|Program Title||Security Assistance for Near East Asia|
|Department Name||Department of State|
Direct Federal Program
|Assessment Section Scores||
|Program Funding Level
|Year Began||Improvement Plan||Status||Comments|
The Department of State will continue to implement improvements to assure that vetting procedures for human rights concerns are systematically reviewed and reported to U.S. Department of State headquarters for participation in international miliitary education and training programs and other U.S.-sponsored security training.
|Action taken, but not completed||Actions are in response to GAO report on vetting students for human rights concerns, some action already taken including issuance of standard procedures for human rights vetting of students participating in U.S.- sponsored security training.|
In cases where Foreign Military Financing grant assistance is provided to countries without defined benchmarks to identify desired outcome improvements in force sturcture and/or capabilities, the Department of State will work to establish objectives that support the overall goals of the military assistance program.
|Action taken, but not completed||Improvement plan affects primarily large programs to Israel and Egypt to advance political goals rather than to achieve specific military capabilities. Smaller programs target specific improvements that focus on anti-terrorism and creating forces that are interoperable with the United States. Beginning in FY08, each country will have an operational plan that will include objectives and describe how funds allocated that year will be used to achieve them.|
|Year Began||Improvement Plan||Status||Comments|
Measure: Number of Near Eastern, FMF-recipient militaries which have military procurement programs based on long-term security strategies that address realistic threats, as confirmed by the regional combatant command, and which support both host nation and US security interests.
Explanation:Too often, FMF-recipient militaries seek procurement of weapon systems which are not appropriate for their national security threats, and these militaries often do not provide access to their national security planning process which leads to such procurement objectives. Since many of the region's militaries depend upon US-provided FMF to maintain their current equipment and for modernization, they should tie their procurement programs to US-approved long-term strategies which could eventually lead to a 'graduation' from large amounts of U.S. FMF funding.
Measure: Number of separate UN peacekeeping missions or coalition operations in which Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) FMF and/or IMET-recipient countries participate.
Explanation:While the number of UN peacekeeping missions varies from year to year, NEA IMET-trained solderis and officers continue to participate in increasingly large numbers, as well as in Iraq and/or Afghanistan. This growing participation is an indicator of interoperability and professionalism.
Measure: Number of IMET-trained military personnel in national leadership positions.
Explanation:This measure provides an assessment of the selection process for IMET participants as well as the value placed on U.S.-provided training. It also reflects the value of developing long-term military-to-military relationships as security officials with an understanding of U.S. values rise to influential positions of leadership in foreign governments. The number also provides an indicator of access to those positions of influence within the foreign governments. The information can be gleamed from the annual Combined Education and Training Program Plan (CETPP)
Measure: Success rate in achieving execution of International Education and Training (IMET) allocation consistent with training plan.
Explanation:Each embassy prepares an annual training plan for IMET that targets specific host country military and civilian officials for training in professional military education, technical skills, human rights awareness, and support for civilian control of the military. Identification of trainees, to include alternates, securing agreement on the training plan, and successful execution of the plan are important indicators of a well-managed program which contributes to achievement of the long-term country goals. This measure divides the executed amount of funding (not including turn-back amounts) over the original allocation for the region.
Measure: Number of Near Eastern militaries with units or members cited for numerous, serious human rights abuses.
Explanation:As measured by Department of State annual human rights reports, the main tool to eliminate such abuses is through training on human rights. Engagement with host countries also facilitates investigations of human rights abuses.
Measure: Number of violations by Near Eastern governments of requirements regulating the use, transfer, and sale of U.S.-origin equipment or technology provided under the authority of the Arms Export and Control Act.
Explanation:U.S. agreements to provide military goods and services under the Arms Export and Control Act include restrictions on the use, transfer and sale of such equipment under Section 3 of the Act. The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that non-state actors or unintended recipients do not gain access to such military equipment and technology.
|Section 1 - Program Purpose & Design|
Is the program purpose clear?
