|Program Title||Contributions to International Fisheries Commissions|
|Department Name||Department of State|
|Agency/Bureau Name||Department of State|
|Assessment Section Scores||
|Program Funding Level
|Year Began||Improvement Plan||Status||Comments|
Reinforcing the independence and increase the transparency of the constituent advisory committees by changing applicable legislation. This applies to commissions that are or could be significantly impacted by constituent advisory committees.
|Action taken, but not completed||The Administration is consulting with Congress on legislation to implement the renegotiated treaty establishing one commission as well as the re-authorization of implementing legislation for another commission. Both will include provisions governing the appointment process for delegates to the advisory committees, in order to ensure that a broad range of stakeholders are represented.|
Implementing a system of independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality for each commission.
|Action taken, but not completed||State DAS Balton led a process at the June 2007 Informal Consultation of States Parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement to develop common criteria for measuring the effectiveness of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) that will form the basis for upcoming performance reviews of each of the tuna RFMOs, and may be used by other RFMOs as well. US proposals for comprehensive, independent performance reviews of two more RFMO??s adopted; reviews will occur in 2008.|
Verifying that all commissions are undergoing annual, independent financial audits, have rules in place requiring a periodic change in auditors, and that State receives copies of all audit reports.
|No action taken|
|Year Began||Improvement Plan||Status||Comments|
Improving its program-wide measures, in order to evaluate the outcome and results of the fisheries commissions. In particular, State will increase the number of outcome-oriented measures and efficiency measures in the 2007 Bureau Performance Plan.
|Completed||State has included seven performance measures in the 2007 BPP, including three efficiency measures and four outcome measures. Four measures are program-wide measures.|
Prioritizing its budget recommendations within each commission, based on the performance of each commission and the degree to which each commission contributes to program goals.
|Completed||State has directed the use of its funds within several bilateral commissions toward projects that will increase the performance or efficiency of several commissions. State has also advocated for increased efficiencies and high-priority activities in annual budget and finance meetings of each multilateral commission.|
Measure: Number of multilateral regional fisheries management organizations implementing comprehensive schemes to improve compliance with conservation and management measures by both members and non-members.
Explanation:Successful measures and catch limits to achieve sustainable exploitation of shared fisheries resources must include comprehensive schemes to address both member and non-member fishing that undermines the commissions' management regimes. Relates to long-term measure re: elimination of IUU fishing.
Measure: Level of ratification and subsequent implementation of the comprehensive sea turtle bycatch provisions of of the Inter-American Sea Turtle Convention (IAC) and Indian Ocean Sea Turtle MOU (IOSEA MOU). For years 2003-2005, the first number is for signatories to IOSEA MOU and the second number is for Parties to IAC. 2003 represents the baseline figures and the following years represent additional signatories/parties. In 2006, the measure changes to reflect the percent of IAC parties that have adopted sea turtle bycatch reduction measures for trawl fisheries. In 2007, the measure reflects the percent of IAC parties that have adopted sea turtle bycatch reduction measures for pelagic fisheries.
Explanation:Participation in these agreements by all fishing States in each region will ensure the broadest possible application of measures to minimize the bycatch of highly endangered sea turtles and build support for ecosystem-based fisheries management schemes. These measures relate to the long-term measure regarding the recovery of depleted stocks.
Measure: Estimated parasitic sea lamprey abundance in all Great Lakes as a percentage of the maximum target level that would allow for healthy fish populations. 100% is the ideal. (%)
Explanation:Complete eradication of all sea lamprey from the Great Lakes is not scientifically possible, but commercially- and recreationally-caught fish stocks in the Great Lakes can return to levels of abundance if parasitic sea lamprey populations are reduced to a target level. Relates to long-term measure re: recovery of depleted stocks.
|Section 1 - Program Purpose & Design|
Is the program purpose clear?
