|The White House
President George W. Bush
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March 10, 2003
Press Briefing Excerpts - 3/10/03
The James S. Brady Briefing Room
Excerpts from the Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, March 10, 2003
1:23 P.M. EST
The President early this morning spoke with President Jiang Zemin
of China. He called during the ongoing session of China's National
People of Congress to congratulate President Jiang on years of
service to his country. The Presidents recalled their common
commitment to seeking peaceful means to keep the Korean Peninsula
free of nuclear weapons. While expressing hope for a peaceful
solution in Iraq, the President emphasized his determination to
defend the security of the American people.
The Presidents agreed on the importance of developing U.S.-China
relations, and they talked about the need for continuing and
ongoing consultations about the situation vis-a-vis Iraq.
The President also this morning spoke with Japanese Prime Minister
Koizumi regarding the situation in both Iraq and North Korea. The
President thanked the Prime Minister for his support for the
U.S.-UK-Spanish resolution and for Japan's efforts to work with
other nations in order to maximize pressure on Iraq to disarm. Both
agreed that a peaceful resolution of the issue depends on Iraq's
Excerpts from the Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, March 10, 2003 (Full Transcript)
1:23 P.M. EST
MR. FLEISCHER: The President early this morning spoke with President Jiang Zemin of China. He called during the ongoing session of China's National People of Congress to congratulate President Jiang on years of service to his country. The Presidents recalled their common commitment to seeking peaceful means to keep the Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. While expressing hope for a peaceful solution in Iraq, the President emphasized his determination to defend the security of the American people.
The Presidents agreed on the importance of developing U.S.-China relations, and they talked about the need for continuing and ongoing consultations about the situation vis-a-vis Iraq.
The President also this morning spoke with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi regarding the situation in both Iraq and North Korea. The President thanked the Prime Minister for his support for the U.S.-UK-Spanish resolution and for Japan's efforts to work with other nations in order to maximize pressure on Iraq to disarm. Both agreed that a peaceful resolution of the issue depends on Iraq's actions.
The President also today spoke with President Mbeki of South Africa. President Bush shared his view, or expressed his view that the lack of Iraqi compliance presents a grave threat to world peace and to the United Nations' credibility. President Mbeki reported on the South African team sent to Baghdad to convey information on South Africa's voluntary disarmament of weapons of mass destruction.
Both leaders agree that Iraq must make a strategic decision to disarm. And they also discussed the importance of the unique nature of the U.S.-South African bilateral relationship. And President Bush congratulated President Mbeki on the Congo peace process.
The President also today spoke to the Sultan of Qaboos [sic] to review with him the current situation in Iraq and to thank him for Oman's years of reliable and steady friendship and support for the United States. The President noted that if hostilities were unavoidable, the United States would seek to provide humanitarian aid, relief and support to the people of Iraq so that they are cared for.
Q Ari, the Russians are promising to veto this new resolution. How much more damaging would that be than a French veto alone?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, I note the Foreign Minister has indicated that that is a possibility. And the President certainly hopes that it will not come to that from the Russian point of view. The President would be very disappointed if Russia were to take a stand that would be a setback not only for peace, because it's important to immediately disarm Saddam Hussein, but also for the freedom and the liberty of the Iraqi people.
Q Is the President talking to Putin? And what did Jiang tell the President?
MR. FLEISCHER: The call was just as I indicated. They're going to continue to consult about events in Iraq.
Q Well, what commitment regarding abstaining the veto?
MR. FLEISCHER: I think continued consultation is probably the best way to describe it. And what was your first part there?
Q Whether he's talked to Putin?
MR. FLEISCHER: He has in the past. As you know, he talked to President Putin, I believe it was on Thursday of last week, if I recall, or Wednesday of last week. And if there are any other phone calls, we'll keep you informed.
Q There seems to be a hardening of the position by this White House towards this U.N. process. It began with the President, while you're engaged in diplomacy, being not very diplomatic, saying, well, it's time for everybody to show their cards and forcing the vote. And now this morning, on the record, but off camera, you were making the point, at least suggesting that if the United Nations fails to pass the second resolution, that it would be a moral failure on the part --
MR. FLEISCHER: Correct.