Explanation: The purpose of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) is to promote U.S. national security by preventing and responding to terrorism; enhancing regional stability (by including for legitimate defense needs); strengthen military to military ties; promote civilian control of the military and respect for human rights; facilitate access for U.S. contingency operations; and further interoperability for peacekeeping and coalition operations.
Evidence: 1. Section 503, Chapter 2, Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961; 2. Department of State Congressional Budget Justifications; 3. Section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (the authorities for grant assistance); 4. Section 541 (IMET) of the FAA; 5. the Department of State NEA Bureau Performance Plan (BPP) (Assistant Secretary Statement and the Goal Papers).
Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest, or need?
Explanation: Terrorism and regional instability in the Near East are two principle threats to U.S. national security. By contributing to the development of responsible and capable regional militaries through the provision of training and equipment, FMF and IMET enhance the capabilities of regional militaries to combat and prevent terrorism, and therefore, contribute to regional stability. The U.S. relies on many governments in the region for cooperation on a variety of defense-related issues, such as coalition support, peacekeeping operations, access to airspace and logistical nodes. These issues require close interoperability with the U.S. military, and FMF and IMET target these needs. Tailored FMF and IMET programs for individual Near Eastern countries are developed by the Embassy country team (with the resident security assistance organization as the lead agency), in close coordination with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and European Command (EUCOM). Early in the budget development process, a country-specific Security Cooperation Plan is written to include long-term strategic goals and the key military capabilities necessary to meet those goals. Based on these requirements (e.g., improving interoperability), outcomes and tasks are developed which are then generated into specific equipment and training requirements.
Evidence: 1. Embassy Mission Performance Plans (MPP); 2. NEA BPPs; 3. State Department Congressional Budget Justifications; 4. DOD reports, such as the the annual Combined Education and Training Program Plans (CETPP) for each country, as well as CENTCOM and EUCOM Theater Security Cooperation Plans
Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?
Explanation: FMF and IMET are the principle forms of U.S. security assistance. IMET complements other foreign assistance programs, by providing training opportunities for foreign military officers which contribute to their understanding of democracy, civilian rule of the military and respect for human rights, but it does not duplicate other programs offered by DOS or DOJ, for example. Training opportunities for foreign security officials are coordinated at the embassies to ensure that such individuals are not offered similar programs which might be redundant. Other DOD exchange and joint training programs are designed to benefit both U.S. and host nation military participants. FMF programs provide grant assistance to those countries ascribed a strategic importance but may not have sufficient funds available for military sustainment or procurement. FMF programs leverage other forms of security assistance, such as the use of Excess Defense Articles (EDA), but again, FMF is not redundant or duplicative.
Evidence: 1. NEA BPP; 2. Embassy MPPs; 3. State Department Congressiona Budget Justifications
Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?
Explanation: The State Department's Near Eastern Affairs Bureau (NEA) coordinates closely with the Political-Military Affairs Bureau (PM), the country teams at the posts in the region, and with the U.S. military's CENTCOM and EUCOM J5s and OSD/ISA/NESA to ensure a fully coordinated approach to FMF/IMET programming. Actual execution of the allocations is managed by PM, DSCA and the country teams, in coordination with the country teams and NEA. The design of the security assistance program for the NEA region cannot, however, be considered completely free of flaws if one considers input from a purely political perspective as a limit on effectiveness. For example, the majority of the secuirty assistance funding in the region (or across the globe for that matter), is limited to just two countries, Israel and Egypt, regardless of any U.S. requirements-based analysis. In other words, the amount of FMF funding allocated to these two countries annually, and for the forseeable future, is not necessarily directly related to specific and measurable security tasks in support of U.S. national security objectives.
Evidence: Department of State Congressional Budget Justifications; MPP's and both the NEA BPP and PM BPP; DSCA' web-based planning tools;Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs)
Is the program design effectively targeted so that resources will address the program's purpose directly and will reach intended beneficiaries?
