|Program Title||Economic Support Fund for the Western Hemisphere|
|Department Name||Department of State|
|Agency/Bureau Name||Department of State|
Competitive Grant Program
|Assessment Rating||Moderately Effective|
|Assessment Section Scores||
|Program Funding Level
|Year Began||Improvement Plan||Status||Comments|
Work closely with counterparts to track program performance.
|Action taken, but not completed|
Coordinate as appropriate to utilize the most efficient and effective funding mechanism.
|Action taken, but not completed|
|Year Began||Improvement Plan||Status||Comments|
Measure: The ratio of administrative costs to ESF non-cash transfer program funding
Explanation:This indicator measures the cost of funding WHA programs.
Measure: Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
Explanation:The CPI measures one aspect of our efforts to promote democracy in the region: local citizens' perceptions of corruption in their countries (10 = highly clean; 0 = highly corrupt).
Measure: Countries w/ the equivalent of a Freedom of Information Act
Explanation:Adoption of FOIA-type statutes in 13 ESF countries
Measure: Countries adopting government ethics codes
Explanation:This indicator measures the number of ESF countries (out of 13) that have adopted government ethics codes, which indicates efforts to improve transparency and accountability.
Measure: Percentage of ESF funds that have been obligated 4 months after WHA receives its final budget line item allocations
Explanation:This indicator measures WHA's efficiency in moving funds available for obligation to the intended beneficiaries.
|Section 1 - Program Purpose & Design|
Is the program purpose clear?
Explanation: ESF is authorized through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to furnish assistance "in order to promote economic or political stability." WHA uses its democracy programs to foster political stability in the region. ESF funds have been so used to support friendly governments faced with difficult economic decisions, build democratic traditions in formerly authoritarian states, promote like-minded voting in international bodies, and encourage resolution of regional conflicts.
Evidence: a. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 531. b. FY05 State Dept. Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) (www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2005/). c. WHA cable to posts on FY06 Mission Performance Plan (MPP) priorities. d. FY05 MPPs for Ecuador and Panama. e. The FY05 Bureau Performance Plan narrative (BPP). BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers:
Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest or need?
Explanation: Democratic governance is a relatively new phenomenon to most of the Western Hemisphere, and recent incidents of civil unrest reflect frustration that the promise of democracy remains unfulfilled for many. Some of the world's most intractable poverty and greatest income inequality can be found in this region. In support of Section 531 of the Foreign Assistance Act, FY 2006 ESF will be spent in 12 countries and through 5 regional programs to foster democracy and good governance, expand economic opportunities and trade capacity building, and improve environmental protection and conservation efforts in the Western Hemisphere. Through the Third Border Initiative, ESF will be used to strengthen border and immigration controls and aviation safety and security in the Caribbean.
Evidence: a. ECLAC of the United Nations Statistical Yearbook (www.eclac.cl/default.asp?idioma=IN). b. World Bank Group Regional Overview (wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LAC.nsf/ECADocByUnid/53AEDA6320C3215285256CFE00518DF0?Opendocument). c. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Annual Report (www.iadb.org/aboutus/I/hi_ar_2003.cfm). d. Transparency International (TI) corruption index (www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2003/2003.10.07.cpi.en.html). e. World Bank corruption index (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data.html). f. Freedom House Annual Survey of Freedom on democracy (www.freedomhouse.org/research/survey2004.htm). g. USAID CBJ (www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/request.html). h. State Dept. CBJ. BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers:
Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?
Explanation: The development of efficiency measures is new as of this year's PART. The agency has not yet developed specific plans and procedures to thoroughly measure and improve efficiencies in program execution.
Evidence: a. Albright/Anderson Guidance Memo on Foreign Assistance Coordination. b. FY05 State CBJ. c. FY04 USAID CBJ. d. Congressional Notifications for reprogrammings of ESF to Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Venezuela. e. Notes from JPC subgroup on sources of foreign assistance.
Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?
