We are continuing as a top priority to unmask the full story of Iraq's
WMD programs. We have already found a very revealing component of
Iraq's biological weapons program -- two mobile production facilities
equipped to produce BW agents.
The configuration of these mobile facilities is almost identical
to that described by Secretary Powell in his February 5 presentation to
the UN Security Council. The Secretary's presentation was based on an
account of an eyewitness who had firsthand experience with these BW
systems. The description of this witness, which had been corroborated
by other informants,
U.S. officials, UN personnel, and other
independent experts have long said that Saddam Hussein 's regime had WMD programs, and was continuing to pursue the
capability to produce such weapons, particularly biological and
chemical. These mobile production facilities are entirely consistent
with this assessment.
Mobile facilities are much less susceptible to
discovery by inspectors, and less vulnerable than a fixed site to
discovery and attack.
Mobile facilities can also support a
mobilization production concept to provide BW agents to operational
units just before use. This concept -- "just in time WMD on demand" --
may also apply to Iraq's CW program.
U.S. officials, UN personnel,
and other independent experts have long said that Saddam Hussein's Iraq
had not accounted for large quantities of chemical and biological
agents and delivery means -- hundreds of tons of CW, thousands of
liters of BW agents such as anthrax, and thousands of specially
designed shells and bombs. All of these estimates were taken from UN
inspection reports -- cited not just by the United States but also by
UN inspectors prior to the conflict.
If Saddam Hussein could have
accounted for these materials, it's reasonable to suppose that he would
have done so, rather than risk his regime, his fortune, and possibly
We continue to look for chemical and biological weapons
and agents. This is a process that will take a major effort and a lot
of time -- similar in approach to an organized crime investigation.