Q -- of the United Nations. A, would you explain that point of view and that shift now that we're seeing? And, B, does this reflect the fact that the President feels like this is going down, it's not going to go either way?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, clearly, if a nation vetoes, then that expresses the will of the United Nations, regardless of whether or not the United States, Spain, England, Bulgaria, the other nations are able to reach nine or 10 votes, which we are continuing to work very hard to do and to strive for. And we'll see what the ultimate outcome is. There could be a veto. There also could be nine or 10 votes still. We are working very hard on that.
The President has made a couple points very clear. One is, if the United Nations fails to act, that means the United Nations will not be the international body that disarms Saddam Hussein. Another international body will disarm Saddam Hussein. So this will remain an international action -- just the United Nations will have chosen to put itself on the sidelines -- that is, the United Nations Security Council will have.
So Saddam will be disarmed by an international group. But from a moral point of view, as the world witnessed in Rwanda, and as the world witnessed in Kosovo, the United Nations Security Council will have failed to act once again. And this is becoming a trend for the United Nations Security Council, where in the most important security issues around the world, they're leaving regions of the world in which humanity is suffering from ethnic cleansing, is suffering from mass killings, and in the case of Iraq, suffering from the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction -- the United Nations Security Council is, from a moral point of view, leaving the people of these regions on the sidelines. And from the President's point of view, that's a regrettable development if it happens.
Q Can I just follow on that?
MR. FLEISCHER: Yes
Q So if they vote with you, then they're living up to their obligations; but if they oppose the United States, they're immoral?
MR. FLEISCHER: I didn't say they were immoral. I said that from a moral point of view, what are the people of Iraq to think when it comes to who is it who fought for their freedom and liberty? What were the people of Kosovo to think? What were people to -- about, with the ethnic cleansing, about the role of the United Nations Security Council? Those are the issues.
Q But don't you see why people could conclude that dissent within this deliberative body is not really condoned by the United States?
MR. FLEISCHER: Different nations have different points of views. That's the point of view of the United States. Other nations that will vote differently are free to express their point of view from their point of view. That's the point of view of the President. This is a moral issue, and the President hopes that action will be taken. It doesn't suggest that if they don't take action they are immoral.
But the President does believe that when people of Kosovo ask who they are to thank for the end of ethnic cleansing, they cannot thank the United Nations Security Council. The President of Rwanda, himself, expressed similar thoughts about waiting for the United Nations Security Council. And after waiting, a million people died.
So these are important issues to be discussed, frankly and openly. And these are the implications.
Q I have a follow up to David, because he didn't follow up enough. (Laughter.) Are you suggesting, seriously, that a failure to pass the resolution because one of the Permanent Five veto it, even though there may have been nine or 10 votes, would be some sort of moral victory? You get nine or 10 votes, but you don't get the resolution.
MR. FLEISCHER: The moral issue is an issue that I think you will hear expressed by the people of Iraq, that in the event that hostilities ensue and the Iraqi people are freed from the cloak of a brutal dictatorship that tortures, that kills, people of Iraq will know who to thank. That will be a moral issue. That will be a moral matter. That's an approach to this issue.
And nations are certainly within their right, certainly within their judgment. They will express that from their own point of view of moral -- a moral position. And their position will be no less moral than the United States' position. But the people of Iraq will know, in their hearts, who led to action that led to their freedom and who didn't.
Q So you are trying to build nine or 10 votes for this, even though it may be vetoed, for that reason, to express this moral clarity; is that --
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, the reason the President is proceeding is because the President said he would. The President does think it's important, and the time is coming -- and it will happen this week -- for the nations of the Security Council to raise their hand and take a stand on the immediate disarmament of Iraq.
Q If the President bombs Iraq, which he apparently plans to do, it will be in defiance of a U.N. vote, because only in terms of self-defense and you're attacked can you really attack under the U.N. charter. It will also be immoral, and how do you know what the Iraqis think? You think they'd rather be dead and have liberty? I mean, what is this liberty if you're going to send 3,000 missiles over in 48 hours, according to all the plans I've read? How many people are going to survive that?