Explanation: The purpose of the State Department's International Fisheries Commissions program is to lead and coordinate U.S. input to the ten international fisheries commissions and organizations to which the U.S. belongs. Within these commissions the State Department advances U.S. interests including freedom of navigation, protecting of economic interests (fishing rights) and the well being of coastal communities, and environmental/habitat protection. The purpose of each commission, which the U.S. supports, is to facilitate international cooperation to achieve the conservation of the target living marine resources and/or sustainable use of fish populations. The ten multilateral and bilateral fisheries commissions also oversee the allocation of fishing rights to the U.S. and other members. Funding for the U.S. assessments and shares of operating expenses for the international fisheries commissions are funded by the State Department International Fisheries appropriation account.
Evidence: Evidence stating the purposed of the commissions and the U.S. interests in participating in them is set out in treaty texts and U.S. law. Most of the commissions were established by treaties that the United States negotiated and ratified to protect its economic and environmental interests. The main functions of each organization are described in its treaty. U.S. law implementing the treaties defines the State Department's mission as well. The bulk of U.S. funding goes to four commissions, approximately 95 percent of the appropriated funds (Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Pacific Salmon Commission, and Inter Pacific Halibut Commission). Treaties and Agreements Establishing Commissions. Relevant U.S. implementing legislation. ff. Interagency guidance document on the Department of State's responsibilities concerning oceans and marine resources;
Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest or need?
Explanation: Each fisheries commission was created to address a specific need to manage and sustain the target fish stock and to protect the economic interests of its members. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations estimates that 75% of the world's commercial fish stocks are being fished at or beyond sustainable levels. International law requires that countries who exploit shared fisheries resources must cooperate directly or through regional organizations to manage them. Effective study and conservation of other parts of the marine environment affected by fishing can also only happen through international cooperation. Each component commission grew from the recognition of a specific need for cooperative management or scientific collaboration; new agreements were then negotiated with relevant nations, submitted to the Senate for advice and consent, and ratified. The oldest agreement, the IPHC, was formed in 1924 to reverse sharp declines in halibut abundance from overfishing. The most recent, the IAC, grew from concern in the late 1990s that bycatch of endangered sea turtles needed to be addressed internationally.
Evidence: The UN Food and Agriculture Organization's State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2002 and several other subsequent reports clearly define the problem of dwindling commercial fish stocks and the need to track, analyze, and research fish stocks using international cooperation on fishing. Fish collection data is collected and reported by the individual commissions as well as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. See www.fao.org Also, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy Preliminary Report states that "intensive exploitation of fish populations at the international level is jeopardizing global marine life and the marine environment." See www.oceancommission.gov
Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?
Explanation: The funding for the international commissions resides with State and State is the U.S.'s lead on diplomacy; however, the technical expertise, regulatory development and enforcement capability required to meaningfully participate in many of the commissions resides in other agencies, such as the National Marine Fisheries Commission. State does coordinates its efforts with several other technical agencies to advance U.S. goals in these commissions. The Department oversees finance and administrative management of all component commissions and ensures that measures taken in one commission are consistent with USG policies in other commissions, and overall foreign policy goals. State is the lead agency for 3 commissions (Antarctic, CCAMLR, IAC). National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration is the main partner agency in 12 commissions where it leads on science and stock management issues and ensures consistency with domestic management. State and tribal governments also provide technical expertise in 5. USCG coordinates enforcement issues in 5 commissions. Other partners include USFWS and Army Corps of Engineers, who administer lamprey control programs in the GLFC, and NSF, who coordinates science issues within CCAMLR and the Antartic Treaty.