Explanation: Country-specific FMF and IMET programs for NEA countries are developed by the Embassy country team (through the resident security assistance organization) and are reviewed by the regional combatant commands, the State Deaprtments Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) and Political-Military Affairs (PM) to ensure that the requested resources address the program's purposes. The programs are developed to meet specific goals and measures established by the regional combatant commands in the Theater Security Cooperation Plan, the country team's MPP and both NEA's and PM's BP. These plans include long-term goals and the key capabilities required to achieve these goals. Outcomes and tasks are developed from these required capabilities which target specific military audiences in the recipient countries. Resources are allocated for NEA security forces and/or their members. To ensure that unintended recipients (units and individuals) do not benefit from the program, recipients are identified in Letters of Offer and Acceptance between the USG and the ercipient government, and appropriate vetting is then conducted prior to execution of the program. Also, each recipient government must sign agreements with both the State Department and the Department of Defense to allow U.S. end-use monitoring of any equipment transfers.
Evidence: Country-specific Security Assistance Plans; NEA MPPs and both NEA and PM BPPs; Letters of Offer and Agreement; Department of State vetting cables ; End-use monitoring agreements (Blue Lantern and Sec. 505 agreements); Combined Education and Training Program Plans (CETPP)
|Section 1 - Program Purpose & Design||Score||100%|
|Section 2 - Strategic Planning|
Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?
Explanation: At the strategic level, the NEA BPP has goal papers and performance indicators for programs supported by FMF and IMET. In addition, CENTCOM and EUCOM, as well as the security assistance organizations at each NEA post, maintain specific long-term objectives and annual objectives for FMF-supported activities as part of their Security Cooperation Plans and the post MPPs. OSD also now develops a DOD Security Cooperation Guidance document which reflects long-term goals and measures. The Theater Security Cooperation Plans include outcomes and tasks that are supported by a variety of activities of which FMF and IMET are but just two of those activies. The capabilities, outcomes and tasks included in the Security Cooperation Plans for the basis of the security objectives and the FMF and IMET requests forwarded in the MPPs. For example, key goals of IMET training include selecting IMET candidates baesd on their potential to rise to senior positions in host country militaries and to respect human rights and civilian authority.
Evidence: NEA and PM BPPs; the State Department Congressional Budget Justifications; the CENTCOM and EUCOM Theater Security Cooperation Plans; the DoD Security Cooperation Guidance; the Combined Education and Training Program Plans (CETP)
Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?
Explanation: At the strategic level, ambitious and realistic targets, along with the related measures, are established through 2009 in the BPP and in each country MPP. Likewise, long-term security assistance goals for the region are detailed in DoD's Security Cooperation Guidance. For IMET programs, the long term goals are established for timeframes of 15-20 years.
Evidence: NEA's BPP and the regional country MPPs; the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) web-based planning tool; student performance reviews (for IMET); the Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP) and Country Security Cooperation Plans (CSCP) for both CENTCOM and EUCOM; the Combined Education and Training Program Plans(CETPP).
Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?
Explanation: Annual performance measures for FMF and IMET are established for both a regional as well as a country perspective. The country level objectives and targets (listed in both the country MPPs and the CSCPs) are detailed. These measures are reviewed annually--MPPs by the country teams at the embassies as well as by NEA; the CSCPs are reviewed at the annual security cooperation conference hosted by the appropriate combatant command (CENTCOM or EUCOM). The annual performance measures for the region are described in the NEA BPP as well as in the two combatant commands' TSCPs. As for IMET, the structure, policies and legislation governing this program allow for regular, periodic (usually semiannual) reviews of student performance as well as country program execution performance.
Evidence: BPP; country MPPs; TSCP and CSCPs; DSCA web-based planing tool; student performance reviews (for IMET); Combined Education and Training Program Plans(CETPP). Other key annual measures of performance include: ratio of administrative costs to program funding level; amount of IMET allocation expended compared to the training plan; number of NEA FMF-recipient countries which participate in peacekeeping or coalition operations, as well as the number of NEA soldiers trained in IMET-funded courses who particiapte in those operations
Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?
