|Program Title||Andean Counterdrug Initiative|
|Department Name||Department of State|
|Agency/Bureau Name||Department of State|
Direct Federal Program
|Assessment Section Scores||
|Program Funding Level
|Year Began||Improvement Plan||Status||Comments|
Develop long-term and annual outcome measures that build toward a desired end state for the alternative development component of the program.
|Not enacted||The Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance has standardized the collection and reporting of performance information for Foreign Assistance programs in its Operational Plans, including USAID's Alternative Development projects in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Furthermore, the Alternative Development component of the program was moved into Economic Support Funds (ESF) and Development Assistance (DA) funds for FY 2008 and beyond.|
Implement nationalization strategy in Colombia to increase cost sharing and host government control of the program.
|Action taken, but not completed||Implement nationalization strategy in Colombia to increase cost sharing and host government control of the program.|
|Year Began||Improvement Plan||Status||Comments|
Ensure that the State Department INL Bureau's new financial management system can track and report information needed to inform strategic planning and resource allocation decisions.
|Completed||The INL Bureau implementated the new financial management system Lima, Peru, La Paz, Bolivia and Bogota, Colombia in FY 2007. All are utilizing the system to manage project finances; and program officers will use current and historical reports as a component in planning future resource requirements.|
Link annual funding requests for each component of the program to relevant program goals.
|Completed||The Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance took the lead in linking foreign policy objectives to the annual budget request. The FY 2008 Budget Submission linked program objectives to funding requests.|
Measure: Flying hour cost (measured in U.S. dollars) for aerial coca eradication in Colombia
Explanation:Measures the flying hour cost for eradicating one coca hectare in Colombia. Costs are estimated to rise temporarily as spraying becomes less economical. It assumes that in 2005 aircraft will increase efficiency as the aircraft refurbishment program begins.
Measure: Metric tons of cocaine produced in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. The long-term goal is to reduce production by almost 80% to 210 metric tons (MT) by 2010.
Explanation:The measure demonstrates the effectiveness of ACI programs designed to help the governments of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia to eradicate coca crops, destroy drug processing labs, and halt the diversion of precursor chemicals to drug processing.
Measure: Hectares of coca cultivated in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.
Explanation:By reducing the number of hectares under coca cultivation, the program will ultimately reduce the supply of processed cocaine shipped to the United States.
Measure: Disrupt the shipment of cocaine from the Andean Region to the United States. By 2008, the annual level of cocaine seizures by partner governments should reach 35% of estimated pure cocaine produced each year.
Explanation:By providing technical assistance and equipment, the ACI program strengthens partner governments' ability to seize cocaine destined for the United States from the Andean Region. This measure reflects the amount of cocaine seized by partner governments each year compared to the estimated cocaine produced each year. The baseline was 12.5% in 2001.
Measure: Proportion of client families that remain coca-free by 2010.
Explanation:This measure tracks the effectiveness of USAID assistance in encouraging families involved in growing illicit coca to join the licit economy. These populations represent citizens involved in or vulnerable to becoming involved in illicit (coca) production. The purpose of USAID assistance and services is to provide specific beneficiaries of the program with an alternative method of employment that does not involve illicit growing of coca. USAID has committed to collecting data for families in Peru and Colombia.
|Section 1 - Program Purpose & Design|
Is the program purpose clear?
Explanation: The purpose of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) is to cause the net reduction in illicit drug crop cultivation and trafficking through a combination of intense and consistent eradication, interdiction, organizational attack, and alternative development in key source and transit countries, including Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama and Brazil. ACI programs can accomplish this by improving the capacity of the partner nation to: eradicate illicit crops and provide the security for an increased respect for the rule of law and the substitution of licit crops for illicit crops; detect and interdict the movement of illicit drugs, precursor chemicals and money; and disrupt the operations of drug trafficking organizations and illegal armed groups by using, among things, arrests, extraditions and asset forfeiture.
Evidence: FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan (BPP) for the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL). FY 2002 State Department Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations accounts.
Does the program address a specific and existing problem, interest or need?