Evidence: The overlap with other federal programs is apparent in the implementing legislation of several of the treaties. For example, the Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1982 assigns "general responsibility to carry out the Convention" to the Secretary of Commerce. In addition Commerce is tasked to "adopt such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of the Convention." The implementing legislation for the Inte-American Tropical Tuna Commission, designates that "at least one [U.S. Commissioner] be either the Administrator, or an appropriate officer, of the National Marine Fisheries Service." Also, State is authorized with the concurrence of the Secretary of Commerce to "approve or disapprove the general annual programs of the commissions" and Commerce is delegated rulemaking authority. (U.S.C. Title 16 Chapter 16, Sec. 951-962) ff. Interagency guidance document on the Department of State's responsibilities concerning oceans and marine resources; gg. Delegation guidance document distributed by Department representatives to all commission meetings; hh. Letter from GLFC Chairman regarding Department of State's role; ii. Example of State's role - e-mail with foreign policy advice on participation of "Northern Cyprus" in ICCAT; jj.-vv. Participant lists from Annual Reports
Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?
Explanation: Participation in these commissions allows the United States to share the costs and effort required to study and mange shared living marine resources with its bilateral and multilateral partners. Membership in these commissions allows US fishers access to fisheries worth over $7 billion annually, not including the unquantifiable benefits of healthy whale stocks and better marine science. Effective participation in these organizations requires striking a balance between scientific, commercial, regulatory and foreign relations equities and the Department of State is best placed to evaluate these sometimes conflicting interests. U.S. has been successful expanding the impact of 4 commissions (GLFC, NPAFC, ICES, PICES) in particular by leveraging other funding sources for specific research initiatives. There is no evidence demonstrating that the multi-agency shared responsibilities for international fisheries within the USG is the most efficient or effective design.
Evidence: The mechanism of international fisheries commissions is likely the most efficient design for managing a large shared resource. However, there is no evidence that the multi-agency shared responsibilities model is the most efficient way of managing U.S. participation. There is evidence that there is a clear overlap of functions and changes to the current configuration have been considered. The Senate 2004 appropriations bill for State transferred the functions of State's Office of Oceans and Fisheries to the International Fisheries Division of the National Marine Fisheries Service as the bill eliminated all of OES. The Conference bill did not include the provision. Senate Commerce Justice State Appropriations bill. (S.1585 - Section 621). a. - p. Treaties and Agreements; q. FY 2005 Congressional Presentation Document; ww. Example - BASIS program as outgrowth of NPAFC
Is the program effectively targeted, so that resources will reach intended beneficiaries and/or otherwise address the program's purpose directly?
Explanation: The program supports coordinated conservation and study of shared resources and protects fisheries access by U.S. commercial, recreational, and tribal groups. Four of the component commissions account for over 90% of the total program budget; in each of these between 80-90% of the budget goes directly to program activities such as stock assessments, other research, sea lamprey control, fishery observers and enforcement programs. Of the remaining 10, budgets are kept smaller by having most research carried out by member states, and commission secretariats serve to coordinate and publish the studies, plus manage catch and compliance statistics and facilitate meetings and symposia. Administrative expenses in these commissions average about 50% of the budget. In all 14, DOS reviews detailed expenditure reports and audits at each annual meeting to ensure funds were spent as intended. Increases to the overall program budget are explicitly earmarked for specific program activities.
Evidence: q. FY 2005 International Fisheries Commission Congressional Presentation Document, xx. - kkk.. Finance and Administration Reports of component commissions.
|Section 1 - Program Purpose & Design||Score||80%|
|Section 2 - Strategic Planning|
Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?
Explanation: Whereas the fisheries commissions have long-term measures, the OES fisheries program has few adequate measures. Most of the measures in the Bureau Performance Plan are focused on process outputs and are not tied to outcomes or indicate that the program is able to use budgeting to promote results and accountability. For example, the first long-term goal is "Fulfill obligations pursuant to treaties and agreements....." Processing payments to the commissions is not an indicator of OES success. On the other hand, long-term measures related to fish stocks, etc. are in place for all 14 commissions. Measures related to 9 commissions are integrated into OES strategic initiatives to conserve living marine resources, level the economic playing field for U.S. fishers, and combat economic crime. Those that are not reflected in the OES Bureau Program Plan are set in the planning documents of the OES offices who manage the program. Measures include reducing populations of parasitic sea lamprey and increasing native fish stocks in the Great Lakes (GLFC), finalizing implementation of two outstanding requirements of the 1999 Pacific Salmon Agreement (PSC), improving knowledge of migration patterns and distribution of Pacific halibut (IPHC), ratifying and securing entry into force and/or full functioning of new conservation agreements (IATTC/IAC/Antarctic), rebuilding stocks and improving compliance and enforcement rules (ICCAT/NAFO/CCAMLR), establishing ecosystem-wide scientific reports (ICES/PICES).
