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For Immediate Release
May 14, 2002
The Outlook for Peace in the Sudan
Report to the President of the United States on
The Outlook for Peace in Sudan
From John C. Danforth
Special Envoy For Peace
April 26, 2002
Report to the President
When you introduced me at a Rose Garden ceremony as your Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan, you eloquently expressed the anguish felt by many Americans for the suffering of the Sudanese people. You said that it was time to bring some sanity to Sudan. You gave me a mandate: to determine the commitment to peace by the parties to the Sudan conflict, and to recommend whether the United States should engage energetically in efforts to bring a just peace to that country.
Afterwards, I discussed possible approaches to fulfilling my mandate with Secretary of State Colin Powell, Assistant Secretary of State Walter Kansteiner, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and others. Based on these discussions, I decided that the most effective approach would be a catalytic one that encouraged and harmonized the peace initiatives of countries neighboring Sudan, especially Egypt and Kenya, and that engaged interested countries such as Canada, Norway, Switzerland, certain members of the European Union and others in a common effort to support peace. The United States would not create its own peace plan to compete with those plans already in existence. Instead, we would encourage advocates of existing plans to move forward in cooperation with one another. Nor would we attempt to arbitrate the competing claims of the parties in Sudan. Rather, we would test the prospects for a dynamic peace process in which the United States might be a participant.
During these preliminary discussions, we also agreed that my responsibilities might include two trips to Sudan and its neighbors, and a trip to Europe; that I would issue a report in approximately six months; and that, if you so directed, I would be available as needed in future peace negotiations.
An outstanding group of professionals assisted me in carrying out my mission, led by retired Foreign Service Officer Robert Oakley. The team also includes Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Charlie Snyder, Coordinator for Sudan Affairs Jeff Millington, Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council Michael Miller, and U.S. Agency for International Development Assistant Administrator Roger Winter.
ENGAGING THE PARTIES
To fulfill my mandate, I twice traveled to Sudan to meet with the senior leadership of the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the chief antagonists in the Sudan conflict, as well as numerous other groups and individuals of civil society. I traveled extensively in Sudan, visiting areas affected by the war, drought and human dislocation. The human suffering I witnessed was staggering. I talked to people who had been attacked by government helicopters and had fled to the bush with nothing but the clothes on their backs. I talked to others who had been abducted by marauding Arab raiders, subjected to unspeakable brutality, separated from their children and reduced to lives of servitude. I also met many Sudanese who were struggling to hold to their faith in the face of privation and attack. One of my most memorable experiences was an open air Episcopal service near a bombed out church in the small southern town of Rumbek. The faith of the congregation was something that I will always treasure.
I met with President Moi of Kenya, President Museveni of Uganda, and President Mubarak of Egypt to discuss their countries' efforts to help bring a just peace to Sudan. All expressed the belief that the active engagement of the United States offered the only hope for finally bringing this conflict to an end. In Europe, I coordinated with our British, Norwegian and Italian allies, and discussed the religious situation with the Vatican and the Archbishop of Canterbury. In New York I reviewed UN humanitarian efforts in Sudan. I also reached out to members of Congress and activist groups engaged in Sudan. While there were differences about how we could best contribute to ending the conflict, the underlying message was one of support for your peace initiative and a plea for committed United States engagement.
DEVELOPING HUMANITARIAN PROPOSALS TO "TEST" THE PARTIES
I decided to take a different approach to the Sudanese parties in fulfilling my mandate. The history of Sudan is littered with dozens of proposals and agreements to end the fighting. These agreements all have one thing in common: none was implemented, and none brought Sudan closer to peace. After 18 years, with over two million dead and over 4.5 million refugees and internally displaced, the war continued. Therefore, instead of drafting yet more new comprehensive peace agreements, I decided to test the parties' commitment by submitting to them a series of concrete proposals that would challenge them politically while at the same time reduce the suffering of the Sudanese. I worked closely in developing these proposals with Administrator for the Agency of International Development Andrew Natsios, your Special Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, and especially with one of his chief assistants, Roger Winter. Natsios and Winter are very experienced with Sudan. They agreed with me that it was vital that we coordinate the humanitarian and development programs of USAID and other donor countries with my mission to demonstrate to the Sudanese that movement toward peace would produce both short-term benefits and the prospect of long-term rewards.