Explanation: ESF is designed to be a unique and complimentary lever that the USG utilizes to further its political and economic goals in the region. It reinforces and supplements other types of U.S., third-country, and multilateral foreign assistance, but remains the most flexible funding source to promote short- to medium-term U.S. foreign policy interests. WHA takes an active role in managing ESF and works closely with USAID to coordinate ESF with Development Assistance (DA) and Child Survival and Health (CSH) funds. AID and State created a Joint Policy Council subgroup that focuses exclusively on distinguishing between these funding sources. As examples of the flexible nature of ESF funds, WHA reprogrammed FY 2004 ESF to support the democratic process in Venezuela, buttress the Govt. of the Dominican Republic in response to civil disturbances, maintain political stability and democratic order in Bolivia, and sustain the interim Govt. of Haiti after the fall of Pres. Aristide.
Evidence: a. NSPD on Western Hemisphere Strategy b. Western Hemisphere Strategy matrices. c. WHA Senior Review PowerPoint slides. d. Discussion paper on possible reprogrammings for FY 2004. e. Notes from JPC Working Group on ESF/DA delineation. f. Congressional Notifications on reprogrammings of ESF for: 1. Bolivia 2. Brazil (Zero Hunger) 3. Dominican Republic 4. Guatemala (CICIACS commission on human rights abuses) 5. Venezuela
Is the program effectively targeted, so that resources will reach intended beneficiaries and/or otherwise address the program's purpose directly?
Explanation: Foreign policy priorities and specific country or regional needs determine how and where WHA and USAID apply ESF resources in the region. Performance indicators are then developed at the post or mission level to match performance to goals and confirm whether or not resources are being applied effectively. WHA has begun the development of annual regional performance measurement and will continue to refine these measures through ongoing coordination with USAID which is the primary implementer. Long-term regional performance measures have already been established and are monitored to track progress. There is evidence that programs "graduate" - for example, the Admin. of Justice account will be closed in FY 2005 since WHA determined that its goals could better be achieved bilaterally. WHA will use the recent NSPD/Western Hemisphere Strategy to lay the foundation for the FY 2006 WHA Bureau Performance Plan. As a guide, in FY 2004 WHA will spend 70% of ESF on democracy, 28% on economic growth/trade, and 2% on other sectors.
Evidence: a. USAID Annual Reports (AR), formerly called the Results Review and Resource Request (R4) (www.dec.org/partners/ardb/). b. FY04 USAID CBJ. c. USAID's EVALWEB (www.dec.org/partners/evalweb/). BPP Evidence: Goal Papers:
|Section 1 - Program Purpose & Design||Score||100%|
|Section 2 - Strategic Planning|
Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?
Explanation: The breadth of activities funded with ESF means that mission performance measures may vary from country to country, but WHA does have regional performance goals and measures relating to its long term objectives of fostering stability through democracy and good governance, and economic growth and development. For democracy activities funded by ESF, WHA's long-term goals are to reduce corruption (Transparency Intl.) and expand basic freedoms (Freedom House) for countries receiving ESF. For economic growth and development activities, the World Economic Forum Growth Competitiveness Index score will measure economic progress. ESF performance goals support other top priority WHA BPP initiatives such as a peaceful democratic transition in Cuba, strengthening democratic institutions, and reducing poverty.
Evidence: a. WHA FY 2005 MPP guidance cable to the field b. WHA FY 2005 Bureau Performance Plan (BPP). c. FY 2005 Mission Performance Plans (MPP) for Ecuador and Panama. d. FY05 WHA BPP resource request table for ESF. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers:
Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?
Explanation: Ambitious targets are established in the WHA BPP for each of the long-term ESF performance goals, and are projected out for three years beyond the current fiscal year. All of these have quantifiable performance measures and targets. For example, WHA has set a goal of 5% annual growth in the World Economic Forum Growth Competitive Index score for this region through FY 2007, even though FY 2003 PART results saw a contraction from the FY 2002 baseline. WHA has established aggressive targets for both the Transparency Intl. corruption index and Freedom House freedom indices to measure progress on democracy activities. At the same time, WHA responds to new political and economic developments in the region by redirecting ESF funds in the short-term (either through reprogrammings or the annual budget process) to higher priority targets, such as has been done in FY 2004 with Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala (CICIACS) and Venezuela.