Explanation: ACI programs address two problems of national security interest to the United States. First, programs are aimed at attacking the source of 90% of the cocaine and 40% of the heroine entering the United States, as well as the social and economic conditions that have pushed the poor to cultivate illicit crops and allowed narcoterrorists and drug traffickers to prosper in the Andean region. Second, by strengthening law enforcement and military institutions in host countries, these programs promote stability and rule of law in the Western Hemisphere.
Evidence: INL's FY 2006 BPP defines the problem in the Goal Paper for ACI. The Department of State's Strategic Plan for FY 2004-2009 defines the problem of international drug trafficking in the Andean region.
Is the program designed so that it is not redundant or duplicative of any other Federal, state, local or private effort?
Explanation: The ACI account has primary responsibility for providing assistance to the governments of Andean countries to build their capacity in the areas of drug eradication, interdiction, alternative development and law enforcment/justice institution-building. This account funds activities by multiple USG agencies, including the State Department, USAID, DEA, DOJ, and DHS. The State Department has the lead in coordinating these various activities at the individual country level (through the US Embassy interagency process) in order to avoid duplication of effort.
Evidence: Foreign Assistance Act, Part 1, Chapter 8 gives the Department of State the mandate to provide foreign assistance to combat illegal drugs. The Mission Performance Plans (MPPs) for each U.S. Embassy in the Andean countries define roles and responsibilities for all USG agencies participating in counternarcotics activities. International efforts efforts are coordinated with the Dublin Group and the Organzization of American States (OAS).
Is the program design free of major flaws that would limit the program's effectiveness or efficiency?
Explanation: There is no strong evidence that another approach or mechanism would be more efficient or effective to achieve the intended purpose. The creation in FY 2002 of the separate and distinct ACI appropriation account was meant to strengthen the design and implementation of these diverse programs by linking the "carrot and stick" programs (i.e., alternative development/institution building/economic development and eradication/interdiction) into one account to ensure a holistic approach to the USG's counternarcotics efforts in the Andean region.
Evidence: FY 2002 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations accounts; 2003 GAO Inspection of Colombia and DOS response.
Is the program effectively targeted, so that resources will reach intended beneficiaries and/or otherwise address the program's purpose directly?
Explanation: At the macro level, ACI is targeted at countries that are major source and/or transit zones for drugs coming to the United States. At the country level, the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), USAID, the Department of Justice and other USG agencies provide assistance directly to those host country institutions and communities (e.g., national police, military, prosecutors, coca farmers) in the best position to impact the cultivation, processing and trafficking of illicit drugs.
Evidence: Draft ACI Strategic Plan; Source Zone strategies specify the efficiency and effectiveness of targeting the source of coca cultivation. USAID Peru Performance Monitoring Plan illustrates how alternative development is used to target coca growers.
|Section 1 - Program Purpose & Design||Score||100%|
|Section 2 - Strategic Planning|
Does the program have a limited number of specific long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes and meaningfully reflect the purpose of the program?
Explanation: This question received a "YES," because INL has long-term measures that meaningfully reflect its two primary program goals: reduced production of cocaine and increased drug interdiction. It should be noted, however, that although USAID has a long-term output measure for its alternative development programs in the Andean region, the agency has not yet developed long-term outcome measures for these programs that demonstrate desired end states.
Evidence: INL's FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan; FY 2006 Mission Performance Plans for Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador.
Does the program have ambitious targets and timeframes for its long-term measures?
Explanation: The program has ambitious targets and timeframes for its two long-term outcome goals: (1) an 80% reduction in processed cocaine by 2010 and (2) by 2008, Andean governments will seize 35% of cocaine produced in the region each year. As noted above, there are no long-term outcome measures, targets or timeframes for the alternative development component of the ACI program.
Evidence: INL's FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan
Does the program have a limited number of specific annual performance measures that can demonstrate progress toward achieving the program's long-term goals?
Explanation: The program has an annual measure ("reduce the cultivation of coca") that supports the long-term goal of reducing the production of cocain. The program also has an annual efficiency measure related to reducing the flying hour cost of aerial eradication of coca in Colombia. In addition, USAID has developed an annual output measure for its alternative development programs. It measures the number of hectares devoted to licit agricultural and/or forest products developed or expanded in areas receiving USAID assistance.