We devised four proposals, all based on three basic premises. The proposals focused first and foremost on protecting ordinary Sudanese civilians who often find themselves caught between the two opposing parties. Second, they obliged the parties to change past patterns of behavior and to make tough political choices. Third, the proposals provided for international involvement and monitoring so as to maximize the chances of being respected. Previous agreements did not provide for international involvement and often collapsed because of the intense distrust of the parties who could not monitor compliance and verify implementation. Our proposals were designed to avoid this failure. (International involvement has the added advantage of making it harder for the world to turn a blind eye to the suffering and injustice that is the reality in Sudan.)
The four proposals addressed specific areas of human suffering in Sudan. I presented the outlines of these proposals to the parties during my November visit to the region. Three weeks later a joint State/USAID/DOD team returned to Sudan to follow up. The negotiations were intense because we were asking both sides to put the well-being and protection of the people and the prospects of peace above considerations of short-term military advantage. After eighteen years of war, this was not easy. Nevertheless, by dint of persuasion, pressure and perseverance, we were eventually able to secure agreement to all four of the proposals, as discussed below.
During my first trip, however, we received only vague verbal commitments on three of the four proposals. We encountered stiff resistance to our proposal to end intentional military attacks against civilians, particularly bombing by Sudanese Government aircraft and use of helicopter gunships. Both sides were prepared to commit themselves verbally to not attacking civilians, but the Government resisted setting up an international mechanism to ensure compliance. It took over three months of intensive, painstaking negotiations, but in late March we were also successful in reaching agreement on this proposal.
As difficult as it has been to reach agreements on paper, it is essential to recognize that the end product of past efforts has been paper agreements and nothing more. The history of Sudan is replete with paper agreements that the parties have quickly ignored. Repeatedly throughout my mission, starting with the first visit, I told both sides that I was far less interested in what the parties promised than in what they did. Implementation was what would count.
This distinction between promises and action was clear throughout my mission. Prior to my November trip, the Government of Sudan promised that I could travel to the Nuba Mountains. Two days before my visit (which did occur despite the warnings), government artillery shelled the landing strip on which I was scheduled to arrive. In another instance, the Government of Sudan tentatively agreed to our proposal not to intentionally attack civilians. Three days later, a military helicopter strafed a World Food Program feeding site, killing at least seventeen civilians. In light of these incidents (and many more), I would condition participation by the United States in a peace process upon concrete implementation of and full compliance with all agreements.
Here is a brief description of the four proposals and their implementation to date. The texts of the four agreed proposals with more details on the implementation are contained in the annex.
Cease-fire and comprehensive relief and rehabilitation program for the Nuba Mountains region
This area of African and Christian influence had been under siege for almost two decades by the Government, which used military force and starvation as weapons, and which applied cultural and religious pressures against the people who live there. The government had allowed no relief into certain targeted areas of the Nuba Mountains for thirteen years to reinforce food pressures upon the population.
We first proposed and obtained a four-week cease-fire to allow for food drops. I then proposed during my first visit to extend the stand-down from military action to allow the relief agencies to work, to establish a formal, internationally monitored cease-fire, and to implement a comprehensive relief and rehabilitation program for the entire region. We also had a broader objective: to educate the parties as to what would be involved in a comprehensive cease-fire, and to begin to develop their confidence in working with each other and with us in a practical, non-political manner.
The Government and the SPLM both agreed to a written proposal during the December visit of the State/USAID/DOD team headed by Jeff Millington. Subsequent, detailed negotiations to work out the verification procedures, international monitors and the Joint Military Commission combining Sudanese parties and the international observers were held successfully in January in Switzerland, under Swiss chairmanship, with Swiss and American facilitators. The cease-fire continues to hold on the ground. Some freedom of access between GOS and SPLM controlled areas has also developed.
The Norwegian Government has taken the lead with our support in the international monitoring effort that will put from 15 to 25 monitors on the ground in the region to ensure the compliance of the parties. The first monitors have arrived and the Joint Military Committee has begun to function satisfactorily. Monitors and funding to date have come from Italy, France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. USAID also worked with UN relief agencies to complete the survey of relief and rehabilitation requirements. Relief and development supplies have begun to flow into the region with locally granted flight clearances. This is a complete departure from the previous Sudanese Government refusal to grant access except under great pressure with approval at the top level of government.