Evidence: There is enough evidence to give a Yes answer based on the long-term measures in the commissions that OES has also adopted. However, the measures of State's activities as provided in the BPP indicate that the program has no meaningful way to capture the most important aspects of the program purpose. As a result, this question will receive less weight. lll. OES/OMC Priorities for 2004; mmm. OES/OA Priorities for 2004; nnn. GLFC Strategic Vision for the First Decade of the New Millennium; ooo. The ICES Strategic Plan; ppp. Report of progress towards PICES Strategic Plan BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: SE.02 Environmental Protection EP.02 Trade and Investment IC.02 International Environmental Crime
Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?
Explanation: 11 of 14 commissions have set targets and timeframes for measures. The OES Bureau Program Plan includes specific targets for measures involving 8 of the commissions. The U.S. also works within component commissions establish specific targets and timeframes for relevant measures to achieve these goals. For example ICES, PICES and NPAFC have adopted long-term strategic plans to implement research plans and the GLFC adopted a decade-long workplan to achieve lamprey control by 2010. Two management commissions (ICCAT/NAFO), have set 10- or 15-year rebuilding plans to restore specific depleted fish stocks.
Evidence: These documents include the targets and time frames for long term goals. nnn. GLFC Strategic Vision for the First Decade of the New Millennium; ooo. The ICES Strategic Plan; ppp. Report of progress towards PICES Strategic Plan; qqq. NPAFC Science Plan 2001-2005; rrr. Recommendation by ICCAT Relating to the Rebuilding Program for North Atlantic Swordfish; sss. Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a Rebuilding Program for Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna; ttt. NAFO Rebuilding Plan for Greenland Halibut, Article 7 of NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: SE.02 Environmental Protection EP.02 Trade and Investment IC.02 International Environmental Crime
Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?
Explanation: 10 of 14 have specific annual measures that measure progress towards long term targets. The OES Bureau program plan identifies measures for 8. The Department also negotiated strategic plans of the two science organizations that set specific annual measures to work towards the long-term research goals. The seven commissions whose mandate includes allocation of fishing rights also have specific annual measures to manage stocks from baseline levels to levels that support a maximum sustainable yield. These measures require parties to set target stock sizes based upon scientific analysis, recommend annual catch limits, review compliance, and make necessary adjustments, such as closures of fisheries when catch limits are reached.
Evidence: jj. - vv. Annual Reports; lll. OES/OMC Priorities for 2004; mmm. OES/OA Priorities for 2004; qqq. NPAFC Science Plan 2001-2005; uuu. Example of multi-year fisheries catch levels, ICCAT (2) vvv. - zzz. Conservation and Management Measures BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: SE.02 Environmental Protection EP.02 Trade and Investment IC.02 International Environmental Crime
Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?
Explanation: Annual measures established for the program include specific baselines and targets; for example in the GLFC. All 7 commissions that allocate fishing rights to members define baselines and targets for stock management. Two set multi-year catch limits with a specific baseline catch level and a rebuilding target. Others establish a statistical definition of the baseline biomass and the long-term target biomass that will produce the largest possible sustainable yield and set annual catch limits each year based on the most recent scientific analysis of total stock size. The United States works to ensure this annual process results in progress towards both our long-term goals to conserve these stocks and the annual targets we identify in the OES Bureau Program Plan.