Evidence: INL's FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan; FY 2006 Mission Performance Plans for Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador.
Does the program have baselines and ambitious targets for its annual measures?
Explanation: The program has baselines and ambitious targets for the annual measures related to the cultivation of coca and the flying hour cost of aerial eradication of coca. USAID is developing baseline data and targets for the measure related to hectares of licit agricultural and forest products.
Evidence: INL's FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan
Do all partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) commit to and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program?
Explanation: There is no strong evidence that existing contractors or partners commit to INL's long-term or annual goals. However, it should be noted that INL is in the process of competing a new contract for its eradication and interdiction programs, and unlike previous contracts, this contract will be a performance-based contract. In addition, there is concern about the apparent lack of consultation and coordination between INL and USAID at the Washington headquarters' level regarding USAID's alternative development program goals, which are meant to complement INL's eradication goals. Finally, INL, USAID, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which is responsible for overseeing the President's National Drug Control Strategy, do not coordinate closely when setting long-term and annual goals. Agencies have committed to closer coordination in the future.
Evidence: Interagency agreements between INL and other USG agencies; Award Fee memo for Dyncorp contract
Are independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality conducted on a regular basis or as needed to support program improvements and evaluate effectiveness and relevance to the problem, interest, or need?
Explanation: The State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL), which administers the eradication and interdiction components of the ACI program, does not conduct regularly scheduled objective, high quality, independent evaluations of its ACI programs. USAID, which administers the alternative development programs under ACI, has contracted with private firms to conduct independent evaluations of elements of its ACI programs in Bolivia and Colombia, but it does not regularly schedule independent evaluations and has not contracted for evaluations of its programs in Peru or Ecuador, two of the four Andean countries in which it administers ACI programs.
Evidence: No evidence was provided of a program evaluation plan or schedule of program evaluations.
Are Budget requests explicitly tied to accomplishment of the annual and long-term performance goals, and are the resource needs presented in a complete and transparent manner in the program's budget?
Explanation: INL's annual budget requests are broken down by country and, within each country, by major program activity area. At the country level, INL relates budget requests to narrative descriptions of conditions in those countries. INL does not clarify, however, what the impact of funding decisions would be on expected performance, either at the country or program-wide level. The annual budget for INL is developed mostly with input from U.S. missions overseas. Mission budget requests follow INL's budget request guidance and are based on each embassy's MPP.
Evidence: INL's annual Congressional Budget Justification
Has the program taken meaningful steps to correct its strategic planning deficiencies?
Explanation: In the past year, INL has taken several meaningful steps to improve strategic planning. The Bureau is developing a new strategic logic model to guide all strategic planning documents, including Mission Performance Plans, Bureau Performance Plans, Letters of Agreement with partner foreign countries, and annual budget request documents. In addition, the new contract that INL is currently competing for its aviation program will be a performance-based contract. Finally, INL and USAID have committed to conducting closer consultation and coordination in the planning of their complementary program goals.
Evidence: INL's Strategic Logic Model; Revised formats for bilateral Letters of Agreement and Interagency Agreements demonstrate efforts to improve planning coordination with partners.
|Section 2 - Strategic Planning||Score||62%|
|Section 3 - Program Management|
Does the agency regularly collect timely and credible performance information, including information from key program partners, and use it to manage the program and improve performance?
Explanation: INL, through the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of the US Embassies in the various Andean countries, regularly collects statistics and performance data from host country partners regarding progress made on eradication, interdiction and arrests of narco-traffickers. INL uses the information to manage the program and allocate resources. An example is the decision by the NAS in Peru, based on performance data, to redirect financial support from an underperforming Amazon riverine project to a more effective port security project. Likewise, USAID requires its funding recipients to monitor and report performance information quarterly and uses this information to manage its programs. An example is USAID's decision last year to modify significantly its approach to alternative development in Peru. This question received a "NO," because USAID, as a key program partner and implementing agency, does not regularly report its performance information to INL, which has overall responsibility for the ACI account. This lack of reporting impacts program planning and coordination, which is necessary because the INL and USAID programs are meant to complement one another in a "carrot and stick" approach to combatting drug trafficking in the region.