Days of Tranquility
This proposal was aimed at enhancing the provision of relief to needy Sudanese by having the parties agree to specific periods when they would stand-down military action to allow the relief agencies to work. The proposal focused on eradication programs for polio, guinea worm and bovine rinderpest. Sudan contains some of the largest remaining reservoirs in the world of all three diseases.
For the parties to stand-down militarily and to allow relief personnel unhindered and continuing access to specified areas during specified periods to implement eradication programs.
There has been a great deal of confusion concerning the three elements of the Days of Tranquility proposal and where the responsibility lies for delays. In some cases, bureaucratic misunderstandings on the part of implementing donors as well as the Sudanese Government and the SPLM are at fault. In the case of Guinea worm, the program is not yet ready to move ahead even though the parties approved it in January. Nevertheless, in the case of the polio program, which was initially held up by GOS flight denials and an incident in which SPLM militia captured, beat and robbed one group of polio vaccinators, implementation is now steadily improving. The bovine rinderpest program has also been completed. However, given the continuing uncertainty about this proposal, I recommend that the United States engage directly with the parties to remove the confusion over Zones of Tranquility and to ensure that its implementation proceed without any interference by either the GOS or the SPLM. The uncertainties, delays and doubts highlight the need for greater clarity and care on all sides in preparing, presenting and carrying out humanitarian activities in regions of military and political sensitivity.
Attacks Against Civilians
This proposal was intended to prevent intentional, wanton attacks (often by government bombers and helicopter gunships) against innocent civilians. As stated earlier, Government helicopters recently fired into a crowd of 4,000 Sudanese villagers waiting to receive food at a World Food Program feeding site, killing at least seventeen and wounding many more. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and associated militia have also targeted relief operations and civilian targets.
For the parties to reconfirm their commitment not to intentionally attack civilians and civilian facilities such as schools, hospitals and relief sites, and to establish an international verification mechanism to confirm compliance.
Both parties have signed the agreement. The United States is now pulling together an international consortium to establish the verification mechanism and will take the lead in providing both financial and personnel support to ensure success. The mechanism will be headquartered in Khartoum with a secondary office in Rumbek and will be staffed by approximately 15 experienced professionals.
There is probably no issue other than civilian bombings that concerns Americans more than the continued existence of slavery in Sudan. The record is clear: The Government arms and directs marauding raiders who operate in the south, destroying villages and abducting women and children to serve as chattel servants, herders and field hands.
The proposal commits the Government to strengthen and make effective its own anti-slavery commission. It further commits both parties to facilitate the visit of a U.S.-led, internationally supported mission of eight eminent persons to undertake an assessment of the situation and make recommendations to the parties and others on practical measures that can be taken to end such abuses.
The Government has strengthened its commission by bringing it under the direct control of the President of Sudan, and by selecting a respected vice-minister as the new Commission Chairman. For our part, the U.S. Department of State has organized the Mission of Inquiry under the leadership of former Voice of America Deputy Penn Kemble and Ambassador George Moose. The British, Norwegians, Italians and French have very experienced and eminent persons participating in the Mission that completed its first visit to the region on April 18. The Mission is expected to make specific action recommendations whose implementation will be encouraged, supported and observed by its very capable team of Technical Advisors headed by an American, Elizabeth Jackson. In addition, USAID and the Department of State are making funds available to promote reconciliation between the southern Dinka tribe (the victims of the slave raids) and the tribes of the marauding raiders.
EFFORTS TO END THE CONFLICT
I made it clear throughout that the United States does not intend to launch a new ""American"" peace initiative. There are already too many peace initiatives for Sudan and our objective should be to consolidate these initiatives, not add to them. Also, rather than denigrating the work of the Kenyans, the Egyptians and others, we should encourage them to cooperate with each other and build upon their past efforts.
I have been impressed with the efforts of President Moi to breathe new life into the peace process Kenya is spear-heading for the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the regional grouping of East African states. President Moi met me three times to discuss peace and could not have been clearer in committing his own personal prestige to an early peace agreement in Sudan. He received a reinforced mandate from the IGAD Summit in Khartoum in March and has appointed the very capable Army Chief of Staff, General Lazarus Sumbeiywo, to be the Kenyan Envoy to the peace process. General Sumbeiywo is working hard to bring the Sudanese Government and the SPLM together around a negotiating framework that seeks to address the legitimate grievances and aspirations of the southern Sudanese in the context of efforts to maintain the unity of the country.