Evidence: jj. - vv. Annual Reports; aaaa. Example - Targets and timeframes for PSC measures bbbb. Example - Targets and timeframes for GLFC sea lamprey control; cccc. IPHC Research Program 2004 BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: SE.02 Environmental Protection EP.02 Trade and Investment IC.02 International Environmental Crime. lll.OES/OMC priorities for Fy 2004. nnn. GLFC Strategic Vision paper.
Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?
Explanation: Other USG agencies (e.g. NOAA, FWS. USCG) who works with the Department to represent the U.S. in these commissions help develop goals and measures through the interagency position-setting process and commit to their implementation. The Department provides guidance to relevant stakeholders, states, and non-governmental organizations that participate in U.S. delegations to the component commissions and commit to working towards agreed measures. Other countries and the U.S. indicate their commitment to the goals of the organizations by ratifying the treaties, by implementing the international rules and standards established under the treaties, and by enforcing fishing limits set by the commissions. US also monitors the efforts of commission secretariat staffs to ensure the organizations are meeting the goals and targets by providing relevant scientific information, statistics, and compliance information.
Evidence: Several documents show that the country members of the commissions commit to and work toward the goals. Also, U.S. documents show that the interagency team coordinates to work toward the goals. a. - p. Treaties and Agreements; gg. Delegation guidance document distributed by Department representatives to all commission meetings; jj. - vv. Annual Reports of the fisheries commissions; Member votes in commissions on finance and budgets,(Reports on Finance and Budget, Financial statements, Notes of Member meetings on finance).
Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?
Explanation: There is no evidence provided that shows that independent evaluations of sufficient scope are conducted on a regular basis. The last OES inspection was conducted by the Department's Inspector General in 1997 and included a review of both program and financial management of the program. Another is scheduled for spring 2005. The components and quality of the proposed IG study is unknown. The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy is completing an evaluation of State and USG participation in these commissions in 2004. As for the effectiveness of the commissions themselves -- 6 commissions have formal constituent advisory committees that provide an annual assessment of effectiveness and relevance to beneficiary needs and recommend new initiatives. It is unclear that the advisory committees are independent. Through U.S. efforts to increase transparency within the commissions, international industry or environmental organizations also annually review the performance of the commissions to determine whether they are meeting production or conservation goals. Organizations like Seafood Watch and Traffic conduct periodic assessments of the status of the fish stocks and the effectiveness of the commissions managing them.
Evidence: dddd. Report of 1997 OIG Inspection of the OES Bureau; eeee. - mmmm. Advisory Committee Charters and Reports; nnnn. Seafood Watch Seafood Reports on Pacific Halibut and Yellowfin Tuna; oooo. TRAFFIC Bulletin on Patagonian toothfish; pppp. Humane Society report on IAC
Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?
Explanation: Budget requests for the four commissions that constitute over 90% of program funding are specifically tied to performance measures. For example, funding requests for GLFC increased almost $2 million from FY 2000 to FY 2002 to support efforts to increase alternative lamprey controls and decrease dependence on chemical lampricides. Within commissions, the U.S. requires transparent and detailed justifications how budget proposals will accomplish key goals. Once overall commission budgets are set, US contributions for all but two (Antarctic and IAC) are based on treaty-mandated formulas. Lack of full funding for the 3 bilateral commissions (GLFC, PSC, IPHC) has a direct affect on their ability to meet performance goals. As a smaller part of the overall budget, changes to U.S. contributions in the other commissions has less of a direct affect on program achievements, but in most cases underfunding means the U.S. loses its vote and the leverage to affect the management of the programs.
Evidence: q. FY 2005 Congressional Presentation Document; xx- kkk. Finance and Administration Reports; qqqq. International Fisheries Commissions FY 2002 Congressional Presentation Document; rrrr. Minutes of Extraordinary Session of the PSC August 21, 2003 BPP Evidence: A/S Statement:
Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?
