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 Home > News & Policies > November 2001

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
November 14, 2001

Fact Sheet on New Strategic Framework with Russia
Fact Sheet on New Strategic Framework with Russia

In a major address on May 1st, President Bush called for a new strategic framework to transform our relationship with Russia - from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests.  Since that time, the United States and Russia have engaged in an intensive dialogue toward this end.  Our nations are pursuing deeper and broader cooperation on a range of political, economic, and security issues, including the fight against terrorism.

Nuclear weapons should no longer be at the center of U.S.-Russian relations in a day and age when neither country is the enemy of the other.  We believe that the current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect the strategic realities of today.  Therefore, the United States and Russia have confirmed their respective commitments to implement substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons.  President Bush has announced that, for the United States, this will result in a level of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads.  President Putin has stated that Russia will try to respond in kind.

Russia and the United States have different views of the ABM Treaty and strategic defenses.  This issue is only one element of our broader relationship.  Our differences on this issue will not delay progress in other areas.  And we remain committed to continued consultations on a new strategic framework that enables us to meet the new threats of the 21st century together, as true partners and friends, not adversaries.

Finally, the United States and Russia reaffirm their mutual commitment to strengthen efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  We agree that urgent attention must continue to be given to improving the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials of all possessor states, and preventing illicit nuclear trafficking.  We also will explore the potential for cooperative efforts in consequence management, drawing on our respective capabilities to respond to biological incidents.

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