Detailed Information on the
Strategic Offensive Capabilities Assessment

Achieve Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) program certification by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L))by March 2008 to proceed with the JASSM program.

Measure: Number of JASSM Missiles procured.

Explanation:Procurement of this system in accordance with established schedules must be accomplished in order to meet strategic offense requirements established in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.

Measure: Reduce Number of nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 by 2012

Explanation:This is the goal established for the New Triad in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.

Measure: Number of Trident II Missile Modifications procured.

Explanation:Procurement of this system in accordance with established schedules must be accomplished in order to meet strategic offense requirements established in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.

Is the program purpose clear?

Explanation: The purpose of the program, which is clearly stated in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, is to meet the nation's defense goals in the 21st century. This will be done by by maintaining intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range nuclear-armed bombers, together with new non-nuclear strategic capabilities that strengthen the credibility of our offensive deterrence.

Evidence: 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. In addition, the requirement satisfied by each Strategic Offenseive Capabilities system is specifically described in each program's Operational Requirements Document (ORD).

Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: This program represents a major change in our approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in our deterrent strategy and presents the blueprint for transforming our strategic posture.

Evidence: The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. The various requirements documents generated by the requirements process and validated and approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) document the mission needs, capability gaps, and how each individual system will contribute to our goal of offensive deterrence.

Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?

Explanation: There are no other Federal, state, local, or private efforts that duplicate DoD's Strategic Offensive Capabilities programs.

Evidence: Operational Requirements Documents describe the unique mission that Strategic Offensive Capabilities systems fulfill.

Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?

Explanation: Strategic Offensive Capabilities programs are well designed and well executed. Acquisition is governed by the DoD 5000 series. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process ensures resources are effectively and efficiently allocated among competing requirements.

Evidence: All programs are subject to periodic execution reviews. These reviews (Defense Acquisition Board, Defense Acquisition Executive Summary, annual budget reviews) evaluate the programs to identify and correct flaws in program design.

Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?

Explanation: Strategic offensive capabilities programs are reviewed every year through the program and/or budget reviews. If appropriate, adjustments are made to resources to more effectively address the program purpose.

Evidence: The President's Budget, Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) and some service-level management reports indicate that the program design is effectively targeted to the purpose. The budget documentation clearly describes how resources will be spent to address the purpose.

Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?

Explanation: Each program must meet specific requirements, key performance parameters, schedules, and budgets established through vigorous OSD and Service level reviews.

Evidence: Specific measures for each program are documented in sources such as the Acquisition Program Baseline and Selected Acquisition Report.

Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?

Explanation: The Nuclear Posture Review established a goal of reducing to 1700-2200 the number of strategic nuclear warheads in our force by the year 2012. Targets and timeframes are also developed for all acquisition programs.

Evidence: 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. Timelines for contracts, production, and deliveries are laid out in documents including the Annual President's Budget, Selected Acquisition Reports, and some Service-level management reports.

Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?

Explanation: Individual systems have annual goals for quantities to be contracted for and delivered. Deployment of these systems contributes towards long-term program goals.

Evidence: Annual President's Budget documentation contains budget quantities and delivery schedules.

Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?

Explanation: Programs included in Strategic Offensive Capabilities have Acquisition Program Baselines, which lay out cost, schedule, and performance goals.

Evidence: Acquisition Program Baselines for individual programs.

Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?

Explanation: Prime contractors and subcontractors are fully committed to the annual and long-term goals of the program. This commitment is attained through contractual obligations and applicable incentives.

Evidence: Partner commitments and obligations are detailed in program contracts, including incentive clauses.

Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?

Explanation: GAO has reported on both individual programs within Strategic Offensive Capabilities, and on the New Triad.

Evidence: GAO Reports: GAO-05-301, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS, Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs; GAO-04-248, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS, Assessments of Major Weapon Programs; GAO-05-540, MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, Actions Needed by DoD to More Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-Term Investment Approach

Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?

Explanation: Annually, DoD performs program and budget reviews to examine program execution and accomplishments. Resources are adjusted, as appropriate, to reflect execution and attainment of annual and long-term goals.

Evidence: Annual President's Budget documentation.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?

Explanation: The February 6, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review directed a reorientation of strategic offensive strike capabilities. Decisions include: Develop a new land based, penetrating long-range strike capability by 2018, while modernizing the bomber force; and reducing the B-52 fleet and use the savings to modernize B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s to support global strike operations.