Explanation: OES has established specific goals and indicators for this program for the first time, to complement measures and targets related to these commissions that are integrated into overall Bureau goals and initiatives. These specific goals and indicators as provided in the BPP are more output than outcome oriented.
Evidence: BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: SE.02 Environmental Protection EP.02 Trade and Investment IC.02 International Environmental Crime
|Section 2 - Strategic Planning||Score||68%|
|Section 3 - Program Management|
Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?
Explanation: The Department monitors progress towards goals through participation in meetings of all commissions, direct contact with secretariat support staff and collaboration with partner agencies through the interagency process. All 10 fishery commissions regularly (generally monthly or quarterly) report on catch and landing data, compliance information, and results of stock assessments and research. As start-ups, the IAC and Antarctic Treaty Secretariat are in the process of developing regular reporting mechanisms. Department reviews regular publications of the two science organizations to assess progress of research. Department and partner agencies use this data to assess progress towards long-term goals and develop positions and new initiatives to press for within the commissions.
Evidence: jj. - vv. Participants lists from Annual Reports; ssss. Example of monthly commission reporting - March 2004 NAFO Provisional Catches letter; tttt. International Agreements Concerning Living Marine Resources of Interest to NOAA Fisheries BPP Evidence: Goal Papers: SE.02 Environmental Protection EP.02 Trade and Investment
Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?
Explanation: Responsibilities for managing the commissions in this program are distributed among 10 officers in OES/OMC and OES/OA. They are a key component of these officers' overall responsibilities to direct and manage international marine conservation policy, and each officer's work requirements reflect the program's long-term goals. Individual staff members are evaluated annually, and continuing employment is potentially contingent on performance of program duties. The Executive Secretaries of each of the component organizations are appointed subject to the continuing approval of the Parties and are held accountable for administrative and programmatic results.
Evidence: a. - p. Treaties and Agreements; uuuu. OES/OMC Foreign Affairs Officer Job Elements and sample evaluation (Civil Service); vvvv. OES/OMC International Affairs Officer Job Elements (Foreign Service). - hhhhh. Financial Regulations of Component Commissions.
Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?
Explanation: DOS obligates money as soon as possible according to the payment schedule of component organizations. According to annual reviews of actual expenditures, all 12 fully-functioning commissions spend funds according to approved budgets within acceptable variance. The two start-up commissions (IAC and Antarctic Treaty Secretariat) have yet to report a full year's expenditures. Most commissions have a policy in the rare instances where all payments made by commission members are not spent in the designated year, that the excess is kept in a working capital fund and used to reduce overall budgets and assessments in the following year.
Evidence: jj. - vv. Annual Reports, xx. - kkk. Finance and Administrative Reports; iiiii. OES/DRL-EX Commissions Accounting Documents
Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?
Explanation: There are no regular procedures in place to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness. State provided examples of how efficiencies are reached within some commissions on an ad-hoc basis. For example: 1) Where research is conducted by grantees, commissions award research funding on a competitive basis; in all cases research activities and costs are reviewed annually by the member countries. 2) Four commissions follow zero real growth budget policies, two have achieved savings through consolidating intercessional meetings, 3) four have implemented e-mail communications and electronic publishing. 4) GLFC negotiated a set-rate contract for lampricide at about a 40% discount.
Evidence: The evidence provided by the Agency does not support a Yes answer by showing that procedures are in place to ensure the most efficient use of funding. The agency emphasized ad-hoc activities. jj. - vv. Annual Reports; xx. - kkk. Finance and Administrative Reports; jjjjj. Example - NAFO service and cost initiative; kkkkk. Example - GLFC Plan to decrease lampricide use; lllll. Example - IWC Plan to reduce intercessional meeting costs
Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?