MR. FLEISCHER: Number one, on the legal basis of it, under United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, the United
Q It doesn't wipe out the charter.
MR. FLEISCHER: Of course it doesn't wipe out the charter; it reinforces it, and that's why it would be legal via United Nations previous resolutions, as previous United States Presidents have shown.
The United States military will, of course, take every step to minimize the loss of innocents. There are no guarantees it'll happen --
Q How can you do that with 3,000 missiles?
MR. FLEISCHER: Helen, I just would like to remind you that if the standard was if the United Nations Security Council did not act, how many Muslims would have been killed in ethnic cleansing in Serbia? By that standard, if you judge legitimacy by whether the United Nations Security Council --
Q We did intervene in Kosovo, if you recall.
MR. FLEISCHER: May I finish? If by that standard you judge legitimacy by whether the United Nations Security Council acted, then you would think you'd need to restore Slobodan Milosevic to power, because he was removed without the United Nations Security Council approval. That was regime change in Serbia, wasn't it?
Q Wait, wait. The U.N. didn't change Slobodan Milosevic regime, the people of Serbia did. The goal of that operation --
MR. FLEISCHER: With a little help from NATO and the United States.
Q But I don't want to talk about history -- (laughter.)
MR. FLEISCHER: I suppose he might still be there had it not been for NATO and the United States.
Q We allowed that conflict to end with him in power. And I don't want to get into an argument about history, I want to talk to you about this notion of --
MR. FLEISCHER: History is very relevant here, because you're judging the Security Council.
Q All right. You're mis-stating the history, then.
MR. FLEISCHER: No, I'm not. The question --
Q Because Slobodan Milosevic was not removed from power by military action. Full stop, period.
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, it certainly undermined his ability to stay in power, if I recall. But the point is, the United Nations Security --
Q That wasn't the goal. Now you're sliding over.
MR. FLEISCHER: The United Nations Security Council failed to authorize military action in Serbia. A different international coalition -- in that case, NATO -- was formed to do so. The question Helen was asking seemed to say that without Security Council approval a military action might not have a legitimacy. It did have legitimacy, and a result of the military action, Slobodan Milosevic fell from power.
Q Let me ask you about -- you and others have said that by this deadline Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime must take a strategic decision to disarm. And diplomats at the United Nations and others have noted that's kind of a vaporous phrase. It's very hard to see what it actually means. How do you tell when someone's had what one of them compared to a religious conversion?
Is the President open to providing some kind of specificity, some kind of benchmark: here's what we need to see specifically from Saddam Hussein, as either part of this resolution or around it?
MR. FLEISCHER: Here's what's happening in New York and what you can expect. Ambassadors at the United Nations and others are in the final stages of diplomacy in New York, in anticipation of a vote that will take place this week. The exact form of the vote, what the exact content of what will be voted on remains a matter of consultation and discussion among various nations.
Some nations have suggested such things as benchmarks. There are ideas that are being explored and looked at. And so it is too soon to say what the final document that will be voted on will include. It's too soon to say what the exact date will be. You've indicated it will be this week, but there's a important phase of diplomacy underway as we speak. That diplomacy is marked by some level of flexibility within the diplomacy. But the bottom line remains the same; it must lead to the immediate disarmament of Saddam Hussein.
Q So just to button this down, you're open to -- or you're aren't ruling out this notion of benchmarks, specific tasks that the Iraq regime must take? And is the 17th a drop-dead date, or is there a little bit of wiggle room in there? Could it slide a day or two?
MR. FLEISCHER: What I've indicated is there's a diplomatic process underway in which consultation is important, listening to the ideas of various nations is important. That's underway as we speak. I've not indicated whether anything is final in the language that has been offered in the amended version of the resolution.
Q Ari, first, what indications do you have about the possibility of Iraq moving explosives into oil fields? And how would you respond to that?
MR. FLEISCHER: One, I cannot confirm those reports. I'm not in a position to have evaluated them. Let me just suggest -- and this is if we enter into hostilities, this will be a pattern that will be repeated many times, just as in 1991, anything dealing with operations, with movements, would be questions that have to get referred to the Pentagon, not the White House.