Explanation: Baselines and target development (as well as program execution) is planned on a country and program basis in the first instance. This information is used to develop regional baselines and targets (as in the BPP). All targets are ambitious and typically grow each year. For baselines, see PART key annual measures, as well as NEA's BPP and the MPPs. Jordan's FMF program, for example, has definitive baselines, goals, and targets in the MPP and in the Political-Military Implementation Plan. This rigor is attempted as well to those countries, such as Israel and Egypt, whose FMF is driven more by political considerations than purely needs-based analysis.
Evidence: NEA BPP and country MPPs; Congressional testimony and Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJ); DSCA web-based planning tool.
Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?
Explanation: To ensure full host government cooperation, detailed Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) are negotiated between teh USG and the host government. These LOAs include the terms of individual FMF programs (equipment, training, spare parts), and programs are assess at least annually by both DOD and State. The actual implementation of FMF programs occurs at the security assistance organizations at our embassies, in close coordination with their host nation military partners. CENCTOM, EUCOM, DSCA, NEA and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) all participate in program management. In addition, the U.S.-based education and training institutions that support IMET programs are full partners in the process. Key to the success of many of these programs is the commitment by the host nation countries. For example, host countries generally select officers who graduate 1st or 2nd from their own preparatory courses to attend the U.S. military professional education courses. typically, upon graduation, these foreign offiers return to become instructors at their own equivalent courses, often incorporating into their curriculum what they lerned at the U.S> course.
Evidence: NEA BPP and country MPPs; Congressional testimony; DSCA-web-based planning tool; LOAs.
Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?
Explanation: Most formal evaluations of the regional security assistance programs are conducted by State, DOD and the combatant commands, CENTCOM and EUCOM. There are independent evaluations of U.S. security assistance including formal reviews by the General Accounting Office and informal reviews by U.S. security policy sponsored by the DOD's senior service colleges, Congressional visits, civilian academic studies, as well as critics of U.S. security policy from within the region. Most external assessments of security assistance deal with the strategic policy objectives that are supported by FMF and IMET, such as the participation of recipient countries in U.S.-led coalitions or peace operations, rather than the FMF programs that supports these objectives. The Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) used by the combatant commands includes an assessment feature that reviews progress made towards each specific task listed in the CSCP for each country (this feature is still under development). Information provided by the recipient governments and private companies can also be crucial to the evaluation of our security assistance programs.
Evidence: Congressional testimony; the CENTCOM/EUCOM TSCMIS; upcoming GAO reports on security assistance to Egypt and to the Maghreb countries; SSC reports and papers; NGO reports (such as the Human Rights Watch Annual Report); journal articles
Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?
Explanation: At the strategic level, the MPPs and the BPP match resources to specific objectives and performance measures. The NEA BPP identifies the goals and measures for FMF-supported programs in the Goal Papers (CT.03, RS.02) and Performance Indicators. A parallel process is conducted by CENTCOM and EUCOM via the CSCP and TSCP. Then, for each country, and in coordination with the posts, an interagency (NEA, PM, OSD, combatant command) decision is made as to the levels of funding to request in support of the strategic goals and other foreign policy objectives. However, the programs for Israel and Egypt which total approximately 70% of all security assistance funding are based on political commitments resulting from the Camp David Accord. Therefore, the outcomes are not necessarily tied to performance measures. The original goal of the Camp David Accord was to maintain peaceful relations between Israel and Egypt by creating relativley balanced forces on both sides which would deter either side from military aggression.
Evidence: NEA BPP; MPPs; DSCA web-based planning tool; CENCTOM and EUCOM TSCMIS, TSCP and CSCPs; Congressional testimony and budget justifications.
Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?
Explanation: The regional stability and counterterror performance goals from the State/AID Strategic Planning Framework are synchronized with the long-term and annual goals for FMF. Several State/DOD working groups further coordinate program adminstration. The post security assistance organizations, the combatant commands and DSCA regularly collect and analyze information on program performance, and thenchange training schedules, deployments, equipment deliveries and sales, based on their analyses. NEA and PM also regularly review performance information and change programs and future budget requests when needed. It should be pointed out, however, that routine Congressional earmarking limits the flexibility of State and DOD to respond quickly to changing circumstances. The withdrawal of Syrian military forces from Lebanon and the evolving relationship with Libya provide examples of such challenges. In FY06, though, new authorities provided by Section 1206 and 1207 authorities addressed this limitation to a degree. Other situations which necessitate program adjustments include, funding allocations differing from the planned requests; unexpected student availability; sanctions (such as Global Trafficking in Persons tier ratings) or legislative holds (such as parking violation fees). Adjustments may also be required when a country cannot or does not expend its IMET allocations. Future FMF allocations may be reduced until prior year funds are expended.