Explanation: The Department leads delegations to three commissions and coordinates interagency consultations in the others. Priorities and goals for each organization are developed through both informal consultations with partner agencies and through the Oceans Sub-Policy Coordinating Committee. Recent successes only possible through effective interagency coordination include the adoption of a ground-breaking trade-based compliance regime in ICCAT, successful negotiation of the revised IATTC Convention, and swift implementation of a new project to prevent invasive Asian carp from reaching the Great Lakes. All 3 bilateral commissions (GLFC/PSC/IPHC) coordinate closely with state and local government efforts on habitat restoration and management. Multilateral organizations also collaborate with and through the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and APEC. Science commissions maintain MOUs with management organizations to coordinate research projects and avoid overlap or duplication of effort.
Evidence: jj. - vv. Annual Reports; mmmmm. Example - informal State/NOAA/USTR consultations to develop comprehensive trade proposal at ICCAT; nnnnn. Oceans Sub-PCC April 7, 2004 agenda and highlights; ooooo. Memo to DAS West on IATTC convention renegotiation; ppppp. ICCAT Advisory Committee Chair's report of the 2003 ICCAT Meeting; qqqqq. GLFC Asian Carp Press Release; rrrrr. Third Meeting of Regional Fisheries Bodies and FAO, March 2003; sssss. Sample ICES and PICES MOUs on science cooperation with management bodies (5)
Does the program use strong financial management practices?
Explanation: The OES bureau manages the funds appropriated to the program in accordance with all Federal standards. OES continuously reviews each organization's budget, income, and asset sheets, and any concerns must be addressed before payments are made. Within the program, accounting and financial management practices vary from organization to organization, but all commissions employ independent auditors, have adopted financial regulations that require best practices, and are subject to ongoing oversight by the parties. OES reviews and edits the financial regulations and rules of procedure before they are adopted by component commissions, to ensure they contain required checks and balances and reflect good management.
Evidence: xx. - kkk. Finance and Administrative Reports; - hhhhh. Financial Regulations; ttttt. Independent audits of commissions (8) found each commission in compliance with its own financial regulations and standard accounting practices.
Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?
Explanation: The data provided by State supports a No answer. According to State, "These programs are not managed as a group. They have been grouped only to expedite PART analysis. Problems with individual programs are corrected by the commissioners (usually Presidential appointees) and periodic OES reviews. The State Department Inspector General provides a higher level of oversight." Clearly, State makes management decisions that directly affect the operation of these commissions. For example, State reprograms funding between unrelated commissions to suit State's policy/program goals.
Evidence: The evidence provided does not show that State or the commissions have a system for identifying and correcting program management deficiencies and uses the system to make corrections. Also, no evidence was provided to show that corrections are made. dddd. Report of 1997 OIG Inspection of the OES Bureau
Does the program have oversight practices that provide sufficient knowledge of grantee activities?
Explanation: OES staff participates on, and sometimes lead, U.S. delegations to the meetings of all 14 commissions and work continuously with both commission secretariats and other parties to design, review, and approve the commissions' activities. OES also reviews each organization's budget, income, and asset sheets and requires that any concerns be addressed before payments are made.
Evidence: jj. - vv. Participants lists from Annual Reports; xx. - kkk. Finance and Administrative Reports
Does the program collect grantee performance data on an annual basis and make it available to the public in a transparent and meaningful manner?
Explanation: Through the public advisory process that seeks the input of members of the public into U.S. activities within these commissions, the Department and its partner agencies provide detailed information on the performance of these commissions. The Department also works closely with the National Marine Fisheries Service to produce its annual report on all international agreements related to living marine resources. This document, which is widely distributed to constituent groups and available online, details the budget and program activities of each of the commissions within this program.
Evidence: eeee. - mmmm. Advisory Committee Charters and Reports; tttt. International Agreements Concerning Living Marine Resources of Interest to NOAA Fisheries
|Section 3 - Program Management||Score||78%|
|Section 4 - Program Results/Accountability|
Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?