Evidence: a. WHA BPP. b. World Economic Forum Growth Competitive Index (www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/Global+Competitiveness+Programme%5CGlobal+Competitiveness+Report) c. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2003/2003.10.07.cpi.en.html) d. Freedom House, "Freedom in the World" (www.freedomhouse.org/research/survey2004.htm) BPP Evidence: Goal Papers:
Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?
Explanation: WHA has developed new annual performance measures through FY 2006 that support long-term ESF performance measures for democracy and economic growth activities. However, it is somewhat unrealistic to think that most activities funded by WHA ESF have regional impacts that can be measured on an annual basis. It is unlikely that a democracy program in Country X can significantly affect the TI Corruption Perceptions Index for the region from one year to the next. Therefore, WHA is working with USAID to develop country-specific, output-based annual indicators, and plans to have those in place for the FY 2007 BPP/PART process next year. Note that annual ESF reprogrammings serve to meet annual performance goals, such as funds redirected to the Dominican Republic in preparation for elections in May 2004. Those funds supported intl. election observers who were widely praised for their contributions to free and fair elections.
Evidence: a. FY 2005 WHA BPP. b. World Economic Forum Growth Competitive Index (www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/Global+Competitiveness+Programme%5CGlobal+Competitiveness+Report) c. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2003/2003.10.07.cpi.en.html) d. Freedom House, "Freedom in the World" (www.freedomhouse.org/research/survey2004.htm) e. Congressional Notification on Dominican Republic election observers BPP Evidence: Goal Papers:
Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?
Explanation: WHA has set appropriately ambitious targets to meet by FY 2006.
Evidence: a. FY 2005 WHA BPP. b. World Economic Forum Growth Competitive Index (www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/Global+Competitiveness+Programme%5CGlobal+Competitiveness+Report) c. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2003/2003.10.07.cpi.en.html) d. Freedom House, "Freedom in the World" (www.freedomhouse.org/research/survey2004.htm) BPP Evidence: Goal Papers:
Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?
Explanation: WHA and USAID/LAC Bureau work together to ensure a focus on achieving the long-term goals of strengthening democracy and improving economic growth and development in the Hemisphere. Each year, each agency reviews the other's regional planning and budgeting documents in order to coordinate goals at the regional level. This coordination between State and USAID also affects USAID's country-level strategic objectives, which are developed to support the overarching long-term objectives for the region. Nonetheless, because WHA does not have regional annual performance goals for ESF resources, the annual objectives are developed solely by USAID missions at the country level. The grantees and contractors that implement ESF funds commit to supporting the annual and overall strategic objectives that are set at the country level. The USAID Bureau for this region is in the process of developing regional performance measures, and OMB encourages State and USAID to work closely together to coordinate the improvement of annual and long-term performance measures for the WHA region.
Evidence: a. FY 2004-2009 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan (www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/). b. Automated Directives System (ADS) Section 350 guidance on SOAgs (www.usaid.gov/pubs/ads/). c. Sample SOAg (www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/350mac.pdf). d. ADS 300 guidance on assistance and acquisition. BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers:
Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?
Explanation: Regular independent evaluations have been conducted, primarily through USAID's mechanisms; however, OMB recommends that State/WHA take a more active role in requesting and structuring regular evalutions in the future. State Dept.'s Office of the Inspector General (IG) conducts periodic reviews of bureau and post operations, with a review of WHA completed just last year. The USAID EvalWeb publishes periodic assessments and evaluations by sector or theme. One example is a recent PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) study of the ESF-funded Cuba program. PWC found the Cuba program to be effective, especially considering Cuban Govt. obstacles and the difficult political environment.
