are free of material internal control weaknesses. GTRI staff reviews accounting reports on a monthly basis to monitor obligations and costs for all programs/projects and sites.

Evidence: DOE Financial Management Orders; PPBE Guidance Documents; PPBS; PMIS.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: GTRI has taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies. For example, GTRI significantly restructured the reactor conversion work to streamline and accelerate it by shifting additional resources into converting U.S. reactors, bringing in additional technical experts, and accelerating the LEU fuel development to focus on milestones and fuel qualification. Since these changes, GTRI achieved its first U.S. reactor conversion since 2000. In the past 9 months, 3 reactors were converted worldwide with 3 more planned before the end of FY 2006.

Evidence: NNSA Strategic Plan; Annual Program Reviews; PPBS; RERTR Program Work Plans.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: GTRI has demonstrated significant progress in achieving its long-term goals. Since its creation, GTRI has been able to dramatically accelerate progress towards achieving its threat reduction goals. For example, reactor conversions accelerated from 39 over the first 26 years (1.5/yr) to 7 over the past 3 years (2.3/yr) to a planned rate of 15 over the next 2 years (7.5/yr). Likewise, radiological source recoveries increased from 7,322 over the first 11 years (666/yr) to 6,328 over the past 3 years (2,109/yr). GTRI efforts to return Russian-origin HEU fuels and to protect civil nuclear and radiological materials are new initiatives within the past 3-4 years but both have increased the annual rate over that time.

Evidence: PPBE; JOULE; Secretarial Commitments.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: GTRI has improved its measures for FY2008 to make them more meaningful to the public. However, based on the previous metrics, GTRI has a good track record in achieving its annual targets. In FY05, GTRI exceeded 3 annual targets: (1) a cumulative 11,682 U.S. sealed sources recovered (target 11,500); (2) a cumulative 234 radiological sites secured (target 174); and (3) a cumulative 6,783 U.S.-origin spent fuel assemblies repatriated (target 6,693). GTRI just missed fully achieving 2 FY05 annual targets: (1) a cumulative 40 reactor conversions to LEU completed (target 44) [2 reactors converted 1 month late in Oct 2005 (FY06) vs. Sept 2005 (FY05) and GTRI accelerated the conversion of 2 U.S. reactors to allow the program to meet its FY06 target]; and (2) a cumulative 122 kgs of Russian-origin HEU repatriated (target 175) [the pilot shipments of Russian-origin HEU spent fuel from Uzbekistan were completed in FY06 due to Russian delays].

Evidence: PPBE; JOULE.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: To a large extent, GTRI has demonstrated improved efficiencies in achieving program goals. For example, in the 4-year period from 2000 to 2004 only 2 reactor conversions occurred. After implementing the improvements described in Q3.7, GTRI converted 3 reactors in the past 9 months and 3 more will be converted before the end of 2006. In 2007, 7 reactors will be converted and 8 more will be done in 2008. GTRI has developed a new efficiency measure to track overhead cost savings resulting from the program directly contracting with the private sector for new activities versus having to pay more to place these new contracts with private industry via the DOE labs. A total cost savings of at least $4 million dollars over 5 years is expected.

Evidence: PPBE; Program Reviews.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: GTRI's performance compares favorably to other Government and private sector programs that have similar purposes and goals. GTRI is the only program recovering domestic radioactive sealed sources and research reactor fuel, as well as the only program implementing the U.S. nonproliferation policy to minimize and, to the extent possible, eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium in civil nuclear applications. GTRI is achieving positive results in these areas.

Evidence: GAO-05-157 (1/05).

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: Several external audits expressed favorable reviews. A 2005 GAO audit of the U.S. radiological threat reduction program found that "between October 1, 2002, and March 31, 2004, DOE recovered 5,529 radioactive sealed sources, exceeding its recovery goal and more than doubling the number of sources previously recovered since 1996."

Evidence: GAO-04-807 (7/04); GAO-05-57 (11/04); Ongoing DOE-IG audit (A05AL036).