Q Okay, and secondly, is the United States prepared to accept the damage that's being done to international institutions and alliances as a result of the debate over Iraq? And if the U.S. fails this test that you have set up for it -- if the United Nations fails this test you have set up, what sort of structure or relations do you see emerging afterwards?
MR. FLEISCHER: Here's what's at stake in the United Nations and in international organizations. Given that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction that are prohibited to him, what is the lesson for the next country that has weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons, such as Iran or North Korea, where we fear they are developing their programs to have weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons? How then does the world enforce anti-proliferation arrangements if the methods set up by the international community are not effective? And that is being tested now with the United Nations Security Council. There are issues that need to be thought through, from an international point of view.
And the focus is, as the President has said, will the United Nations Security Council be relevant? There's another point to be made, and that is: will the United Nations Security Council be effective? Will they be effective in stopping proliferators from obtaining weapons? If they're not effective, then the world has to examine these issues carefully to find the best means of finding an effective solution.
Q Do you think changes may be needed at some point?
MR. FLEISCHER: Clearly, given the fact that after 12 years, where Iraq has -- some thought Iraq was contained -- sanctions have been tried, diplomacy has been tried, inspections have been tried, and it has not worked. I think there does need to be a second look.
Q Ari, if I could just follow this point that you made here. This morning you said that if the United Nations failed to confront Iraq, proliferators would celebrate. You mentioned North Korea and Iran, as you just did before. On the flip side of that, would you then say that if we do confront Iraq, either within or outside the United Nations context, does that suggest that the natural continuation of President Bush's policy is that we will confront Iran and North Korea by whatever means we need to? Either within the U.N. or outside? In other words, Iraq is the first step would seem to be the suggestion you were making.
MR. FLEISCHER: I think you're watching unfold an example with North Korea where the United States is dealing with a situation of North Korea seeking to obtain nuclear weapons through diplomacy and through a multilateral approach.
The point is, what's the most effective way to enforce anti-proliferation regimes, so that nations do not commit to possession of these weapons, particularly these rogue nations. That's the bottom line, is what is an effective mean to stop them from arming up with these types of weapons of mass destruction. And in different regions, different solutions may be required.
Q Can you clarify Secretary Powell's statement this weekend, as well as your own, about the unmanned drone that was discovered, these recently discovered drones in Blix's report? Is this new information, is it new evidence? And do you believe that --
MR. FLEISCHER: This is new information.
Q It is.
MR. FLEISCHER: And we are aware of the reports regarding UNMOVIC's discovery of Iraqi production of not only the drones, but munitions capable of dispensing chemical and biological weapons. The also have undeclared UAVs, or drones, unmanned aerial vehicles. The drone, in this case, has a 24-foot wingspan, as well as a second undeclared vehicle. They were constructed from converted L-29 drop tanks, which are auxiliary fuel tanks for L-29 model Iraqi aircraft. UNSCOM discovered that Iraq has used modified drop tanks to spray simulated anthrax in the past. The fuel capacities of these drones may violate the 150-kilometer imposition on Iraq, separate and apart from the fact that it can contain chemical or biological weapons.
There's a meeting in New York of the Security Council at 3:30 p.m. today that is a closed session, and I anticipate that this is something that may come up.
Q You say it's new information. Is it new information because they have not presented this before, or is it new information for this administration? Or was this something the administration was already aware of?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, this was technically an appendix that was added very late to the cluster report that I referenced when I briefed on Friday. It was not discussed by Mr. Blix in his oral presentation, and it may come up today in the private session the United Nations Security Council is having.
Q But was it something the administration knew about prior to receiving that report on Friday?
MR. FLEISCHER: It was -- if it was prior, it was so immediately prior that as we looked through a 200-page document and then found the appendix added at the end, we only became aware of it at that moment. You always have fears and suspicions, as you know, of a UAV program operating in Iraq, as Secretary Powell had talked about previously and as other newspapers have reported. What's new here is that the U.N. may have discovered something on the ground.
Q And do you believe that Blix intentionally buried this information?