Evidence: NEA BPP and the country MPPs; DSCA web-based planning tools; Congressional legislation
|Section 2 - Strategic Planning||Score||88%|
|Section 3 - Program Management|
Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?
Explanation: Federal partners and program managers are held accountable for cost, schedule, and performance results. The security assistance organizations, CENTCOM and EUCOM, and DSCA regularly collect and analyze information on program performance. These reviews lead to changes in training schedules, deployments, or perhapsthe return of unused funds for reallocation. Additionally, PM and NEA also review performance information. Some of these reviews are directly tied to regional objectives and targets, while others are tied to specific country program objectives and targets. The results of these reviews are reflected in changes to the programs in subsequent budget requests. For example, adjustments might be made when a country cannot expend its IMET allocation due to a lack of English language capabilities. Future FMF allocations may be reduced until prior year funds are expended.
Evidence: NEA BPP and MPPs; Congressional testimony;DSCA web-based planning tool; DIILS trip reports
Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?
Explanation: The Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) is a government-to-government agreement that defines the terms and conditions in accordance with the law. U.S. grant funds are controlled and managed by USG organizations with USG oversight. Funds for IMET are closely monitored by the educaiton and training institutions, embassies, Congress, and NGOs. Managers are held accountable through performance appraisals and/or performance evaluations.
Evidence: USG financial reports; Congressional testimony and record; formal program/financial management reviews. The AECA and FAA are the governing authorities for program implementation.
Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner, spent for the intended purpose and accurately reported?
Explanation: LOAs governthepace of spending and ensure that funds are spent for the intended purpose. Security assistance organizations conduct end-use monitoring. By law, IMET funds must be spent within one year or will be reallocated. IMET funds are in fact spent in a timely manner, despite the typical delay in availability due to the lack of a signed authorization bill well into a given fiscal year. Status of Funds reports are compiled on a monthly basis and are reconciled on a quarterly basis.
Evidence: LOAs; AECA and FAA
Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?
Explanation: For FMF-funded cases and IMET-funded training, the USG uses the same rules for the beneficiaries of funding as it does for itself. Web-based tools are increasingly used for program management. On an annual basis, State reallocates funding based on program execution status; program status information is provided by DSCA and the combatant commands.
Evidence: DSCA Policy guidance; AECA; FAA; annual appropriations legislation
Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?
Explanation: Given the direct links between terrorism and transnational crime (especially illegal narcotics trafficking), there is coordination of programs funded by INCLE, ATA, and those funded by FMF at the post level, reflected in the country MPPs. At the regional level, country team members and NEA, PM and DRL staffs coordinate INCLE, ATA and FMF counterterror programs to provide equipment and training to police and military personnel to ensure minimal duplication of effort. In most countries, the security assistance organizations will coordinate informally with other embassies to effect minimal coordination, or at least awareness of other similar national programs. Some FMF-funded programs in the NEA region are designed to complement and support other USG security assistance programs, such as Excess Defense Articles (EDA) and GPOI (Global Peace Operaitons Initiative).
Evidence: NEA BPP and country MPPs; Congressional testimony; CENTCOM and EUCOM TSCP and CSCPs; DSCA web-based planning tool; post reporting
Does the program use strong financial management practices?
Explanation: LOAs are overseen by DFAS Denver and the DSCA Comptroller, as well as the security assistance organization at the embassy, PM, and CENTCOM/EUCOM. Implementation of the program is followed by the security assistance organizations at the embassies, PM, and CENTCOM/EUCOM.
Evidence: DFAS reports
Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?