Evidence: a. AR report for Guatemala (www.dec.org/partners/ardb/index.cfm?fuseaction=ouPage.start). b. USAID EvalWeb assessments (www.dec.org/partners/evalweb/). c. FY05 WHA BPP. d. IG Report on WHA. e. PWC report on the Cuba program (www.usaid.gov/regions/lac/cu/program_report/).
Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?
Explanation: There is not sufficient evidence that budget requests are tied to the accomplishment of annual and long-term performance goals. The bureau has not sufficiently integrated performance and results analysis into its resource allocation and request processes, and OMB urges WHA to develop a more rigorous approach to annual strategic budgeting, which includes data on performance, and that will result in consideration of reallocation of ESF resources partly based on performance.
Evidence: a. State Dept. FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report (www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/perfrpt/2003/). b. FY 2005 WHA BPP. c. MPPs for Ecuador and Panama. d. November 2003 trip to Bolivia and Peru. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers:
Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?
Explanation: WHA is working to improve its BPP and performance reporting. A comparison of the FY 2004 WHA BPP with the FY 2005 shows a greater focus on the most important bureau initiatives, a greater effort at simplicity and clarity, tighter performance indicators and targets for out-years, and a better link between the priorities identified in the Asst. Secretary's Statement and strategic and performance goals. WHA is working with USAID to develop annual performance measures for each post's ESF programs to better evaluate performance as one component of ESF budget requests. A WHA analyst is now traveling to ESF recipient countries to review programs. WHA uses ESF to respond to changing conditions in the region, making long-term strategic planning for ESF somewhat tenuous. The flexibility of ESF that is such an asset to the Bureau in practical terms makes strategic planning more difficult.
Evidence: a. WHA BPP for FY04 and FY05. b. IG report.
|Section 2 - Strategic Planning||Score||90%|
|Section 3 - Program Management|
Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?
Explanation: WHA and USAID require funding recipients to manage, monitor, and report project performance information on a regular basis. These requirements are incorporated as standard clauses in contracts and grant agreements. The overseas posts (AKA Operating Units or OUs) collect performance reports from recipients on a quarterly, semi-annual, and annual basis through the Annual Report (AR) and Performance Management Plan (PMP). As an example of management action resulting from poor performance, the economic growth/income generation component of the Ecuador program ran into difficulties when CARE took the calculated risk of providing loans through two local NGOs with no experience in such matters. After an independent evaluation in FY02, USAID suspended the income generation component of the Southern Border program and concentrated efforts in the other three components (social services, local government strengthening, and natural resources management).
Evidence: a. AR for Guatemala. b. USAID LAC Bureau review of Guatemala AR. c. Post Performance Management Plan (PMP) with El Salvador. d. USAID's ADS 202.3.6. e. USAID adherence to 22 CFR 226, ""Administration of Assistance Awards to US Non-governmental Organizations,"" section 226.51, ""Monitoring and reporting program performance."" (www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_03/22cfr226_03.html) f. ADS 303.7. BPP Evidence: Goal Papers:
Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?
Explanation: Contracts, grants and cooperative agreements contain clauses related to periodic progress/performance and financial reporting that are used to monitor activities. Past performance of contractors is considered in accordance with Federal Acquisition Requirements. Most ESF is implemented in the field by USAID working through contractors or grantees. A cognizant technical officer (CTO) is designated for each USAID program to manage contractors and grantees. CTO's review and approve vouchers, monitor contractor/grantee performance and financial pipelines, and oversee subgrants. In addition, through USAID's personnel evaluation process, activity managers are evaluated for effective management of agreements, and staff who serve as local managers for country programs are assessed according to their contributions toward the Mission's Strategic Plan. Input is sought from supervisors, peers, and clients on performance as part of the annual evaluation process.
Evidence: ADS 300. One exception to the general rule that USAID implements ESF programs overseas is the Administration of Justice (AOJ) program, where the Dept. of Justice through its ICITAP program has managed some country programs. However, in 2 countries during FY 2002, WHA in conjunction with its Chiefs of Mission became dissatisfied with ICITAP as the program manager and transferred program management to INL.
Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?
Explanation: Obligations and other information are tracked through the USAID Phoenix tracking system. The LAC Bureau in USAID has very small amounts of carry-over funds vs. funds made available. The USAID CBJ provides information by Strategic Objective (SO) for all posts' budget requests, expenditures and program performance and results. USAID's Automated Directives System (ADS) Section 602 also provides specific guidance regarding forward funding of program funds. Finally, all posts are required to prepare procurement plans that outline planned procurements and obligations and help ensure that funds are spent in a timely manner and for the intended purpose.
Evidence: a. Phoenix Flash Report. b. FY04 USAID CBJ. c. ADS 602.
Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?
Explanation: The development of efficiency measures is new as of this year's PART. The agency has not yet developed specific plans and procedures to thoroughly measure and improve efficiencies in program execution.
Evidence: ADS 300 provides the overall guide (ADS 302 for Contracts and 303 for Grants).
Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?
Explanation: State and USAID share a joint Strategic Planning Framework, and work closely at the bureau and at the country level through the MPP process. In addition, as implementing agency for the ESF program, USAID coordinates through a variety of mechanisms: memos of understanding and 632(a) arrangements with other Federal Agencies; inter-agency working groups, such as with the U.S. Trade Representative on trade issues; and the Consultative Group with other donor agencies. Finally, WHA and USAID actively seek public-partner alliances in common development areas.
Evidence: a. State-USAID Strategic Plan. b. MPPs for Ecuador and Panama. c. Interagency coordinating memo on the Third Border Initiative account. BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers:
Does the program use strong financial management practices?
Explanation: USAID implements most of WHA ESF funding. Through the Federal Managers Financial IntegrityAct (FMFIA)/Management Control Review Committee process, USAID ensures that resources are protected against fraud, waste and abuse and that they achieve the results for which funds were appropriated. The process requires each OU in the LAC Bureau to do a self-assessment of the adequacy of management controls in all areas of agency operations including program, administrative, and financial management. Each OU submits an FMFIA memo to the LAC Bureau, which in turn submits a Bureau memo to the USAID Administrator. LAC grants and contractors are also subject to audits. Currently, the Phoenix system is used for Washington accounting and the MACS system for field accounting, using two systems has created a disconnect between the two. USAID plans to roll out the Phonenix system to the field, which will resolve the outstanding problems. It is anticipated that a first LAC pilot Mission (USAID/Peru) may begin Phoenix operation in mid-FY 2004. Other pilot Missions will follow a few months later depending on the success of the first pilot. Once Phoneix is deployed to all missions, OMB anticipates agencies getting a "yes" answer for this question.
Evidence: a. ADS 620. b. ADS 596. c. FMFIA checklist. d. Post-completed FMFIA analysis with Ecuador as example. e. USAID LAC Bureau FMFIA memo to USAID Administrator dated October 29, 2002. f. Report on Material Weaknesses - Ecuador. g. USAID guidelines for recipient-contracted audits (www.usaid.gov/oig/legal/audauth/rcapguid.pdf).
Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?
Explanation: USAID is actively addressing its weaknesses in financial management as described in 3.6. At the post level, missions address deficiencies or weaknesses that can appropriately be resolved at that level. Any significant deficiency or material weakness is reported to USAID's LAC Bureau and included in the Bureau FMFIA memo to the Administrator. In 2002, missions were also specifically requested to complete an information system security checklist, and the LAC Bureau has recently undertaken management assessments of its posts. For countries in which both ESF and DA are spent on democracy or economic growth activities, WHA and LAC work closely together to ensure that the two different types of funds are directed to different activities (now part of the Joint Policy Council process). For example, the democracy program in the Dominican Republic uses DA funds to promote greater civil society participation while ESF funds strengthen the judicial sector and support anti-corruption activities.