MR. FLEISCHER: No, I have not said that. No, I think that this is one of the issues that members states of the Security Council look forward to learning more about. It's important to learn more about this.
Q Is that the fear, though, that he may have done that?
MR. FLEISCHER: That's why there are questions. And I'm sure those questions will get answered.
Q There are two things here, the unmanned aerial vehicles and the bombs that have cluster sub-munitions, they call them, in other words little balls that come out.
MR. FLEISCHER: Correct.
Q Is it the U.S. view that both of these are intended or have the capability of dispersing chemical and biological weapons?
MR. FLEISCHER: There's no question that munitions are capable of dispensing chemical and biological weapons. And based on past reporting that UNSCOM did, there is also a concern about the UAV's being modified for this exact same purpose, which is the spraying of chemical and biological weapons. We're talking about weapons of mass destruction.
Q Now, the bombs and the little round sub-munitions, the cluster bombs, that is just as new as the UAV information? I wasn't clear which one you were talking about being new. And is that also part of the --
MR. FLEISCHER: Both pieces of information only became available to us in the final version of the cluster document; the UAV is in the appendix. So this was late-breaking news, very late last week.
Q And the U.S. view is that these are undeclared, potentially prohibited systems?
MR. FLEISCHER: They are undeclared. And we look forward to learning and hearing more from the United Nations.
Q Do you have any sense, has UNMOVIC given you any sense of why it is that this was not included in Dr. Blix's report before the Security Council?
MR. FLEISCHER: This is why I said there are outstanding questions. And all members of the Security Council, I think it's safe to say, look forward to hearing the answers. These are important questions.
Q Ari, aside from the reported comments -- on Russia -- of the foreign minister, has the White House received a direct indication from Russia about what their country's position is on the U.N. resolution and whether or not they now have a firm position to vote no?
MR. FLEISCHER: You know, unless a nation is on the record and public about what their ultimate stand will be -- whether they will vote yes, whether they will abstain, or whether they will veto -- it's not the place of the White House to describe the position of other nations. I cannot do that. We will continue the diplomatic process and continue to talk to Russia, of course.
Q -- through the diplomatic process, have they reached out to the administration to make clear their position?
MR. FLEISCHER: The last time the President and President Putin spoke, they both talked about continued consultation.
Q And does -- the diplomatic push that the President is personally involved in now, does his role in that extend to, you know, carrying the lobbying campaign, the diplomatic campaign, himself directly to New York, to the U.N. this week to meet with other leaders?
MR. FLEISCHER: No, the President has no plans to travel. And you should not expect that. When the vote is taking place, the vote will take place at the normal levels of discussion for the United States government.
Q A follow? Ari, you said again today, as you did, I think originally last week, that if the U.N. fails to act, Iraq will be disarmed by another international organization.
MR. FLEISCHER: Correct.
Q Namely, the coalition that the United States has put together. You seem to be equating an ad hoc coalition that the United States has been able to form around one issue and one task with permanent bodies like the U.N. and NATO, which have charters formed by treaties, have charters and structures. Does the President believe that international affairs can be conducted entirely through ad hoc bodies like the one he's putting --
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, clearly the coalition of the willing will be a coalition assembled for the purpose of using force to disarm Saddam Hussein. So the answer is obviously yes. But the point I'm making here is that there are many ways to form international coalitions. The United Nations Security Council is but one of them. There are not the only group that can speak well about international organizations and international efforts. And that is why that if the decision is made to use force to disarm Saddam, it will be through a large coalition of the willing, through many other nations, not just the United States.
Q But ad hoc coalitions don't have formal rules and structures to make decisions. They make it up as they go along, as the United States is doing here with this coalition. Doesn't that play into criticisms that other countries and other people in other countries have made about the United States, that we are making up the rules as we go along?
MR. FLEISCHER: I'm not aware of anybody saying making up the rules as we go along. I think the President has been overt. The mission is to disarm Saddam Hussein.
Q Ari, given all the difficulty of pursuing the U.N. routes, the speech in September, the vote in November, now another vote, is there any second guessing going on in the White House among those who say that we should have not done this --
MR. FLEISCHER: You know, I've talked to the President about that, and the answer is, no. The President thought this was the right thing to do and thinks that it remains the right thing to do, for the same reasons he gave in his September 12th speech.