Explanation: By allowing partner agencies to simultaneously view and analyze the same data and recommendations, the DSCA web-based planning tool has made the management of FMF and IMET programs more efficient and transparent. For the Egypt program, the Deparments of State and Defense are working to examine ways assistance funding for modernization of the Egyptian armed forces can be better measured.
Evidence: DSCA web-based planning tool
|Section 3 - Program Management||Score||86%|
|Section 4 - Program Results/Accountability|
Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?
Explanation: Although most FMF is allocated to just two countries (Israel and Egypt), in fact these countries have been at peace with each other since the inception of the program. As for the rest of the NEA countries, FMF and just as importantly, IMET, has resulted in much stronger security relationships with some of the recipients (Jordan, for example), and might have contributed to a deterrent effect within the Gulf over the past decade (there is no overt way in which to measure this). This security assistance is also contributing to Yemen's increasing capability to enforce the rule of law within its own borders and combat the terrorists who have been using the lawless hinterlands as safe havens. The NEA BPP and country MPPs document similar results achieved towards long term goals and specific targets. In addition, there is significant and increasing cooperation on a broad range of defense issues. A number of NEA countries have and continue to participate in coalition operations as well as peacekeeping operations. Achieving a common level of interoperability has been crucial to this accomplishment. there remains, however, considerable work to be done increase the capabilities and professionalism of many of the militaries with the region. Such security assistance will be critical, for example, to our success in Iraq.
Evidence: GAO reports on security assistance to Egypt and to the Maghreb countries; think tank reports; NGO reports; NEA BPP and MPPs; Congressional testimony; DIILS trip reports;DSCA web-based planning tool
Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?
Explanation: Progress has been demonstrated across the range of annual performance goals in the MPPs and the BPP, limited only by reduced resource appropriations.
Evidence: NEA BPP and MPPs; Congressional testimony; DSCA web-based planning tool; CENTCOM/EUCOM TSCMIS; DIILS trip reports; think tank reports; NGO reports
Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?
Explanation: The Department of State is seeking efficiencies in this program by ensuring that all FMF-recipient countries have military procurement programs that address the proper threats, achieving efficiency by working to fund only items that meet realistic host nation and US security interets. NEA conducts rigorous interagency MPP reviews, just as CENTCOM and EUCOM conduct their security cooperation reviews, leading to improved efficiency in achieving the goals spported by FMF and IMET. Excellent coordination with DOD and INL enhances efficiency and ensures funding is not redundant. The IMET program also provides periodic reviews of student performance as an indicator of program effectiveness and efficiency. While this process will ensure that resources are properly targeted, the measures provided do not indicate that any progress has been made.
Evidence: NEA BPP and MPPs; CENTCOM/EUCOM TSCP and CSCPs; Congressional Budget Justifications
Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?
Explanation: IMET is an effective USG program, and compares favorably with civilian scholarship programs. The influence planted by IMET programs among the ruling elite around the globe is lasting. FMF is the principle vehicle for providing US security assistance, and there are no other comparable private or USG programs (of similar scale). However, most funding supports security assistance programs Egypt and Israel that are not explicitly assessed based on how these programs achieve US security goals.
Evidence: NEA BPP and MPPs; Congressional testimony and Budget Justification
Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?
Explanation: Various evaluations show that NEA FMF and IMET programs have achieved their intended results, with the possible exception of the programs for Israel and Egypt. The extaordinary size of the FMF programs to these two nations over such a long period of time has led to some criticism. These programs, however, are exceptional in that they are products of a political process rather than a more rational security assistance analysis. A recent GAO report on the FMF assistance program for Egypt found that although the Egypt program was seen to support US foreign policy goals, State and DoD do not asesss how the program specifically contributes to those goals. The report also found that DoD has not determined how it will measure progress in achieving key goals such as interoperability and mondernization of Egypt's army.
Evidence: Reports from the Center for Strategic Studies (CSIS) and other 'think tanks;' GAO reports on security assistance for Egypt; NGO reports; SSC reports and papers; DSCA reports; Congressional Research Service reports, as well as Congressional testimony and budget justifications
|Section 4 - Program Results/Accountability||Score||47%|