Evidence: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)--an annual report compiled by INL on counternarcotics activities worldwide, including in the Andean Region. Quarterly NAS reports to Washington; "Aircraft Inventory, Status and Flying Time" (a report on aviation activities that is used to manage air operations); USAID's Operating Unit Annual Reports and Operating Unit Performance Management Plans; USAID's ADS 202.3.6, which includes the following topics: Assessing Performance of Contractors and Recipients; Using Customer Feedback; Making Necessary Adjustments."
Are Federal managers and program partners (including grantees, sub-grantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners) held accountable for cost, schedule and performance results?
Explanation: Both INL and USAID include in contracts, grants and cooperative agreements clauses related to periodic progress/performance and financial reporting which are used to monitor activities and hold partners accountable. INL and USAID also include performance goals in bilateral Letters of Agreement and Strategic Objective Agreements with host governments. Although USAID provided evidence of an evaluation mechanism for its program managers, this question received a "NO," because INL did not provide evidence that standards for the performance of its ACI program managers had been established.
Evidence: Bilateral Letters of Agreement with partner countries include some accountability language. The End Use Monitoring Report is an annual report showing accountability for proper use of equipment provided by INL to host countries. USAID designates a cognizant technical officer (CTO) for each Latin America Bureau activity to manage contractors and grantees, and CTOs are evaluated for effective management of these agreements.
Are funds (Federal and partners') obligated in a timely manner and spent for the intended purpose?
Explanation: This question received a "YES" because the program obligates funds consistent with the overall program plan, is not in violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, and does not have significant erroneous payments. However, it should be noted that the program's unobligated funds at the end of the year averaged over $100 million for the past two fiscal years. These unobligated balances were due in part to Congressional certification requirements and holds that delayed INL's receipt of the actual funding. For example, in FY 2003 INL did not receive Congressional clearance to obligate ACI funds until May 30.
Evidence: INL's Financial Management Activity Reports (FMARs) are accounting tools to monitor quarterly expenditure of funds. Advice of Allotments demonstrate the procedures to allot funds to US embassies for ACI projects ; USAID's Phoenix Flash Reports and ADS 602 (Forward Funding Policy for Program Funds).
Does the program have procedures (e.g. competitive sourcing/cost comparisons, IT improvements, appropriate incentives) to measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness in program execution?
Explanation: INL has procedures for employees to follow regarding, for example, use of Purchase Authorizations and End-Use Monitoring, but, while these focus on compliance with rules and laws, they do not standardize procedures that measure and achieve efficiencies and cost effectiveness. INL is investing in IT solutions that will directly link procurement invoicing to a new local accounting system which will lead to fewer accounting and invoice errors.
Evidence: INL Procurement Policies and Procedures Handbook; INL Financial Management and Property Tools
Does the program collaborate and coordinate effectively with related programs?
Explanation: At the individual country level, the US Ambassador and the interagency team at the embassy in the host country, with guidance from Washington, decide the annual strategy for each country consistent with the President's National Drug Control Strategy. This interagency coordination is reflected in the annual Mission Performance Plan, a joint planning document that assigns responsibilities for each relevant agency. INL's Narcotics Affairs Section at each embassy and USAID's in-country team base their annual program plans and budget requests on these embassy-wide planning documents.
Evidence: Annual Mission Performance Plans; Peru NAS Director's agendas for weekly interagency counternarcotics meetings; Office of Latin Programs list of coordination meetings.
Does the program use strong financial management practices?
Explanation: INL currently has weak financial management systems that raise concerns about the bureau's ability to track, reconcile, and accurately report on unobligated balances. An internal review found that INL's current financial management system is inadequate to support its programs. Specifically, INL is unable to produce accurate and timely information (e.g., unit or overall costs, pipeline, burn rate) that would support day-to-day resource allocations or trade-off decisions. It should be noted, however, that INL plans to implement a new financial management system in August 2004 that is designed to rectify these problems.
Evidence: INL's Financial Management Handbook provides the bureau's guidelines for managing funds. USAID's ADS 620 chapter provides the overarching accounting and financial reporting principles and standards for the Agency. USAID's Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) checklist.