Now if the vote ultimately does not come out the way the President hoped it would, because of a veto, then I think that the President will remind the world about what he said in that September 12th speech, about the need to have international organizations that are effective in fighting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As I said earlier, that if the United Nations does not act, that there are other proliferators down the line who will celebrate the United Nations Security Council's failure to back up its own resolutions.
And that's why the President went to the United Nations. The President still is working hard to make the United Nations Security Council the organization that enforces its own resolutions calling for immediate disarmament.
Q Ari, another follow on the cluster bombs and the drone, if I may. Aside from the U.N. disclosure, does the United States have information of its own, independent, about either of these potential weapons systems?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, if you're asking me to discuss anything of a classified nature, I, of course, cannot do that.
Q More so that -- in other words, beyond what we know from the appendix.
MR. FLEISCHER: On the topic of the drones, if you recall, the President raised that in his speech in Cincinnati, last fall, which was a subject of concern that Iraq has been working to develop these.
What is notable here, that came out the very end of last week from the United Nations, is that they may have discovered something.
Q Yes, but he said the intelligence showed that we had those. Or they did.
Q The President has been reluctant to put forward any cost estimates on what the war might cost. But the Congressional Budget Office did so on Friday, suggesting the first month might cost $10 billion, and then $8 billion a month from there on out, until it's completed.
But, surely, since the President has been talking so much about reconstruction and making sure that a proper democratic government is allowed to take hold in Iraq, that schools will be rebuilt, that kind of thing -- the government must have some idea what the after cost might be?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, just as the President sa
id at the news conference last week, that in the event hostilities begin, a supplemental will be sent up to the Congress that takes into account best estimates at that time about what costs could be. They would include various areas of reconstruction, as well as military operations.
But unless that happens, I'm not in a position to speculate about what the cost could be.
Q Why not?
Q Why not? I mean, every time --
MR. FLEISCHER: For all the reasons I've been --
Q No, every time you guys put together --
MR. FLEISCHER: For all the reasons we've been giving for weeks on the same question.
Q Every time you guys put together a domestic policy initiative, there's a cost estimate attached -- even in its most preliminary phases.
MR. FLEISCHER: Because the variables of war are totally different from the variables of a domestic cost estimate. If Saddam Hussein surrenders and Iraq disarms on the first day in the first hour, that has one dramatic impact on the price.
Q Well, why not share the range?
MR. FLEISCHER: If it appears to be a lengthier price, then we would be in a position to know at that time. Until we have more information, it's very hard to make all these assessments with finality.
Q Ari, the March 17th date, does that have significance only in the U.N. context? Or is that a date that we're prepared to enforce? Or is -- are all bets off once the U.N. acts? If it doesn't approve that date, is the war on immediately?
MR. FLEISCHER: I think the best way to look at the March 17th date and say, what is this -- at this point, that is the date that has been given by the United Nations as part of the resolution that's been tabled. And so it's part of the diplomatic process about when the diplomacy will be brought to an end. In the event that the President decides to authorize a use of force, we have not indicated what the date may or may not be. Anything of that nature would come from the President, himself.
Q If the United Nations -- if the President's efforts are unsuccessful and the United Nations does not accept that March 17th date, is the message to those who want more time, that there is no more time as of that moment?
MR. FLEISCHER: As the President said, there would be warning to inspectors, to journalists, to others to get out. And in the event that there is anything further to be said about a date, it would come from the President, himself. So I can't speculate about whether this would or would not happen, or what the date may or may not be. The date of March 17th has been set by the resolution that would be tabled -- has been tabled per the diplomacy.
Q Ari, two follow-ups, one on Russia. In the President's recent phone call with Mr. Putin, did he get at all the impression that while they may not be with us, but at least they're not going to be against us, like -- which has been quoted in the press? Did he get that impression? And, secondly, on the cost estimate, why is it not appropriate now to have those cost estimates released, given that the Pentagon has made those estimates already? You said he would do it at an appropriate time, but why is now not an appropriate time?