Egypt had also developed its own initiative to bring peace to Sudan. This Joint Initiative (with Libya) focused more on broader national issues than that of the Kenyans. In the past, the two have appeared to be at odds, and the existence of two peace initiatives allowed the Sudanese parties to favor one or the other to advance their own interests and avoid difficult decisions about peace.
I spoke to both President Moi and President Mubarak about coordinating their efforts to make them complementary rather than competitive. Both reacted positively. President Moi emphasized the importance of Egypt to peace in Sudan, and asked the help of the U.S. in seeking to harmonize their two initiatives. President Mubarak assured me he wanted to work with Kenya, that he was prepared to harmonize the Egyptian initiative with that of IGAD, and that he would welcome direct discussions to this end. He reviewed with me his view of the situation, especially in light of the terrible events of September 11, which make Muslim-Christian agreement all the more important. I consider President Mubarak's views on Sudan and the Egyptian commitment to increased cooperation with IGAD to be a major advance. Since my meeting with President Mubarak, General Sumbeiywo has visited Cairo to discuss better coordination. He is now working on how to bring Egypt into the negotiating process, an effort we should support vigorously.
The newfound cooperation and coordination between the U.S. and interested European governments is, I believe, another positive development. In the past, exaggerated differences in approaches between the United States and Europe have had an impact upon the Sudanese to the detriment of efforts to encourage peace. Recently, greatly improved communication and coordination between the United States and Europe have increased our joint and separate potential to work for the relief of suffering in Sudan, and to encourage progress toward peace.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The principal conclusion of my mission is that the war is not winnable by either side in terms of achieving their present objectives. Therefore this is the time for a major push for a compromise settlement. I believe that both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM have given sufficient indications that they want peace to warrant the energetic participation of the United States in a long-term peace process. Leaders of both sides have stated their desire for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and have encouraged American involvement. During April, both sides have offered proposals to IGAD that suggest rethinking of previously held positions. With respect to the four test proposals, both sides have shown that it is possible to agree on contentious issues and to permit international monitoring of the implementation of their agreements.
The Nuba Mountains agreement, relating to one of the most hotly contested regions of the country, is extraordinary. The cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains is holding; international monitors are arriving; and a long-term relief and rehabilitation effort is beginning. The impact of this successful agreement has given the people of the Nuba Mountains a new life, and in other parts of Sudan it has provided a powerful argument for peace that is not lost upon the Government or the SPLM. Agreements on the slavery mission and attacks against civilians are equally encouraging. With sustained implementation, they will provide further evidence that peace is possible.
However, progress even on the four test points has been exceedingly difficult, and such agreement as has been reached has been grudging. Both sides want the conflict resolved, but on their own terms. Great suspicion still exists on both sides, and the fighting continues, centered at present in the Upper Nile Province. Both sides view progress as a zero sum game, with any advantage to one side seen as a disadvantage to the other.
Difficulties with the Days of Tranquility initiative illustrate the problem. We see the Days of Tranquility as improving the health of Sudanese and building confidence between the combatants. However, the Government of Sudan tries to manipulate the process to tighten control of supplies going to SPLM areas, and the SPLM insists that UN operated flights neither originate in nor fly over land controlled by the government.
The extreme difficulty of reaching agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM underscores the essential importance of outside intermediaries in a peace process, including the United States. However, the usefulness of outside assistance will depend on the willingness of the parties to live up to the commitments they make. I believe that any participation by the United States should be reviewed continually in light of the ongoing willingness of the parties to implement their agreements, and that a breakdown in the implementation of the four test agreements would bring into question the parties' commitment to peace.
MY OBSERVATIONS ON KEY ISSUES
In the event that the United States will opt to participate in a sustained peace process for Sudan, I offer the following thoughts on substantive issues that must be addressed and on some procedural steps we should take. It is up to the parties to determine their own positions on these issues on which they have strongly held views. It is not up to me or the United States or other outside parties. However, they are critical issues that the U.S. as well as the parties need to consider carefully. In the course of genuine movement toward peace the views of the parties may evolve.
I. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Both the discovery of significant oil reserves, especially in the south, and the advent of serious production in 1999 have reshaped Sudan's civil war. (Sudan has proven oil reserves of over one billion barrels and prospects of an additional one to four billion barrels.) No enduring settlement to Sudan's war can be achieved unless the oil dimension is effectively addressed. The SPLM regards oil as a southern endowment that the government has forcibly exploited to finance a war strategy that relies increasingly on expensive, highly lethal weapons. For its part, the government regards oil fields as vulnerable, strategic assets, which it seeks to defend preemptively through attacks upon southern insurgents and their alleged civilian supporters. The recent reconciliation between John Garang and Riak Machar, and Garang's statements on impending attacks by the SPLA, are seen by the Sudanese Government as a serious Nuer-Dinka threat to the oil fields, justifying a military response including attacks on civilians.
Any peace process should address the oil issue in order to resolve a major cause of conflict and to serve as the basis for a just peace. The fair allocation of oil resources could be the key to working out broader political issues if it were possible to find a monetary formula for sharing oil revenue between the central government and the people of the south. It might be possible to find some formula acceptable to both the SPLM and the GOS for cessation of the current conflict over the oil fields before a final peace agreement.
International oil companies and foreign investors capable of making the investment needed to realize Sudan's oil potential are more likely to venture into Sudan if there is peace and political stability than in current circumstances. That fact should serve as a powerful incentive for the Sudanese Government and the SPLM to reach agreement. Any such arrangements will, however, require extensive discussion and analysis and will require reliable mechanisms with international monitoring to guarantee the integrity of whatever revenue-sharing formula is agreed upon.
Since shortly after my appointment as Special Envoy, I have urged our government to draw upon experts in various departments to develop our best thinking on how the distribution of oil revenues might further the cause of peace in Sudan. Some promising work is being done by non-governmental organizations to assemble a profile of Sudan's oil sector and explore revenue-sharing options. I continue to believe that such a work product would be valuable for consideration in a peace process.
Southern Sudanese have consistently experienced mistreatment at the hands of governments in the north, including racial, cultural and religious intolerance and restricted access to the nation's resources. Any peace agreement must address the injustices suffered by the southern Sudanese people.
Southern Sudanese have claimed the right of self-determination as a means of protecting themselves against persecution; however, there are different views of what self-determination means in Sudan's future.
The view that self-determination includes the guaranteed option of secession is contained in the IGAD Declaration of Principles, and is supported by many Sudanese. However, secession would be strongly resisted by the Government of Sudan, and would be exceedingly difficult to achieve.
A more feasible, and, I think, preferable view of self-determination would ensure the right of the people of southern Sudan to live under a government that respects their religion and culture. Such a system would require robust internal and external guarantees so that any promises made by the Government in peace negotiations could not be ignored in practice.
In Sudan, no single issue is more divisive than the relationship between religion and the state. Differences between Muslims and Christians are so sharp that there is no communication or understanding between the two faiths.
The depth of the problem first became clear to me at a joint meeting of Muslim and Christian clergy during my November 2001 trip to Khartoum. Muslim clergy insisted that religion is not an issue in Sudan, that Shari'a law has no application to non-Muslims, and that all Sudanese are free to practice their faiths. The Christian clergy responded to the Muslims' assertion with vehemence and anger, reciting a list of grievances, including the teaching of Islam and Arabic in schools and the government's tear-gassing of the Episcopal cathedral during Holy Week, 2000.
As striking as the contentiousness of the meeting were the words of appreciation separately expressed afterwards. Both Muslims and Christians said that, before the meeting, they had not known each other, and had not previously heard the other side express its views.
The hostility of Christians to the Islamic government was strongly expressed by Christian clergy at a meeting I had with them during my January 2002 trip. I convened the meeting to explore whether they would support the creation in the near future of a system for mediating religious grievances, even before a peace agreement. Their very negative response was that such a system would not work, and that the only way for Christians to deal with the government was by ""self-determination."" By including the right to self-determination in any peace agreement, they believed they would be protected in the event the elements of an agreement on religious rights were not implemented.
Whatever the assertions by the government and by Muslims that religious freedom exists in Sudan, I do not believe that an enduring and just peace will come to the country if a substantial number of citizens believes the government persecutes them. A number of people told me that their sense of being persecuted involves race, ethnicity and culture, but it clearly involves religion.