Explanation: Most of OES's long-term goals are process-oriented. The answer of Large Extent is based on the outcome goals of the fisheries commissions which OES shares. Fisheries are demonstrating progress towards performance goals. According to State, U.S. funding shortfalls have led the Pacific Salmon Commission to curtail activities in 2003 and 2004; thus has stalled progress towards resolving the two remaining elements of the 1999 Agreement.
Evidence: jj. - vv. Annual Reports; uuuuu. GLFC Lake Committee Reports on sea lamprey abundance; vvvvv. NOAA Press Release on N. Atlantic Swordfish, October 2002; Report of PICES Organizational Review; xxxxx. Example - Establishment and achievement of long-term measure: Precautionary Approach implementation in NASCO; yyyyy. Letter to DAS Balton and NOAA Fisheries Administrator Hogarth on affects of shortfalls on PSC functions BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: SE.02 Environmental Protection EP.02 Trade and Investment IC.02 International Environmental Crime
Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?
Explanation: The specific annual performance measures for this program are new and have not been assessed, but all annual targets within program-related measures in the OES Bureau Program Plan were met or exceeded in 2003. All multilateral fisheries management organizations have effective processes for setting annual catch limits, management measures, and stock abundance targets. According to State, the PSC's ability to meet annual targets has also been hampered due to U.S. funding shortfalls.
Evidence: uuu. Example of multi-year fisheries catch levels, ICCAT (2); vvv. - zzz. Conservation and Management Measures; cccc. IPHC Research Program 2004; yyyyy. Letter to DAS Balton and NOAA Fisheries Administrator Hogarth on affects of shortfalls on PSC functions. BPP Evidence: A/S Statement: Goal Papers: SE.02 Environmental Protection EP.02 Trade and Investment IC.02 International Environmental Crime
Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?
Explanation: The program highlights three efficiency measures among these commissions; one is new but the other two are already yielding significant savings. Overall, 7 of 10 commissions have maintained nearly level budgets while continuing steady or increased workloads. Funding for the program as a whole increased 16% from FY 2001 to FY 2004, but most of that increase went to strengthen sea lamprey control through the GLFC, which is subject to its own efficiency measure. Less the GLFC amount, program costs increased one percent during that period, while the number of commissions funded went up by one.
Evidence: q. FY 2005 Congressional Presentation Document; xx. - kkk. Finance and Administrative Reports; qqqq. International Fisheries Commissions FY 2002 Congressional Presentation Document; jjjjj. Example - NAFO service and cost initiative; kkkkk. Example - GLFC Plan to decrease lampricide use; lllll. Example - IWC Plan to reduce intercessional meeting costs
Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?
Explanation: This is the only program with a mandate to support treaties and agreements that conserve and manage shared marine living resources through international cooperation. Similar programs exist to facilitate cooperative management of shared living resources domestically or to promote conservation internationally, but none have all three elements of international cooperation, environmental conservation, and resource allocation.
Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?
Explanation: No independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality exist. The 1997 inspection by the Department's Inspector General offered no recommendations for changes. Although some component commissions have been more successful than others in adopting effective measures to sustain and protect living marine resources, assessments by non-governmental organizations, global bodies such as the FAO, and independent assessments like the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy have reiterated the vital role of regional fisheries commissions in facilitating international cooperation to conserve and manage living marine resources. The Oceans Policy Commission specifically recommended the Department of State continue to support international oceans science bodies. CCAMLR, IAC, and IPHC have specifically been cited by environmental groups as excellent examples of cooperative international conservation and management.
Evidence: State provided examples of reports that compliment commissions work. None analyze the impact of its programs. t. UN Food and Agriculture Organization's State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture; u. Draft Report of the U.S. Commission on Oceans Policy, Chapters 19 and 29; dddd. Report of 1997 OIG Inspection of the OES Bureau; nnnn. Seafood Watch Seafood Reports on Pacific Halibut and Yellowfin Tuna; oooo. TRAFFIC Bulletin on Patagonian toothfish; pppp. Humane Society report on IAC
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