MR. FLEISCHER: On your first question, again, it's the place of other nations to characterize their positions, it's not my place to --
Q But I'm talking about the President's impression, not what -- actually what Putin said.
MR. FLEISCHER: The President's impression is that if Russia has something conclusive to report, they will report it.
On the second part of your question, I've been answering it the same way for weeks -- that in the event that a supplemental is sent, we'll have information at that time, based on the numbers that are as accurate as final.
Q If the U.N. Security Council and the weapons inspectors maintain their present attitude or pattern, is the Bush administration committed to maintaining its present U.N. dues at the current high level?
MR. FLEISCHER: I'm not aware of anything that would indicate otherwise.
Q Why not?
MR. FLEISCHER: Because I think that this will require a period of assessment to determine, when the President talked about the relevance of the United Nations Security Council, and if it is not able to act and be relevant or effective, then I think that people would look at that issue, in terms of relevance and effectiveness. I have just not heard any discussion about that, dealing with dollars.
Q Ari, given the seriousness of a military operation against Iraq, and the feeling in the international community against such a war, even in those countries which have given support to the U.S. on this question, why is the President so averse of going to the United Nations himself, as is proposed by the French, to present -- to make his case personally? Is he not the best person to do that?
MR. FLEISCHER: Because the case will be made, and what will happen up in New York as the votes will be cast. The case will be made in the days and the moments leading up to the vote, not the show of hands, itself. And I think that all, but for maybe an extremely small number of leaders, when you look around the world, very few responded favorably to the French proposal to have a summit meeting to cast a vote. That really did not fall on very receptive ears in any pockets of the Security Council, with some exception. But very, very few.
Q Ari, you've said today that the United Nations Security Council doesn't have a monopoly on the organization of international bodies. But what it does offer is a certain international legitimacy. I'm wondering where a coalition outside of that would derive its legitimacy from in the international conscience?
MR. FLEISCHER: It would derive its legitimacy from, first of all, the legality is of course, as I said, expressed in resolution 678 of the United Nations resolutions. It's also expressed in the Constitution of the United States of America and the President's role as Commander-in-Chief. And of course, also, there is a vote in the Congress on the question of force, in the form of a resolution.
It also is derived from the will of the world to disarm Saddam Hussein, so that security around the world can be preserved. That, itself, derives a moral legitimacy.
Q Ari, haven't you, in your response to Bob's question and Ken's earlier questions declared the U.N., in effect, to be irrelevant already?
MR. FLEISCHER: No, I think that's a -- as the President said on September 12th, he hopes it will be relevant. And one of the ways the President will measure this, it's not only relevance, as I said, it's also, is it effective in enforcing its own resolutions about immediate disarmament.
And I think the vote, as far as the President is concerned, will be instructive.
Q As you point to other international organizations, coalitions, so forth, as a substitute for the U.N., why shouldn't that be taken as an official administration policy that the U.N. is irrelevant?
MR. FLEISCHER: The President has not reached that conclusion, that's why. A vote will take place, and if the President has anything further as far as in forming his opinions, he may have something to say about that. But at this point, what is happening is even with the United Nations Security Council vote, of course, there will be members of the Security Council who may vote "yes," who will not be providing combat troops, for example. So regardless of what the vote is, there will be other nations as part of the coalition of the willing, that provide the force to disarm Saddam Hussein.
Q Ari, on Mexico, this morning you seemed very confident that President Bush is going to get the support of the government of Mexico for the resolution. Why is that? Do you think President Fox already has buy the argument that it's a moral issue that is just -- or is it because he's afraid to get some actions against --
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, you know, if you go back weeks, I've always said that this is one of those issues -- Secretary Powell has said this, as well -- that the votes, we will know where the votes are the day the vote is cast. This is the United Nations
process. It is not atypical for member states of the Security Council to withhold their final vote until the day of the vote. That is part and parcel of the democratic process of the Security Council. The President respects it, and that's why he is working this issue and making phone calls to the various nations, calling undecided nations, calling other nations, for example, and urging them to call members of the Security Council. And so there's a whole round of diplomacy that's underway as nations -- sovereign nations like Mexico exercise their rights to think carefully, and then vote.