Evidence: Quadrennial Defense Review, February 6, 2006.

Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?

Explanation: Program Executive Officers and individual programs collect performance information on a monthly basis from contractors, Systems Commands, the Defense Contract Management Agency, and program team members to manage programs and improve performance. Information is often rolled up into reports/reviews for higher level presentations and evaluations.

Evidence: Performance information is collected in documents/systems such as the Contract Performance and Reporting System, Earned Value Management System, Technical Performance Measures, Award Fee Evaluation Reports, Selected Acquisition Reports, Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries, and Performance Management Reviews.

Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?

Explanation: Acquisition directives assign accountability to program managers for cost, schedule, and performance. Contractual requirements are stated in performance terms.

Evidence: October 30, 2002 Deputy Secretary of Defense guidance memorandum, The Defense Acquisition System, provides guidance on program manager accountability (PMs). PMs receive charters upon assignment, giving authority, responsibility, and accountability.

Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?

Explanation: DoD budget reviews include a number of obligation and expenditure data to ensure funds are executed in a timely manner, in accordance with DoD standards, and for intended purposes.

Evidence: Report 1002 provides program funding execution.

Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?

Explanation: Each program publishes an Acquisition Strategy Report (ASR) that must be approved at the Service or OSD level. This document describes the program plan for contracting and competition. The ASR and contracts include requirements for reporting costs and progress to be measured against the program baseline.

Evidence: Program level Acquisition Strategy Reports, Earned Value Management System data, FAR/contract clauses, Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries.

Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?

Explanation: The DoD, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Nuclear Weapons Council work collaboratively towards the goals outlined in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.

Evidence: 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, GAO Report GAO-06-606T, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, Views on Proposals to Transform the Nuclear Weapons Complex.

Does the program use strong financial management practices?

Explanation: DoD's financial management system is being improved, but slowly. No audit reports showing that strategic offensive capabilities programs are free of internal control or other financial management weaknesses have been provided.

Evidence: There are no reports that specifically cite material financial weaknesses. Numerous audits document DoD's financial management weaknesses. Because of the magnitude of the problem, DoD is unlikely to obtain an unqualified opinion for some time.

Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?

Explanation: GAO Report GAO-05-540 recommended that DoD develop an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach for the New Triad. DoD's Nuclear Posture Review Strategic Capability Assessment identified shortfalls in capabilities that will be used to develop individual investment strategies. These strategies will be used in the overarching integration of these efforts.

Evidence: The Nuclear Posture Review Strategic Capability Assessment includes actions to develop an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach for the New Triad.

Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?

Explanation: The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) established a goal of reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW) to 1,700-2,200 by 2012. Such a reduction represents a two-thirds cut from then-current levels at the completion of the NPR. The precise number of ODSNW is classified (S/FRD). The ODSNW are counted on a daily basis by the Service providers and reported monthly to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Appropriate agencies are furnished a summary of ODSNW on a monthly basis by the Joint Staff. Currently, reductions are on track to achieve the President's direction.

Evidence: ODSNW monthly summaries.

Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?

Explanation: Most performance goals are met. Goals are schedule driven, not calendar driven. They must be met in order for the programs to be allowed to progress to the next phase. Failure to meet cost, schedule, or performance goals may result in a program breach, which must be reported to the Milestone Decision Authority.

Evidence: Acquisition Decision Memoranda, Acquisition program Baseline, Earned Value Management System, Selected Acquisition Report, Defense Acquisition Executive Summary, and cost reporting documents provide program results.

Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?

Explanation: Reductions in strategic nuclear forces will??in the long term??reduce costs.

Evidence: ODSNW monthly summaries.

Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?

Explanation: There are no other government or private programs with similar purposes and goals. The DoE's National Nuclear Security Administration and the Nuclear Weapons Council work collaboratively with the DoD, but they do not have the purpose of providing the Strategic Offensive Capability.

Evidence:

Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?

Explanation: GAO reports indicate that selected major programs are performing well, and some deficiencies in program management are being addressed through various DoD efforts.

Evidence: GAO Reports: GAO-04-248, Assessments of Major Weapon Programs; GAO-05-540, Actions Needed by DoD to More Clearly Identify New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-Term Investment Approach.