Has the program taken meaningful steps to address its management deficiencies?
Explanation: INL has undertaken a number of initiatives to address management deficiencies. They include developing new country and regional strategic plans and a new Strategic Model, a top-to-bottom review of ACI and the aviation programs, updated Letter of Agreement and Interagency Agreement procedures, an updated Financial Management Activity Report model, and other initiatives. INL has created a new Program Assistance and Evaluation Division to look into management and program evaluation and has given that division a broad mandate to address management needs. The bureau's Financial Management Handbook has been updated and reissued, and the Procurement Handbook is being reviewed.
Evidence: Strategic Logic Model; revised Financial Management Handbook; Program Assistance and Evaluation Execution Plan; Revised LOA instructions.
|Section 3 - Program Management||Score||43%|
|Section 4 - Program Results/Accountability|
Has the program demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals?
Explanation: Data for 2003, the most recent data available, reveals that INL is on track to meet or exceed its long-term goals for reducing the production of pure cocaine and interdicting drug shipments from the Andean Region. Working towards the long-term goal of reducing the production of pure cocaine from the baseline level of 995 metric tons in 2001 to 210 metric tons by 2010, INL's target for 2003 was 759 metric tons. INL exceeded this target by 94 metric tons. The actual amount of pure cocaine produced in 2003 was 665 metric tons. Likewise, INL's long-term goal for interdiction by Andean law enforcement organizations is to increase the annual level of drug seizures to 35% by 2008. INL's target for seizures in 2003 was 18%. The actual percentage of drugs seized that year was 21.2%. It should be noted that the reason this question is receiving a "LARGE EXTENT" rather than a "YES" is because USAID has not yet developed a long-term outcome measure for its alternative development programs and does not have baseline data or targets against which to gauge progress towards its long-term output measure for these programs.
Evidence: INL's FY 2006 Bureau Performance Plan and Mission Performance Plans for the Andean Region countries; FY 2004 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).
Does the program (including program partners) achieve its annual performance goals?
Explanation: This question received a "Small Extent," because in 2003, the most recent year for which data is available, INL met its target for reducing the number of hectares under coca cultivation from 205,450 hectares in 2002 to 173,000 hectares in 2003. Data for other annual goals does not support a rating higher than "Small Extent."
Evidence: June 2004 USG publication entitled "Major Narcotics Producing Countries: Cultivation and Production Estimates, 1999-2003."
Does the program demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness in achieving program goals each year?
Explanation: No evidence was provided to demonstrate improved efficiencies or cost effectiveness over the prior year. In fact, FY 2003 data for this program's efficiency measure (reduced cost of aerial eradication per flying hour) showed an increase in program cost over FY 2002. However, INL anticipated this increase as well as an increase in FY 2004. Gains are not expected until FY 2006, after the aircraft refurbishment program has begun.
Does the performance of this program compare favorably to other programs, including government, private, etc., with similar purpose and goals?
Explanation: There are no other programs that have the depth or breadth of the ACI effort in the Andes. Programs sponsored by the United Nations, Organization of American States, and other countries are small, relatively new, and lack the overall focus of the ACI effort. Thus there is no real basis for comparison.
Do independent evaluations of sufficient scope and quality indicate that the program is effective and achieving results?
Explanation: Although independent reports historically have not tended to indicate that this program is achieving results throughout the Andean region, this question received a "Small Extent," because a July 2004 GAO report noted that the U.S. Government's counternarcotics strategy for Colombia has resulted in a 33% reduction in the amount of coca cultivated in Colombia over the last two years and a 10% reduction in the amount of opium poppy cultivated over the last year. The report also found that "U.S. nonmilitary assistance to Colombia is beginning to show intended results, but programs are not readily sustainable." In addition, a July 2003 independent evaluation of USAID's market access and poverty alleviation program in Bolivia found that "each component is making good progress."
Evidence: July 2004 GAO report titled "U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is Beginning to Show Intended Results, but Programs Are Not Readily Sustainable." July 2003 report titled "Evaluation of the Market Access and Poverty Alleviation Project in Bolivia."
|Section 4 - Program Results/Accountability||Score||34%|