Evidence: a. ADS 620. b. FMFIA checklist. c. Post-completed FMFIA analysis with Ecuador as example. d. USAID LAC Bureau FMFIA memo to USAID Administrator dated October 29, 2002. e. Report on Material Weaknesses - Ecuador. f. FY04 USAID CBJ on the Dominican Republic.
Are grants awarded based on a clear competitive process that includes a qualified assessment of merit?
Explanation: To the maximum extent permitted by legislation and statute, USAID and WHA Bureau's contracts and grants are awarded competitively, except where supported by documentation approved by officials with authority to approve non-competitive awards. Decisions on grant and contract awards are properly documented (via selection memos, memos of negotiation, etc.). USAID Washington (via the Office of Procurement) reviews and provides oversight to ensure adherence to Federal regulations and Agency guidance on competition.
Evidence: ADS 300;ADS 202.3.9
Does the program have oversight practices that provide sufficient knowledge of grantee activities?
Explanation: A Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) is designated for each program to manage contractors and grantees. CTO responsibilities include technical review and approval of vouchers, monitoring contractor/grantee performance and financial pipelines, and overseeing subgrants.
Evidence: Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) responsibilities as detailed in ADS 303.3 for Grants and ADS 302.3 for Contracts.
Does the program collect grantee performance data on an annual basis and make it available to the public in a transparent and meaningful manner?
Explanation: Disclosure to the public on results is done by USAID at the agency level and also by Strategic Objective, which goes down to the country level. USAID CBJs and evaluations are available on the USAID website through the Development Experience Clearinghouse.
Evidence: USAID Performance and Accountability Reports; USAID Congressional Budget Justifications; USAID website
|Section 3 - Program Management||Score||80%|
|Section 4 - Program Results/Accountability|
Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?
Explanation: All countries in the region save Cuba have democratic, constitutional governments, a vast improvement from 1980 when less than half did. It can be argued that WHA ESF has contributed to this democratization, but without any performance measurement systems in place over these years to demonstrate that ESF has met its targets, it is not possible to justify a YES answer. It is important to also note that ESF is an important factor in generating support for U.S. positions on multilateral issues. Support from the region is a relevant indicator of a successful ESF program, and OMB notes that WHA should consider developing an additional long-term indicator to reflect this. WHA countries generally supported us on counterterrorism and early UN voting on Iraq, and four also sent troops to Iraq. Canada extended its presence in Afghanistan. For the 2nd year, WHA countries voted with the U.S. on Cuban human rights violations at the U.N. Comm. on Human Rights. In WHA, 7 countries voted with us, and only Cuba against. Measure passed by 1 vote. Since the program has not had annual measures in place until recently, it is impossible to assess progress towards future long term targets. Reviewing just the 2002 to 2003 changes in the indices that WHA uses as long-term indicators, we see a very slight decrease in progress.
Evidence: a. Secretary Powell's 2004 address to the Council of the Americas (www.state.gov/secretary/rm/32100.htm). b. Voting Practices in the United Nations 2003 (www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/c12061.htm). c. ECLAC, "Positive Signs of Economic Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean," December 2003 (www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/prensa/noticias/comunicados/5/13865/P13865.xml&xsl=/prensa/tpl-i/p6f.xsl&base=\tpl-i\top-bottom.xsl). d. World Bank in the Latin America and Caribbean Region 2003 (wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/LAC.nsf/ECADocByUnid/53AEDA6320C3215285256CFE00518DF0?Opendocument). e. USAID strategic report entitled ""Foreign Aid in the National Interest,"" (www.usaid.gov/fani/). f. 2004 testimony by WHA Asst. Sec. Noriega on "Foreign Assistance Priorities for the Western Hemisphere" (www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/30070.htm) and by USAID Asst. Admin. Franco (www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/30320.htm) on aid to the region. BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers:
Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?