Any peace negotiation must address the relationship between religion and government openly, frankly, and at length, perhaps with the mediation of Muslim and Christian leaders from outside Sudan. Because the political division of the country is not a practical solution to the problem of religion, it is also important to explore other ways of guaranteeing religious freedom. Mere verbal assertions of tolerance will not satisfy non-Muslims, for the existing constitution of Sudan purports to assure religious freedom.
The key will be to create guarantees of religious freedom, which could be either internal or external. Internal guarantees would entail a judicial means of enforcing religious rights, which may be unrealistic in the short-term. External guarantees would include international monitoring of religious freedom with a system of ""carrots and sticks"" for enforcing religious rights.
Drafting a comprehensive peace agreement that assures religious and cultural freedom and the equitable distribution of money from oil revenue, or provides the other functions of government would require careful thought. Subjects that must be considered include the division of power between central and regional governments, the method of selecting government leaders at all levels, and ways of enforcing individual rights.
I have been told that there are at least a dozen different significant politico-tribal factions in southern Sudan as well as influential religious and other civil society groups. A similar situation prevails in northern Sudan where there are a number of influential politico-religious parties, ethnic, regional and civil society groups and a politically powerful army as well as the existing government. It will be important to ensure that these various groupings have the ability to make their views known and to participate in decisions relating to peace and the political future of Sudan.
e) Internal and external guarantees.
As pointed out elsewhere in this report, agreements reached on paper have little value in Sudan unless there are mechanisms for enforcement. Without enforcement, the United States could invest much effort and prestige in working out an arrangement that, while sounding good when it is announced, would soon evaporate. Internal guarantees, enshrined in Sudanese law, are worth pursuing. But until Sudan has a credible legal system and an enforceable constitution with political and popular commitments to respect it, meaningful complementary guarantees will have to be provided by other countries or regional or international organizations. The United States should consider in advance the form and extent of whatever guarantees it is willing to provide and which other countries and organizations could usefully be involved. This could include IGAD, the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as well as an ad hoc group of states. An idea that might be worth considering is the establishment by the UNSC of a special committee to monitor the implementation of a peace agreement and report at regular intervals to the Council on any problem that warrants consideration and possible action to correct.
II. HOW TO PROCEED
I believe the same principles that have governed my work as Special Envoy should apply to any further participation by the United States in a peace process.
At the time of my appointment, we realized that, while the United States could be a catalyst, it could not impose a solution on Sudan. Peace in Sudan will depend on the degree to which the combatants want it, and that, in turn, will be determined by actions not promises. It is also they, not the U.S. or other outsiders, who must decide upon basic issues such as those discussed above.
We have put forth four tests of the will of the combatants, each of which meets humanitarian needs, each of which requires sometime difficult political decisions, and each of which entails external monitoring of compliance. Collectively, their continued implementation will constitute significant movement towards a peace agreement as well as reduction in hostilities. Those four proposals should continue to measure the commitment of the Sudanese. Other, limited proposals may emerge which could provide more stepping-stones towards a full, just peace.
We have correctly decided that the United States should not develop its own peace plan. We should continue to actively encourage and assist other countries in the region that have advanced peace plans to work together, especially Egypt and Kenya. We should continue to urge European and other countries interested in peace in Sudan to participate in measures such as monitoring the cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains and verification of the agreement protecting civilians, and to support regional efforts to promote an overall agreement on just peace. The considerable progress made to date needs to be pursued without any loss of momentum. I believe any future participation by the United States in a peace process should follow this catalytic approach.
The participation by the United States in the search for peace, while being collaborative and catalytic, must also be energetic and effective. At the least, this means that we would have to enhance our presently light diplomatic presence in Sudan in order to be effective participants in a sustained, intensive peace process. Also, we should strengthen the amount of interagency personnel resources in Washington dedicated to Sudan and consider increasing our support for the IGAD secretariat.
Finally, through USAID, the United States should continue to accord Sudan a high priority, especially by providing humanitarian and developmental assistance in the south of Sudan. In so doing, the U.S. should coordinate closely with other donors. Also, we should work with other donors in the north, where legally we may provide only humanitarian aid, and if the prospects of peace improve, we should consider removing restrictions on the form of aid we could offer to the north.
John C. Danforth