Q -- Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan, how has the President expressed about Japan's approach? Particularly, did the President ask Prime Minister Koizumi to make financial contribution of Iraq?
MR. FLEISCHER: Any type of involvement from other nations who are allied in this, they will speak for themselves about whether they will make any type of contributions toward reconstruction of Iraq, or to the future of Iraq. Those are issues for those nations to announce, not for the United States.
Q This March 17th date, is that part of the negotiation process? Could that be pushed back in order to get votes on the Security Council?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, clearly, the date was chosen because the drafters believed it was the most appropriate and the best date. As I indicated, there are consultations underway, and I'm not going to get into every shade of those consultations because they're fluid. These are consultations that are going to continue.
Q -- negotiation?
MR. FLEISCHER: I would just leave it at the date was selected because the drafters viewed it as the most appropriate date.
Q On what basis?
Q Ari, do you have any hope that the revelation on the UAV will sway any votes on the Security Council? And, secondly, what's the nature of that threat that the UAV that you're now pointing to poses to the United States?
MR. FLEISCHER: One, I made no predictions about outcomes at the Security Council based on any of this late-breaking evidence. Two, the risk is not only potentially to the United States. As a result of the manner in which these drones can be assembled, can be disassembled, can be easily transported, can be launched from a variety of places, that does present a threat to the United States if it comes in that form.
In the region, of course, it presents a threat to the United States because we have some 200,000 troops in the region. We have friends in the region. We have allies in the region. And even absent the build-up that is taking place now, we had American troops previously stationed in the region. So it does present a threat to America.
Q Ari, the Times editorial over the weekend quoting intelligence sources as saying al Qaeda is apparently moving assets into Iraq. Do you have any evidence of new al Qaeda movement there?
MR. FLEISCHER: There is nothing that has been reported to me. I have nothing new on that topic.
Q Ari, coming at this U.N. slightly differently, in spite of the optimistic words by you and Secretary Powell, it does seem that the second resolution is going to be stillborn. And going back to the 17 resolutions passed against Iraq, none of which have been enforced, it does seem now that the United Nations -- particularly the Security Council -- is impotent when it comes to taking action. And it appears it could go the way of the League of Nations. Is anybody advising the President for the United States to withdraw from the U.N. if it becomes, in his view, irrelevant?
MR. FLEISCHER: Did you say to withdraw from the U.N.? Was that the question? No, I have not heard any discussion about that.
Q Ari, has the President spoken with President Fox from Mexico, or is he planning to do that today? You mentioned the President is planning to speak with different leaders. And also, during the weekend, Ms. Rice mentioned the possibility to travel to the non-permanent members countries of the Security Council if necessary to convince each of them. Is there any plans for any high rank official to travel to Mexico? Any chance --
MR. FLEISCHER: As you can see from the Secretary's efforts and the President's efforts, they are both actively working the diplomacy, both in person and on the phone. Secretary Powell, of course, entertained a leading official from Guinea today. And I think you will be able to anticipate continued in-person diplomacy, as well as phone diplomacy.
On President Fox, as you know, our longstanding pattern is, if a phone call is made, we will do our best to report it to you. And so I've given you the ones that have taken place so far today. And as I indicated earlier -- and don't take this to be he will or will not get a call today or the next day -- but as calls or made, later this afternoon we'll give you a readout, after the next tranche of phone calls are made.
Q Ari, is the U.S. more optimistic now that there's been some political changes in Turkey, getting Turkish approval for the troops we base there?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, it remains to be seen. I don't want to presume the outcome of anything involving Turkey. We will see what Turkish leaders decide to do. This remains an issue that is important for the Turkish government to resolve.
Q Ari, a second question. There's been a lot of talk about trying to get the vote of the U.N. tomorrow. Is that a possibility, or do you think we'll -- negotiations?
MR. FLEISCHER: No, I think at some point this week, I'm not going to predict dates at this point. I'm not indicating it will be tomorrow, it certainly well could be any day later than tomorrow.
MR. FLEISCHER: Thank you.
END 2:10 P.M. EST