Explanation: WHA developed new annual performance measures for ESF and has not yet been able to assess progress towards these new annual goals. To date, WHA utilized the same third-party indices that are used as long-term performance measures on an annual basis. OMB did not accept these third party indices as useful performance indicators for ESF on an annual basis, since they cannot be linked closely enough to the programs and activities funded with ESF. Furthermore, where the bureau does have more than one year of data on these indices (corruption index and economic competitiveness index), the results show a slight decline in progress in the region.
Evidence: a. WHA BPP FY 2005. b. AR report for Guatemala (www.dec.org/partners/ardb/index.cfm?fuseaction=ouPage.start). BPP Evidence: Goal Papers:
Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?
Explanation: Improved coordination with USAID over the past year has the potential to reduce programming inefficiencies, and has resulted in slightly faster obligation of funds. Example - Average ESF pipeline was reduced from 10.8 mo. to 9.3 mo. between 9/03 and 3/04. This is a positive sign. To make progress the bureau needs to continue this coordination with USAID to set and meet ambitious targets for its new efficiency performance measures.
Evidence: a. ADS 302. b. FY 2004 State CBJ (www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2004/). c. FY 2004 USAID CBJ (www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/request.html). d. FY 2005 State CBJ (www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2005/). e. FY 2003 ESF pipeline report. f. FY 2004 (through March) ESF pipeline report.
Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?
Explanation: USG foreign assistance programs are generally regarded as the model by which other donors determine success. WHA believes ESF spending in the region is effective and at least comparable to any other source of similar funding, but it is not supported by evaluations that assess ESF and USG work alongside the work of other donors. ESF assistance has been important in motivating other donors. For example, USG efforts to democratize Cuba through ESF have spurred the EU to do the same. WHA and USAID have joined with Japan to conduct joint activities in Mexico in HIV/AIDS and the environment, just one example of donor coordination and acknowledgment by other donors of the effectiveness of USG assistance programs. In Peru, sectoral donor coordination groups ensure that bilateral and multilateral donors avoid duplication of efforts on such issues as gender, education, and poverty reduction.
Evidence: a. FY 2004 USAID CBJ. b. USAID CDIE Development Statistics reports. c. Memo to the Secretary on initial estimates for funding needed for Haiti reconstruction (classified). d. News article - USAID statements on donor coordination for Haiti. e. Table on donor assistance in South America (http://esdb.cdie.org/cgi-bin2/broker.exe?_service=default&_program=programs.product_donor_2.sas&pcty=0SAM+&year=2002+&output=1&x=39&y=9). f. Table on donor assistance in Central America & Mexico (http://esdb.cdie.org/cgi-bin2/broker.exe?_service=default&_program=programs.product_donor_2.sas&pcty=0NCA+&year=2002+&output=1&x=37&y=11). g. Memos and news articles showing U.S. leadership in donor coordination for Haiti and Bolivia.
Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?
Explanation: A GAO study of democracy programs in six Latin American countries was conducted in 2003. That study found broad success, while also noting the difficulty in measuring success in democracy activities and the need for long-term commitment from host country leaders. State Dept.'s Office of the Inspector General (IG) conducts periodic reviews of bureau and post operations, with a review of WHA completed just last year. In FY 2004, WHA analysts began on-site visits to ESF programs in the region. Some independent evaluations are conducted at the country level as well. For example, WHA/USAID hired PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) to evaluate the ESF-funded Cuba program recently. PWC found the Cuba program to be effective, especially considering the difficult political environment and obstacles set up by the Cuban Government. WHA is working with USAID to develop a process for regular, independent evaluations at the country level.
Evidence: a. GAO report on democracy programs in select Latin American countries (www.gao.gov, report #GAO-03-358). b. Sample CDIE assessments on democracy programs (www.dec.org/pdf_docs/pnacg633.pdf, www.dec.org/pdf_docs/pnaca904.pdf). c. IG Report on WHA. d. PWC report on the Cuba program (www.usaid.gov/regions/lac/cu/program_report/).
|Section 4 - Program Results/Accountability||Score||52%|