**Program:** Military Assistance to new NATO and NATO Aspirant Nations

**Agency:** Department of State

**Bureau:** Department of State, activities

**Key Performance Measures**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Planning</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Results / Accountability</th>
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- **Long-term Measure:** The proportion of allied nations that spend at least 2% of GDP on military budget
  - 2002: 40%
  - 2003: 60%
  - 2004: 90%

- **Annual Measure:** As new NATO military reforms continue, percentage of aspirants making progress achieving NATO-defined and measured, country-specific Membership Action Plans
  - 2002: 100%
  - 2003: 100%
  - 2004: 100%

- **Annual Measure:** Percentage of countries that contribute military capabilities (e.g., equipment, units, and forces) or infrastructure (e.g., airfields) for contingencies when requested by the U.S.
  - 2002: 100%
  - 2003: 100%
  - 2004: 100%

**Rating:** Moderately Effective

**Program Type:** Direct Federal

**Program Summary:**

The program provides US military equipment, services, and training to the governments of the ten new NATO countries and Eastern European nations recently offered NATO membership. These include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Findings from the PART Assessment include the following:

1. The program purpose is very clear, to promote U.S. security by strengthening military and political reform, to promote ties between U.S. military forces and those of receiving nations and, to encourage these nations’ support for U.S. security goals and activities.
2. Strategic goals for the program are established by the State Department, based on Presidential decisions and assistance from the National Security Council, the Defense Department, and other agencies. Formally, the State and Defense Departments annually review the annual and mid-term goals of the program in several highly structured processes.
3. A few management deficiencies have been noted. One is that there is no regularly scheduled evaluation of the program's effectiveness by independent and disinterested parties. Another is that the State and Defense Departments may differ on priorities for the programs which are proposed and defended in Congress by the State Department. State and Defense have budget development schedules which do not produce recommendations simultaneously; this is being addressed by both departments.
4. The review found that program results are positive in many of the ten countries. Most have adopted or plan to develop military force objectives, including force structure and professional development. An important result is the support shown for Balkans deployments, the war on terrorism, and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Several of the countries have promised or shipped arms and equipment to help the U.S. build military forces in Georgia and Afghanistan. Others provide military units to assist in OEF and other contingencies.

In response to this review,

1. The budget proposes a funding level that, with estimated carryover balances, will allow the program to achieve its 2004 goals.
2. State and Defense will press nations that are lagging in their reform efforts.
3. Continued development of an e-government management tool will assist managers in determining program deficiencies.

**Program Funding Level (in millions of dollars)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2002 Actual</th>
<th>2003 Estimate</th>
<th>2004 Estimate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>85</td>
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